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Abstract
We consider the subject of tolerance of the most severe kind of faults, namely Byzantine
faults, through state machine replication in asynchronous environments such as the Internet.
In Byzantine-fault-tolerant (BFT) state machine replication, state consistency among the
replicas of a service is maintained by first agreeing on the order of requests to be processed
(agreement or atomic broadcast phase) and then executing the requests in the agreed-upon
order (execution phase).
We propose a methodology for constructing asynchronous BFT replication protocols
that leverage perceived normal conditions for parsimony and do not compromise correctness
even when such perceptions are inaccurate. Parsimony is to be as frugal as possible for
a given metric of interest. We apply this methodology to obtain parsimonious protocols
that achieve efficiency in three metrics: (1) overall resource use of request execution, (2)
message complexity of atomic broadcast, and (3) latency degree of atomic broadcast. We
then present a suite of group management protocols that allow for the dynamic change of the
composition of the replication group. Our parsimonious protocols are designed to withstand
corruptions of at most one-third of the replicas and do not require the removal of suspected
faulty replicas in order to provide liveness. Such a design allows for the enforcement of very
selective and conservative policies regarding changes to the replication group membership.
We describe the implementation of the protocols within a reusable software framework.
We also present the experimental evaluation of our protocols in the context of a representative
application in both LAN and WAN (Planetlab) settings under both fault-free and controlled
fault injection scenarios.
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Today, networked information systems (NISs) have become pervasive. Every aspect of so-
ciety, be it energy, transportation, business, finance, defense, telecommunications, or man-
ufacturing, is dependant on NISs for gathering, processing, and distributing information.
Military command and control, communication infrastructure, aviation control, and electric
power control grids are all dependant on NISs. The ever-increasing dependency on NISs is
naturally accompanied by ever-increasing concerns for the potential consequences of failures
of NISs. These concerns are only compounded by the increasingly sophisticated, effective,
and numerous attacks by amateurs (through readily available tools and scripts), insiders,
cyber-terrorist organizations, and rogue nations on NISs (particularly on high-value targets).
In the light of such concerns, the need to make NISs trustworthy has never been more crucial.
The trustworthiness of an NIS is judged by its ability to continually meet stated goals despite
accidents, design and implementation errors, operator errors, and malicious attacks [Sch99].
1.1 Current Approaches for Trustworthiness Despite
Malicious Attacks
There are several approaches for enhancing trustworthiness in the presence of malicious
attacks. It is now widely recognized that a “defense-in-depth” strategy that combines two
or more of the following approaches may be more effective than the disjointed employment
of just one specific approach.
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The traditional security approach to enhancing trustworthiness aims to build systems
that are equipped with defense mechanisms to prevent malicious attacks from becoming
intrusions. It also tries to identify vulnerabilities in components either by rigorous testing
before deployment or from successful attacks after deployment, and patches them. Although
this approach has been effective in handling a good number of malicious attacks, practical
experience shows that most (if not all) systems remain vulnerable, at least to some extent.
This is particularly true for large and complex NISs, in which the correct functioning of an
application can depend on the possibly complex interactions of software running on many
nodes.
The fault tolerance approach to enhancing trustworthiness in the face of malicious at-
tacks is to treat security hazards (i.e., attacks, vulnerabilities, and intrusions) as faults and
to equip the system with the ability to continue desired operation despite the activation of
faults. Verissimo et al. [VNC03] describe an attack-vulnerability-intrusion or AVI model in
which they define vulnerabilities, attacks, and intrusions as faults in the following manner.
A vulnerability is defined as “a malicious or accidental, design1 or operational2 fault in the
system that could potentially be exploited with malicious intent.” An attack is a “malicious
operational interaction fault performed with the objective of exploiting one or more vulner-
abilities.” An intrusion is a “malicious operational interaction fault that results when an
attack successfully exploits one or more vulnerabilities.”
Fault tolerance can assume two forms: (1) error processing and (2) fault treatment. In
the context of intrusions, error processing involves intrusion detection (e.g., detection of a
virus) and intrusion response mechanisms or countermeasures (e.g., deletion of virus-infected
files, deactivation of certain malicious user accounts, or disabling of ports) to allow recovery
from the intrusions. Error processing also includes error masking, e.g., voting among system
components, a subset of which may have been compromised by the attacker. Fault treatment
1Design faults are those that are created during system design or development.
2Operational faults are introduced at run-time during system execution.
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includes intrusion diagnosis to identify the cause of the intrusion and isolation/exclusion of
the intruded components from the system. Examples of fault isolation include removal of
corrupted servers from the system, placement of partially corrupted servers in quarantine,
and restarting of corrupted servers from a safe state.
Fault removal involves verification, diagnosis, and correction. Verification is the process
of checking whether the system satisfies all the properties stated in the system specification.
If all stated properties are not satisfied, then diagnosis is performed to identify the reason(s)
why the system is unable to satisfy the properties. Diagnosis is followed by the necessary
corrective steps until the system does fulfill its specified properties. It is also important to
check whether the fault removal procedure has introduced new faults into the system.
Fault forecasting evaluates the fault occurrence and activation history of the system, e.g.,
attack prediction by analyzing system logs and audits that show increased port scan activity.
The forecasting could be probabilistic (e.g., determining the probability that the system will
satisfy its dependability properties given that certain components have been successfully
compromised by the attacker) or non-probabilistic (e.g., predicting the set of possible attacks
based on the current state of the system with respect to the system attack tree). Forecasting
may be necessary to warn about impending attacks, to predict the attacker’s next course of
action given that he/she has intruded into some parts of the system, and to provide useful
information about how to respond to the attacks.
1.2 Fault Tolerance Using State Machine Replication
Among the above approaches for enhancing trustworthiness, our focus in this thesis is fault
tolerance, specifically, fault tolerance using state machine replication. In the state machine
replication approach [Lam78,Sch90], a service that needs to be made trustworthy is modeled
as a deterministic state machine and multiple versions (or replicas) of the state machine are
developed and deployed across distinct nodes of a distributed system. If the replicas are
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coordinated to ensure that their states are consistent after executing each operation, then
this approach can effectively mask the failure of a fraction of the replicas.
In fault-tolerant systems, fault models are assumptions about how components can fail.
Fault models abstractly describe the possible behavior of faulty components. The simplest
fault model is the crash fault model, in which a faulty component simply stops performing
any computation or sending of messages. In the timing fault model, a component always
sends the right contents, but the contents may arrive late or not at all. In the value fault
model, the messages sent by a component may not comply with the specifications. The
most general fault model is the Byzantine fault model, in which faulty components may
exhibit arbitrary deviations from their specifications. This model accounts for all possible
effects of failure. For example, a Byzantine faulty component may send messages with wrong
values, messages that arrive too early or too late, or messages should never be sent at all.
The model also accounts for all possible causes of failures. For example, the deviations
from specifications may be due to a Trojan horse, malicious intrusion, random bit flips, or
programming error. Because of its generality, the Byzantine fault model is an attractive way
to model the behavior of a compromised node that is under the control of an adversary and
the situation in which multiple compromised nodes collaborate to bring the system down.
1.3 Byzantine Fault Tolerant (BFT) Replication:
Status Quo
There is substantial work on fault-tolerant protocols that can tolerate benign faults (for
example, [Eln93,Hay98,CT96,DGM02]). Here, we limit our attention to protocols that can
tolerate Byzantine faults.
Byzantine fault tolerance as an area has existed for more than two decades, beginning
with the seminal work of Lamport, Shostak, and Pease [LSP82], and includes a large body
of work (e.g., [BG93, CP02,CR93, CL02,DRS90,MR00,KMMS03,KMMS01,MR97,MR98,
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MAD02b, Rab83, YMV+03, ZSvR02]). Byzantine-fault-tolerant replication techniques fall
broadly into two categories: quorum replication and state machine replication. Byzantine-
fault-tolerant quorum replication (e.g., [MR98, MR00, MAD02b, ZSvR02]) uses subsets of
replicas (called quorums) to implement operations for reading/writing on individual variables
of a data repository and for lock acquisition, such that the intersection of any two subsets
contains enough correct replicas. Byzantine-fault-tolerant state machine replication [CP02,
CL02,YMV+03] can be used to perform arbitrary computations accessing arbitrary numbers
of variables, whereas quorum replication is less generic and cannot handle concurrent requests
by clients to update the same information.
Consider a service that needs to be made fault-tolerant using state machine replication.
To maintain state consistency across all correct replicas of the service, they must first agree
on the order of requests (from the clients of the service) to execute and then execute the
requests in the agreed-upon order. The problem of reaching agreement among correct replicas
in the presence of some Byzantine-faulty ones is called Byzantine agreement. This problem
is equivalent to the problem of atomic broadcast which is to ensure that, given a set of
broadcast messages, all correct parties deliver the same sequence of broadcast messages
despite the presence of faulty parties. Fischer, Lynch, and Patterson [FLP85] showed in their
seminal work that any asynchronous atomic broadcast protocol must use randomization,
since deterministic solutions cannot be guaranteed to terminate [FLP85].
Early work focused on the polynomial-time feasibility of randomized agreement [Rab83,
CR93, BG93] and atomic broadcast [BB93], but such solutions are too expensive to use
in practice. Many protocols have followed an alternative approach and avoided random-
ization completely by making stronger assumptions about the system model, in particular
by assuming some degree of synchrony (like Rampart [Rei95], SecureRing [KMMS01], and
ITUA [RPL+02]). However, most of these protocols have an undesirable feature that makes
them inapplicable for wide-area networks such as the Internet: they may violate safety if
synchrony assumptions are not met. For example, Kihlstrom et al. [KMMS01] and Re-
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iter [Rei95] describe group communication protocols that can be used to implement state
machine replication. Both protocols rely on failure detectors to remove faulty group members
in order to make progress. Since failure detectors are not perfect, correct but slow processes
may be incorrectly removed from the group, potentially resulting in the invalidation of the
assumption that at most one-third of the group members are faulty and thereby violating
correctness. These protocols also provide no defense against an adversary that launches
denial-of-service attacks by instigating membership changes.
Only recently, Cachin et al. proposed practical asynchronous agreement [CKS05] and
atomic broadcast [CKPS01] protocols that have optimal resilience t < n/3. Both protocols
rely on a trusted initialization process and on public-key cryptography. Cachin et al.’s atomic
broadcast protocol proceeds in rounds, with each round involving a randomized Byzantine
agreement and resulting in the atomic delivery of some payload messages.
Castro and Liskov’s BFT library [CL02] showed that BFT replication systems can be
built that add only modest extra latencies relative to unreplicated systems. They also showed
that proactive recovery can be used to significantly increase the coverage of the assumption
that there are at most a threshold number (one-third) of replicas that can be corrupted by
the adversary.
A drawback of BFT replication that limited its applicability in many real-world settings
was the requirement that all replicas should run the same service implementation and update
their states deterministically. If all replicas ran the same service implementation, then an
adversary could exploit the same vulnerabilities or software bugs to cause all replicas to fail
simultaneously. The determinism requirement is non-trivial to satisfy in many real-world
services. Rodrigues et al. [RCL01] proposed an extension of the BFT library called BASE,
which uses abstraction to address that drawback. Specifically, BASE enables the use of
diverse COTS-based replica implementations, thereby reducing the possibility of common-
mode failures. The technique uses wrappers to ensure that diverse and non-deterministic
implementations of the replicas of a service satisfy a common abstract specification.
6
Yin et al. [YMV+03] improved BASE by enforcing a clean separation between agreement
on the request delivery order and execution of requests in the agreed-upon order. It is
wellknown that agreement in the presence of t Byzantine-faulty replicas requires a minimum
of 3t + 1 replicas [LSP82]. However, separating the agreement and execution phases allows
the number of replicas involved in the execution of requests to be reduced from 3t+1 to 2t+1.
The separation also opened up the possibility of including a privacy firewall between the two
phases that could be used to enhance confidentiality by preventing a malicious participant
in the execution phase from disclosing unauthorized information to users.
1.4 Objectives, Contributions, and Approach
As is evident from the previous section, while much of the earlier work in BFT had significant
but mainly theoretical implications, more recent work has focused on removing the barriers
that limit the widespread use of BFT to improve security and reliability.
Our research takes a step forward in this direction and aims to make BFT state machine
replication more practical in the Internet. The Internet is an adversarial environment where
an attacker can compromise and completely take over nodes. Because of the loosely synchro-
nized nature of nodes on the Internet, relying on any synchrony assumptions for correctness
is a vulnerability that an adversary can exploit, for example, through denial-of-service at-
tacks. Hence, it is clear that for replication protocols to be applicable in the Internet, the
protocols must be designed to work in the asynchronous system model.
Our goal was to develop a comprehensive suite of protocols for BFT replication that
use very weak assumptions that are difficult to invalidate, even in wide-area networks such
as the Internet, and at the same time have much better average efficiency characteristics
than previous approaches. To obtain this goal, we propose a methodology for constructing
asynchronous Byzantine-fault-tolerant state machine replication protocols that (1) leverage
perceived normal conditions for parsimony and do not compromise correctness even when
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such perceptions are inaccurate, and (2) have the ability to dynamically change the member-
ship of the replication group without relying on that ability for correctness in the presence
of faults.
The research described in this thesis makes the following contributions.
1. An asynchronous protocol for the execution phase of BFT replication that is parsimo-
nious in the overall amount of resources used for request execution. Our work aims to
address two deficiencies of the status quo. First, most work on BFT replication has
focused almost exclusively on the hard problem of atomic broadcast (or, equivalently,
Byzantine agreement), often overlooking the practically significant execution phase of
BFT replication. Second, while a lot of focus has been placed on developing proto-
cols with optimal fault resilience and thereby reducing the deployment costs of BFT
replication, not much emphasis has been placed on reducing the run-time or opera-
tional costs of BFT replication, although those are likely to be at least as important as
deployment costs in many long-lived and resource-intensive applications. To address
these deficiences, we propose an asynchronous, resource-efficient execution protocol
whose amortized overall resource use is (t+1) ·X, where X is the average resource use
per request executed for an unreplicated service. The previous most resource-efficient
way to execute requests in BFT replication was proposed by Yin et al. [YMV+03] and
had amortized overall resource use of (2t+ 1) ·X.
2. An asynchronous atomic broadcast protocol for the agreement phase of BFT replication
that is parsimonious in the number of protocol messages that need to be communicated
per atomically delivered payload. Specifically, we propose an asynchronous, message-
efficient atomic broadcast protocol whose amortized message complexity is O(n), where
n is the number of parties involved. Message complexity of an atomic broadcast pro-
tocol is the number of protocol messages generated by correct parties per atomically
delivered payload. The most message-efficient previous solutions to the problem of
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asynchronous atomic broadcast among n parties (by Castro and Liskov [CL02] and by
Kursawe and Shoup [KS05]) have message complexity O(n2). While these solutions
are certainly useful, given the relatively high message latencies over the Internet, it
would be more desirable to have a solution with message complexity O(n). Linear
message complexity appears to be optimal for atomic broadcast, because a protocol
needs to send every payload to each party at least once, and this requires n messages
(assuming that payloads are not propagated to the parties in batches).
3. An asynchronous atomic broadcast protocol for the agreement phase of BFT replication
that is parsimonious in the number of communication steps involved per atomically
delivered payload. Specifically, we propose an asynchronous, latency-efficient atomic
broadcast protocol whose latency degree [Sch97] is optimal, i.e., 2. Latency degree
of a consensus protocol, or equivalently an atomic broadcast protocol, is the number
of communication steps involved in good runs (i.e., failure-free runs) per atomically
delivered payload. The most latency-efficient previous solutions to the problem of
asynchronous atomic broadcast among n parties (by Castro and Liskov [CL02] and by
Kursawe and Shoup [KS05]) have latency degree 3.
4. A comprehensive suite of protocols that provide dynamic state machine replication but
do not make correctness conditional upon the ability to remove members from the
group. Previous asynchronous BFT replication protocols assume static groups, i.e.,
the number of parties is fixed permanently at system start-up time. However, there
are many situations, particularly for long-lived services, in which it is desirable to have
the capability to dynamically tune the degree of fault resilience. While the ability
to add new parties and remove suspected corrupt parties has been previously ex-
plored in the context of Byzantine fault-tolerant group communication systems (e.g.,
[Rei95][KMMS01][RPL+02]), the group communication protocols of those systems re-
quired the removal of suspected corrupt nodes in order to make progress and provide
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liveness. Since even state-of-the-art intrusion detection systems are unreliable at best,
such a requirement opens an easily exploitable vulnerability to denial-of-service at-
tacks. Our replication protocols are designed to withstand t simultaneous corruptions
and do not require the removal of suspected faulty nodes in order to provide liveness.
Such a design allows for the enforcement of very selective and conservative policies
regarding changes to the membership of the replication group.
5. A software toolkit called the Component-Based Framework for Intrusion Tolerance or
CoBFIT that combines the implementation of the parsimonious execution, parsimo-
nious atomic broadcast, and group management protocols within a reusable software
framework and that can be used to build trustworthy Internet-scale services.
6. Experimental validation of the software toolkit and the protocols in the context of a
representative application under both fault-free and controlled fault injections in both
LAN and WAN environments.
The guiding philosophy for the design of our protocols can be summarized in three
phrases: parsimony, optimism, and worst-case readiness. Parsimony is to be as frugal as
possible for a given metric of interest. Optimism is to hope that we can apply parsimonious
techniques for most of the system’s lifetime. Worst-case readiness is the ability to handle
situations that belie the optimistic hope without compromising correctness. The specific
metrics we consider in this dissertation are (1) overall resource use of request execution,
(2) message complexity of atomic broadcast, and (3) latency degree of atomic broadcast.
However, one can apply our general philosophy to the creation of a distributed protocol that
is parsimonious for some other metric as well.
The motivation for our parsimonious protocols is the observation that conditions are
“normal” during most of a system’s operation. The term “normal conditions” refers to the
state of an underlying network that is relatively stable in terms of the message transmission
delays. However, the complete specification of normal conditions will vary for different
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Parsimonious Mode
hope that conditions are “normal” {specification of normal conditions protocol-specific}
for a given metric of interest, M, use an approach that,
when the hope is met, provides protocol functionality with optimal M, and
when the hope is not met, may not make progress but never violates safety
determine inability to make progress using failure detection; switch to recovery mode
Recovery Mode
ensure progress
reconfigure based on latest failure detection information {redefine “normal” conditions}
switch back to parsimonious mode for next epoch
Figure 1.1: The Informal Generic Structure of a Parsimonious Protocol
parsimonious protocols. For example, in the case of our parsimonious atomic broadcast
protocol, the specification includes a leader that is not actively misbehaving. On the other
hand, in the case of our parsimonious execution protocol, the specification includes a subset
of parties (described later as the primary committee) that are not actively misbehaving.
Figure 1.1 informally presents the generic structure of a parsimonious protocol. A par-
simonious protocol operates in epochs, with each epoch consisting of a parsimonious mode
and a recovery mode. Under conditions that are perceived to be normal, a parsimonious
protocol operates in the parsimonious mode of an epoch. For a given metric of interest M,
the parsimonious mode employs an approach that provides the protocol functionality with
optimal M. Under conditions that are indicative of failures or instability, the parsimonious
mode may not be able to make progress, but never violates safety. Indications of failures
and instability are obtained based on failure detection mechanisms. Under such conditions,
the protocol switches to a more expensive recovery mode, which ensures that some progress
is eventually made, after which the protocols switch back to the parsimonious mode for the
next epoch. Failure detection mechanisms may be based on timing assumptions. While in-
accuracy of these timing assumptions may affect the protocols’ ability to provide parsimony,
the protocol is designed such that those assumptions never affect the protocol’s ability to
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provide safety and liveness. Since practical observations show that system behavior alter-
nates between long periods of stable conditions and relatively short periods of instability,
the hope that timing assumptions based on stable conditions have a high likelihood of being
accurate is realistic. Hence, one can expect the parsimonious protocol to have much better
average efficiency characteristics than the status quo.
1.5 Thesis Organization
The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows.
Chapter 2 presents the overall system architecture and describes how the various proto-
cols fit together. It also presents the formal system model and assumptions for which our
protocols were designed.
Chapter 3 first introduces the primitives on which our atomic broadcast protocol relies.
Then, it defines atomic broadcast and presents our parsimonious atomic broadcast protocol.
The chapter includes an analysis of the protocol, a discussion on the practical significance
of the protocol, and a comparison with related work.
Chapter 4 introduces an abstraction of the agreement (or atomic broadcast) phase that
simplifies the presentation of the execution protocol. The parsimonious execution proto-
col is then presented and analyzed. The chapter includes a discussion on some practical
applications for the protocol and a comparison with related work.
Chapter 5 presents the various protocols for the dynamic membership management of the
replication group, namely admission control, failure detection, group membership agreement,
and reconfiguration. The reconfigurable versions (as opposed to the static versions presented
in Chapters 3 and 4) of the atomic broadcast and execution protocols are also presented. The
chapter specifies the properties provided by the integrated suite of protocols, and includes
a discussion on how the group management capabilities can be utilized without opening
denial-of-service vulnerabilities.
Chapter 6 describes the implementation of the CoBFIT software toolkit. First, it presents
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the framework components that form the foundation upon which protocol components are
built. It describes the implementation of the consistent broadcast protocol and agreement
protocols that serve as primitives for implementing the higher-level protocols, such as the
atomic broadcast protocol and the group membership agreement protocol. Then, it describes
the components that implement the parsimonious atomic broadcast, parsimonious execution,
and dynamic membership management protocols. Finally, it describes the implementation
of components that interface with the replicated service and the clients of the replicated
service.
Chapter 7 presents the experimental evaluation of our protocols in both LAN and WAN
settings under both fault-free and controlled fault injection scenarios. The protocols were
evaluated in the context of a representative application, namely the Fractal Generator, that
generates image files based on input fractal parameters.




In this chapter, we describe the system architecture at a high level and also present the
system model and assumptions under which our protocols provide their specified properties.
2.1 Overall System Architecture
The types of services that can benefit from our protocols are those that can be modeled
as deterministic state machines [Lam78, Sch90]. These services can have operations that
perform arbitrary computations, but the computations must be deterministic, i.e., only the
current service state and the input parameters to a requested operation determine the result
and new service state produced due to the execution of the operation. It is possible to
use the state machine replication approach to obtain a BFT service by developing multiple
versions of the state machine that represents the service and deploying the versions or replicas
on the distinct nodes of a distributed system. It is permissible for the replicas to exhibit
non-deterministic behavior as long as the externally observable behaviors of the replicas
are the same, i.e., the same sequence of operations issued at any two correct replicas must
produce the same sequence of results. It is essential to minimize common-mode failure
among replicas through replica diversity. Several approaches have been suggested in the
literature for obtaining replica diversity, such as deployment of the replicas in heterogeneous
operating systems [SCS03] and opportunistic N-version programming through diverse COTS
implementations of an abstract interface [RCL01].






























Figure 2.1: State Machine Replication Using Protocols PABC and APE
replicas is a key concern that is addressed by enforcing a total order on the client requests to
the service and then executing the requests in exactly that order at all correct replicas. Our
approach (just like Yin et al.’s approach [YMV+03]) is to separate agreement on the order of
requests to execute from the actual execution of the requests (Figure 2.1). In order to achieve
a fault resilience of t, there must be at least 3t + 1 distinct participants in the agreement
phase and at least 2t + 1 distinct participants in the execution phase. Figure 2.1 depicts
the situation for t = 1 in which there are 3t + 1 = 4 participants in the agreement phase
and 2t+ 1 = 3 participants in the execution phase. Although agreement phase participants
and execution phase participants may be placed in distinct nodes, physical separation is not
necessary; a replica may perform a dual role in which it participates in both the agreement
and execution phases while also maintaining a logical separation between the two phases. In
the rest of this thesis, we consider such a model of logical separation between the agreement
and execution phases. All the n replicas participate in the agreement phase, and at least
n− t of them participate in the execution phase.
Figure 2.1 shows at a high level how a client request is processed by the replicated service.
In the figure, the term request certificate refers to an operation requested by the client along
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with proof of authorization showing that the client is indeed permitted to request that
operation.
Agreement phase participants execute Protocol PABC (which stands for parsimonious
asynchronous atomic broadcast), a message-efficient atomic broadcast protocol. Request
certificates form the input to Protocol PABC and atomic deliveries form the output. An
atomic delivery binds a request certificate to a unique sequence number, such that all correct
agreement phase participants will eventually output the same binding. The sequence of
atomic deliveries defines a total order on the request certificates.
Agreement certificates, which are atomic deliveries from the local Protocol PABC, form
the input to the Protocol APE, which runs at all replicas that participate in the execution
phase. Protocol APE (which stands for asynchronous parsimonious execution) is a resource-
efficient execution protocol through which requests are executed in the sequence number
order defined by the agreement certificates. At an execution replica, execution of a request
with sequence number s is always preceded by an update of the service state to reflect
execution of all requests with sequence numbers lower than s. Reply messages carrying the
results of request processing and the sequence number of the processed request form the
output of Protocol APE; the messages are sent to the agreement phase participants. A set of
reply messages from t+1 distinct execution phase participants that contain the same result
and sequence number constitute a reply certificate.
Reply certificates from the execution phase serve as acknowledgments to the agreement
certificates from the agreement phase and are forwarded to the appropriate client. The
execution phase participants implement deterministic state machines and execute requests
in the total order defined by agreement certificates; hence, the result for a given sequence-
numbered request will be the same at any correct execution phase participant. A reply
certificate carries the result of request processing from at least one correct execution phase
participant. Once the client obtains a reply certificate, the client accepts the result value
contained in the certificate as the valid response to its request certificate.
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2.2 System Model
In this section, we describe the system model and assumptions for the static versions (i.e.,
those in which the group of agreement and execution replicas is fixed) of our parsimonious
protocols described in Chapters 3 and 4. Later, in Chapter 5, we extend the system model
for the reconfigurable versions of the protocols in which replicas can be removed or added
to the replication group. We use the terms “replica” and “party” interchangeably.
We consider an asynchronous distributed system model equivalent to the one of Cachin et
al. [CKPS01], in which there are no bounds on relative processing speeds and message delays.
The BFT-replicated service consists of n replicas P1, . . . , Pn. All the replicas participate in
the agreement phase. However, only the first n− t replicas (i.e., P1, . . . , Pn−t) participate in
the execution phase. We use the term agreement replica to denote the part of a replica that
participates in the agreement phase. Similarly, we use the term execution replica to denote
the part of a replica that participates in the execution phase.
Clients of the service and replicas occupy different nodes. The execution replicas start
with the same initial service state and implement deterministic state machines. Up to t < n
3
parties may be controlled by an adversary. We call such parties corrupted ; the other parties
are called correct. We use a static corruption model, which means that the adversary must
pick the parties it corrupts once and for all before starting the protocol. We assume that
the basic unit of corruption is a node. Components or protocols co-located in the same
node trust each other to provide the specified functionality. There is also an initialization
algorithm that is run by some trusted dealer that performs system setup before the start
of the protocol. All computations by the parties, the adversary, and the trusted dealer are
probabilistic, polynomial-time algorithms. The parameters n and t are given as input to the
dealer, which then generates the state information that is used to initialize each party. Note
that after the initial setup phase, the static versions of the parsimonious protocols have no
need for the dealer.
Each pair of parties is linked by an authenticated asynchronous channel that provides
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message integrity (e.g., using message authentication codes [VvOM96]). The adversary
determines the scheduling of messages on all the channels. Timeouts are messages that a
party sends to itself; hence, the adversary controls the timeouts as well.
We restrict the adversary such that every run of the system is complete, i.e., every message
sent by a correct party and addressed to a correct party is delivered unmodified before the
adversary terminates1. We refer to this property in liveness conditions when we say that a
message is eventually delivered or that a protocol instance eventually terminates.
There may be multiple protocol instances that are concurrently executing at each party.
A protocol instance is invoked either by a higher-level protocol instance or by the adversary.
Every protocol instance is identified by a unique string ID , called the tag, which is chosen
by the entity that invokes the instance. The tag of a sub-protocol instance contains the tag
of the calling instance as a prefix.
A correct party is activated when the adversary delivers a message to the party; the
party then updates its internal state, performs some computation, and generates a set of
response messages, which are given to the adversary. There may be several threads of
execution for a given party, but only one of them is allowed to be active at any one time.
When a party is activated, all threads are in wait states, which specify a condition defined
on the received messages contained in the input buffer, as well as on some local variables.
In the pseudocode presentation of the protocol, we specify a wait state using the notation
wait for condition. There is a global implicit wait for statement that every protocol
instance repeatedly executes; it matches any of the conditions given in the clauses of the form
upon condition block. If one or more threads that are in wait states have their conditions
simultaneously satisfied, one of these threads is scheduled (arbitrarily), and this thread runs
until it reaches another wait state. This process continues until no more threads are in a
wait state whose condition is satisfied. Then, the activation of the party is terminated, and
1A more restrictive formalization of liveness conditions for environments with a computationally bounded
scheduler is provided by Cachin et al. [CKPS01] through the notion of probabilistically uniformly bounded
statistics; this notion can be easily applied to our protocols with some modifications, but we refrain from
using it for the sake of readability.
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control returns to the adversary.
There are three types of messages that appear in the interface to our protocols, namely
(1) input actions, which are messages of the form (ID , in, type, . . .); (2) output actions, which
are messages of the form (ID , out, type, . . .); and (3) protocol messages, which are ordinary
protocol messages to be delivered to other parties of the form (ID , type, . . .)). Note that
input actions and output actions are local events within a party. Before a party starts to
process messages that are tagged with ID , the instance must be initialized by a special
input action of the form (ID , in, open, type), where type denotes the protocol type and/or
its implementation. Such an action must precede any other input action with tag ID . We
usually assume that it occurs implicitly with the first regular input action.
We make use of a digital signature scheme for our protocol. A digital signature scheme
consists of algorithms for key generation, signing, and verification. As part of the system ini-
tialization, the dealer generates (using the key generation algorithm) the public key/private
key pair for each party and gives every party its private key and the public keys of all par-
ties. We assume that the signature scheme is secure in the sense of the standard security
notion for signature schemes of modern cryptography, i.e., secure against existential forgery
using chosen-message attacks [GMR88]. Since we use the formal model of modern cryp-





Atomic broadcast is a communication primitive that allows a group of n parties to deliver a
common sequence of payload messages despite the failure of some parties. In this chapter,
we address the problem of asynchronous atomic broadcast when up to t < n/3 parties may
exhibit Byzantine behavior.
We provide two protocols, one with an amortized expected message complexity of O(n)
per delivered payload and the other with a latency degree of 2 per delivered payload. The
most efficient previous solutions are the BFT protocol by Castro and Liskov and the KS
protocol by Kursawe and Shoup, both of which have message complexity O(n2) and latency
degree 3. Like the BFT and KS protocols, our protocol is leader-based and optimistically
hopes that the leader is not actively misbehaving; when network instability or leader mis-
behavior is detected, it switches to a more expensive recovery mode. The key idea of our
solution is to replace reliable broadcast in the KS protocol by consistent broadcast. We
propose two variants of consistent broadcast; using one variant reduces the message com-
plexity from O(n2) to O(n) in the optimistic mode, while the other variant reduces the
latency degree from 3 to 2 in the optimistic mode. But since consistent broadcast provides
weaker guarantees than reliable broadcast, our recovery mode incorporates novel techniques
to ensure that safety and liveness are always satisfied.
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3.1 Introduction
Atomic broadcast is a fundamental communication primitive for the construction of fault-
tolerant distributed systems. It allows a group of n parties to agree on a set of payload
messages to deliver and also on their delivery order, despite the failure of up to t parties.
It is possible to construct a fault-tolerant service using the state machine replication ap-
proach [Sch90] by replicating the service on all n parties and propagating the state updates
to the replicas using atomic broadcast. In this chapter, we present a new atomic broadcast
protocol that is suitable for building highly available and intrusion-tolerant services in the
Internet [Cac01][SZ04].
Though the problem of Byzantine-fault-tolerant atomic broadcast and the equivalent
problem of Byzantine agreement have been widely studied for over two decades, much of the
previous work (described in Section 1.3) was either intended to demonstrate only theoretical
feasibility or based correctness on assumptions that are easy to invalidate (e.g., synchrony).
Hence, the applicability of that work for our purpose is quite limited.
The BFT protocol by Castro and Liskov [CL02] and the protocol by Kursawe and
Shoup [KS05] (hereafter referred to as the KS protocol) take an optimistic approach for
providing more efficient asynchronous atomic broadcast while never violating safety. Both
protocols proceed in epochs, where an epoch consists of an optimistic mode and a recovery
mode, and expect to spend most of their time operating in the optimistic mode, which uses
an inexpensive mechanism that is appropriate for normal conditions. The protocol switches
to the more expensive recovery mode under unstable network or certain fault conditions. In
every epoch, a designated party acts as a leader for the optimistic mode, determines the
delivery order of the payloads, and conveys the chosen delivery order to the other parties
through Bracha’s reliable broadcast protocol [Bra84], which guarantees delivery of a broad-
cast payload with the same content at all correct parties. Bracha’s protocol is deterministic
and involves O(n2) protocol messages; it is much more efficient than the most efficient
randomized Byzantine agreement protocol [CKPS01], which requires expensive public-key
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cryptographic operations in addition. Consequently, both the BFT and KS protocols com-
municate O(n2) messages per atomically delivered payload under normal conditions, i.e.,
they have message complexity O(n2). Bracha’s reliable broadcast protocol involves 3 com-
munication steps, i.e., latency degree 3. Consequently, both the BFT and KS protocols
involve 3 communication steps per atomically delivered payload under normal conditions.
No optimally resilient protocol for asynchronous atomic broadcast with message com-
plexity less than Θ(n2) or latency degree less than 3 was known prior to our work. We
present a protocol for asynchronous atomic broadcast that is the first to achieve optimal
resilience t < n/3 and O(n) amortized expected message complexity. We also present a
variant protocol that is the first to achieve optimal resilience t < n/3 and latency degree 2.
Like the BFT and KS protocols, our protocols are optimistic in the sense that they
progress very fast during periods when the network is reasonably well-behaved and a party
acting as the designated leader is correct. Unlike the BFT protocol (and just like the
KS protocol), our protocols guarantee both safety and liveness in asynchronous networks by
relying on randomized agreement. The reduced message complexity and the reduced latency
degree of our protocols come at the cost of introducing a digital signature computation
for every delivered payload. But in a wide-area network (WAN), the cost of a public-key
operation is small compared to message latency. And since our protocols are targeted at
WANs, we expect the advantage of lower message complexity to outweigh the additional
work incurred by the signature computations.
The key idea in both our solutions is to replace reliable broadcast used in the opti-
mistic mode of the BFT and KS protocols with consistent broadcast, also known as echo
broadcast [Rei94]. We use the term parsimonious mode to denote the optimistic mode of
our atomic broadcast protocols because of the parsimony (either in message complexity
or latency degree) achieved and to adhere to the generic parsimonious protocol structure
described in Section 1.4. Consistent broadcast is a weaker form of reliable broadcast that
guarantees agreement only among those correct parties that actually deliver the payload, but
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it is possible that some correct parties do not deliver any payload at all. But the replacement
also complicates the recovery mode, since a corrupted leader might cause the payload to be
consistently delivered at only a single correct party with no way for other correct parties to
learn about this fact. Our protocols provide mechanisms to address such complications.
Our message-efficient atomic broadcast protocol and the latency-efficient atomic broad-
cast protocol are distinguished only by the type of consistent broadcast implementation they
use in the parsimonious mode. Both consistent broadcast implementations provide the same
properties. We describe the two types of consistent broadcast implementations; however,
for the sake of simplicity, we present only the message-efficient atomic broadcast protocol in
detail. The latency-efficient atomic broadcast protocol is obtained simply by replacing one
consistent broadcast implementation with the other.
Our protocols are related to the reliable broadcast protocol of Malkhi et al. [MMR00]
in their use of consistent broadcast as a building block. Malkhi et al.’s protocol addresses
reliable broadcast over a WAN, but provides no total order.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes the protocol prim-
itives on which our algorithm relies, and the definition of atomic broadcast. The protocol
is presented in Section 3.3 and analyzed in Section 3.4. Section 3.5 discusses the practi-
cal significance of our parsimonious protocol and compares it with related work. Finally,
Section 3.7 summarizes the chapter.
3.2 Preliminaries
3.2.1 Protocol Primitives
Our atomic broadcast protocol relies on a consistent broadcast protocol with special prop-
erties and on a Byzantine agreement protocol.
23
Strong Consistent Broadcast
We enhance the notion of consistent broadcast found in the literature [CKPS01] to develop
the notion that we call strong consistent broadcast. Ordinary consistent broadcast provides
a way for a designated sender Ps to broadcast a payload to all parties and requires that any
two correct parties that deliver the payload agree on its content.
The standard protocol for implementing ordinary consistent broadcast is Reiter’s echo
broadcast [Rei94]; it involves O(n) messages, has a latency of three message flows, and relies
on a digital signature scheme. The sender starts the protocol by sending the payload m to all
parties; then it waits for a quorum of dn+t+1
2
e parties to issue a signature on the payload and
to “echo” the payload and the signature to the sender. When the sender has collected and
verified enough signatures, it composes a final protocol message containing the signatures
and sends it to all parties.
With a faulty sender, an ordinary consistent broadcast protocol permits executions in
which some parties fail to deliver the payload when others succeed. Therefore, a useful
enhancement of consistent broadcast is a transfer mechanism, which allows any party that
has delivered the payload to help others do the same.
For reasons that will be evident later, we introduce another enhancement and require
that when a correct party terminates a consistent broadcast and delivers a payload, there
must be a quorum of at least n − t parties (instead of only dn+t+1
2
e) who participated in
the protocol and approved the delivered payload. We call consistent broadcast with such a
transfer mechanism and the special quorum rule strong consistent broadcast.
Formally, every broadcast instance is identified by a tag ID . At the sender Ps, strong
consistent broadcast is invoked by an input action of the form (ID , in, sc-broadcast,m),
with m ∈ {0, 1}∗. When that occurs, we say Ps sc-broadcasts m with tag ID . Only Ps
executes this action; all other parties start the protocol only when they initialize instance
ID in their role as receivers. A party terminates a consistent broadcast of m tagged with
ID by generating an output action of the form (ID , out, sc-deliver,m). In that case, we
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say Pi sc-delivers m with tag ID .
For the transfer mechanism, a correct party that has sc-delivered m with tag ID should
be able to output a bit string MID that completes the sc-broadcast in the following sense:
any correct party that has not yet sc-delivered m can run a validation algorithm on MID
(this may involve a public key associated with the protocol), and if MID is determined to be
valid, it can also sc-deliver m from MID .
Definition 1 (Strong consistent broadcast) A protocol for strong consistent broadcast
satisfies the following conditions except with negligible probability.
Termination: If a correct party sc-broadcasts m with tag ID, then all correct parties even-
tually sc-deliver m with tag ID.
Agreement: If two correct parties Pi and Pj sc-deliver m and m
′ with tag ID, respectively,
then m = m′.
Integrity: Every correct party sc-delivers at most one payload m with tag ID. Moreover, if
the sender Ps is correct, then m was previously sc-broadcast by Ps with tag ID.
Transferability: After a correct party has sc-delivered m with tag ID, it can generate a
stringMID such that any correct party that has not sc-delivered a message with tag IDis
able to sc-deliver some message immediately upon processing MID .
Strong unforgeability: For any ID, it is computationally infeasible to generate a value
M that is accepted as valid by the validation algorithm for completing ID unless n− 2t
correct parties have initialized instance ID and actively participated in the protocol.
Note that the termination, agreement, and integrity properties are the same as in ordinary
consistent broadcast [Rei94][CKPS01].
Given the above implementation of consistent broadcast, one can obtain strong consistent
broadcast with two simple modifications. The completing string MID for ensuring transfer-
ability consists of the final protocol message; the attached signatures are sufficient for any
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other party to complete the sc-broadcast. Strong unforgeability is obtained by setting the
signature quorum to n− t.
With signatures of size K bits, the echo broadcast protocol has communication complex-
ity O(n(|m| + nK)) bits, where |m| denotes the bit length of the payload m. By replacing
the quorum of signatures with a threshold signature [Des88], it is possible to reduce the
communication complexity to O(n(|m|+K)) bits [CKPS01], under the reasonable assump-
tion that the lengths of a threshold signature and a signature share are also at most K
bits [Sho00].
In the rest of the chapter, we assume that strong consistent broadcast is implemented by
applying the above modifications to the echo broadcast protocol with threshold signatures.
Hence, the length of a completing string is O(|m|+K) bits.
Multi-Valued Byzantine Agreement
We use a protocol for multi-valued Byzantine agreement (MVBA) as defined by Cachin et
al. [CKPS01], which allows agreement values from an arbitrary domain instead of being re-
stricted to binary values. Unlike previous multi-valued Byzantine agreement protocols, their
protocol does not allow the decision to fall back on a default value if not all correct parties
propose the same value, but uses a protocol-external mechanism instead. This so-called
external validity condition is specified by a global, polynomial-time computable predicate
QID , which is known to all parties and is typically determined by an external application or
higher-level protocol. Each party proposes a value that contains certain validation informa-
tion. The protocol ensures that the decision value was proposed by at least one party, and
that the decision value satisfies QID .
When a party Pi starts an MVBA protocol instance with tag ID and an input value
v ∈ {0, 1}∗ satisfying predicate QID , we say that Pi proposes v for multi-valued agreement
with tag ID and predicate QID . Correct parties only propose values that satisfy QID . When
Pi terminates the MVBA protocol instance with tag ID and outputs a value v, we say that
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it decides v for ID .
Definition 2 (Multi-valued Byzantine agreement) A protocol for multi-valued Byzan-
tine agreement with predicate QID satisfies the following conditions except with negligible
probability.
External Validity: Any correct party that decides for ID decides v such that QID(v) holds.
Agreement: If some correct party decides v for ID, then any correct party that decides
for ID decides v.
Integrity: If all parties are correct and if some party decides v for ID, then some party
proposed v for ID.
Termination: All correct parties eventually decide for ID.
The MVBA protocol of Cachin et al. [CKPS01] builds upon a protocol for binary Byzan-
tine agreement (such as the one of Cachin et al. [CKS05]), which relies on threshold sig-
natures and a threshold coin-tossing protocol (e.g., [CKS05]). The expected message com-
plexity of the MVBA protocol is O(n2) and the expected communication complexity is
O(n3+n2(K +L)), where K is the length of a threshold signature and L is a bound on the
length of the values that can be proposed.
3.2.2 Definition of Atomic Broadcast
Atomic broadcast provides a “broadcast channel” abstraction [HT93], such that all correct
parties deliver the same set of messages broadcast on the channel in the same order. A
party Pi atomically broadcasts (or a-broadcasts) a payload m with tag ID when an input
action of the form (ID , in, a-broadcast,m) with m ∈ {0, 1}∗ is delivered to Pi. Broadcasts
are parameterized by the tag ID to identify their corresponding broadcast channel. A party
atomically delivers (or a-delivers) a payload m with tag ID by generating an output action
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of the form (ID , out, a-deliver,m). A party may a-broadcast and a-deliver an arbitrary
number of messages with the same tag.
Definition 3 (Atomic broadcast) A protocol for atomic broadcast satisfies the following
properties except with negligible probability.
Validity: If t+1 correct parties a-broadcast some payload m with tag ID, then some correct
party eventually a-delivers m with tag ID.
Agreement: If some correct party has a-delivered m with tag ID, then all correct parties
eventually a-deliver m with tag ID.
Total Order: If two correct parties both a-delivered distinct payloads m1 and m2 with
tag ID, then they have a-delivered them in the same order.
Integrity: For any payload m, a correct party Pj a-delivers m with tag ID at most once.
Moreover, if all parties are correct, then m was previously a-broadcast by some party
with tag ID.
The above properties are similar to the definitions of Cachin et al. [CKPS01] and of
Kursawe and Shoup [KS05]. We do not formalize their fairness condition, which requires
that the protocol “makes progress” towards delivering a payload as soon as t + 1 correct
parties have a-broadcast it. However, our protocol actually satisfies an equivalent notion
(cf., Lemma 4).
To analyze our protocol and to compare it with related protocols in the literature, we use
two measures, message complexity and communication complexity. The message complexity
of a protocol instance with tag ID is defined as the total number of all protocol messages with
the tag ID or any tag starting with ID | . . . that correct parties generate. The communication
complexity of a protocol instance with tag ID is defined as the total bit length of all protocol
messages with the tag ID or any tag starting with ID | . . . that correct parties generate.
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3.3 The Parsimonious Asynchronous Atomic
Broadcast Protocol
3.3.1 Overview
The starting point for the development of our Protocol PABC is the BFT protocol [CL02],
which can be seen as the adaptation of Lamport’s Paxos consensus protocol [Lam98] to
tolerate Byzantine faults. In the BFT protocol, a leader determines the delivery order of
payloads and conveys the order using reliable broadcast to other parties. The parties then
atomically deliver the payloads in the order chosen by the leader. If the leader appears to
be slow or exhibits faulty behavior, a party switches to the recovery mode. When enough
correct parties have switched to recovery mode, the protocol ensures that all correct parties
eventually start the recovery mode. The goal of the recovery mode is to start the next
epoch in a consistent state and with a new leader. The difficulty lies in determining which
payloads have been delivered in the optimistic mode of the past epoch. The BFT protocol
delegates this task to the leader of the new epoch. But since the recovery mode of BFT
is also deterministic, it may be that the new leader is evicted immediately, before it can
do any useful work, and the epoch passes without delivering any payloads. This denial-of-
service attack against the BFT protocol violates liveness but is unavoidable in asynchronous
networks.
The KS protocol [KS05] prevents this attack by ensuring that at least one payload is
delivered during the recovery mode. It employs a round of randomized Byzantine agreement
to agree on a set of payloads for atomic delivery, much like the asynchronous atomic broadcast
protocol of Cachin et al. [CKPS01]. During the optimistic mode, the epoch leader conveys
the delivery order through reliable broadcast as in BFT, which leads to an amortized message
complexity of O(n2).
Our approach is to replace reliable broadcast in the KS protocol with strong consistent
broadcast; the replacement directly leads to an amortized message complexity of only O(n).
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But the replacement also introduces complications in the recovery mode, since a corrupted
leader may cause the fate of some payloads to be undefined in the sense that there might
be only a single correct party that has sc-delivered a payload, but no way for other correct
parties to learn about this fact. We solve this problem by delaying the atomic delivery
of an sc-delivered payload until more payloads have been sc-delivered. However, the delay
introduces an additional problem of payloads getting “stuck” if no further payloads arrive.
We address this by having the leader generate dummy payloads when no further payloads
arrive within a certain time window.
The recovery mode in our protocol has a structure similar to that of the KS protocol,
but is simpler and more efficient. At a high level, a first MVBA instance ensures that all
correct parties agree on a synchronization point. Then, the protocol ensures that all correct
parties a-deliver the payloads up to that point; to implement this step, every party must
store all payloads that were delivered in the parsimonious mode, together with information
that proves the fact that they were delivered. A second MVBA instance is used to a-deliver
at least one payload, which guarantees that the protocol makes progress in every epoch.
3.3.2 Details
We now describe the parsimonious and the recovery modes in detail. The line numbers refer
to the detailed protocol description in Figures 3.1–3.4.
Parsimonious Mode
Every party keeps track of the current epoch number e and stores all payloads that it has
received to a-broadcast but not yet a-delivered in its initiation queue I. An element x can
be appended to I by an operation append(x, I), and an element x that occurs anywhere in
I can be removed by an operation remove(x, I). A party also maintains an array log of size
B that acts as a buffer for all payloads to a-deliver in the current epoch. Additionally, a
party stores a set D of all payloads that have been a-delivered so far.
30
Protocol PABC for party Pi and tag ID
initialization:
1: e← 0 {current epoch}
2: I ← [] {initiation queue, list of a-broadcast but not a-delivered payloads}
3: D ← ∅ {set of a-delivered payloads}
4: init epoch()
function init epoch():
5: l← (e mod n) + 1 {Pl is leader of epoch e}
6: log ← [] {array of size B containing payloads committed in current epoch}
7: s← 0 {sequence number of next payload within epoch}
8: complained ← false {indicates if this party already complained about Pl}
9: start recovery ← false {signals the switch to the recovery mode}
10: c ← 0 {number of complain messages received for epoch leader}
11: S ← D {set of a-delivered or already sc-broadcast payloads at Pl}
forever: {parsimonious mode}
12: if ¬complained then {leader Pl is not suspected}
13: initialize an instance of strong consistent broadcast with tag ID |bind.e.s
14: m← ⊥
15: if i = l then
16: wait for timeout(T ) or receipt of a message (ID , initiate, e,m) such that m 6∈ S
17: if timeout(T ) then
18: m← dummy
19: else
20: S ← S ∪ {m}
21: stop(T )
22: sc-broadcast the message m with tag ID |bind.e.s
23: wait for start recovery or sc-delivery of some m with tag ID |bind.e.s
such that m 6∈ D ∪ log
24: if start recovery then
25: recovery()
26: else
27: log [s]← m
28: if s ≥ 2 then
29: updateFl(deliver, log [s− 2])
30: deliver(log [s− 2])
31: if i = l and (log [s] 6= dummy or (s > 0 and log [s− 1] 6= dummy)) then
32: start(T )
33: s← s+ 1
34: if s mod B = 0 then
35: recovery()
Figure 3.1: Protocol PABC for Atomic Broadcast (Part I)
31
upon (ID , in, a-broadcast,m):




39: if m 6= dummy then
40: remove(m, I)
41: D ← D ∪ {m}
42: output (ID , out, a-deliver,m)
function complain():
43: send (ID , complain, e) to all parties
44: complained ← true
upon receiving message (ID , complain, e) from Pj for the first time:
45: c← c+ 1
46: if (c = t+ 1) and ¬complained then
47: complain()
48: else if c = 2t+ 1 then
49: start recovery ← true
let QID |watermark.e be the following predicate:
QID |watermark.e
([
(s1, C1, σ1), . . . , (sn, Cn, σn)
]) ≡(
for at least n− t distinct j, sj 6= ⊥
)
and(
for all j = 1, . . . , n, either sj = ⊥ or
(σj is a valid signature by Pj on (ID , committed, e, sj , Cj) and
(sj = −1 or Cj completes the sc-broadcast with tag ID |bind.e.sj))
)
Let QID |deliver.e be the following predicate:
QID |deliver.e
([
(I1, σ1), . . . , In, σn)
]) ≡ for at least n− t distinct j,(Ij ∩ D = ∅ and σj is a valid signature by Pj on (ID , queue, e, j, Ij))
Figure 3.2: Protocol PABC for Atomic Broadcast (Part II)
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function recovery():
{Part 1: agree on watermark}
50: compute a signature σ on (ID , committed, e, s− 1)
51: send the message (ID , committed, e, s− 1, C, σ) to all parties, where C denotes
the bit string that completes the sc-broadcast with tag ID |bind.e.(s− 1)
52: (sj , Cj , σj)← (⊥,⊥,⊥) (1 ≤ j ≤ n)
53: wait for n − t messages (ID , committed, e, sj , Cj , σj) from distinct Pj such that Cj
completes
the sc-broadcast instance ID |bind.e.sj and σj is a valid signature on
(ID , committed, e, sj)
54: W ← [(s1, C1, σ1), . . . , (sn, Cn, σn)]
55: propose W for multi-valued Byzantine agreement with tag ID |watermark.e
and predicate QID |watermark.e
56: wait for the Byzantine agreement protocol with tag ID |watermark.e
to decide some W¯ = [(s¯1, C¯1, σ¯1), . . . , (s¯n, C¯n, σ¯n)]
57: w ← max{s¯1, . . . , s¯n} − 1
{Part 2: synchronize up to watermark}
58: s′ ← s− 2
59: while s′ ≤ min{s− 1, w} do
60: if s′ ≥ 0 then
61: deliver(log [s′])
62: s′ ← s′ + 1
63: if s > w then
64: for j = 1, . . . , n do
65: u← max{sj , s¯j}
66: M ← {Mv} for v = u, . . . , w, where Mv completes the sc-broadcast instance
ID |bind.e.v
67: send message (ID , complete,M) to Pj
68: while s ≤ w do
69: wait for a message (ID , complete,M¯) such that M¯s ∈ M¯ completes sc-broadcast
with tag ID |bind.e.s
70: use M¯s to sc-deliver some m with tag ID |bind.e.s
71: deliver(m)
72: s← s+ 1
Figure 3.3: Protocol PABC for Atomic Broadcast (Part III)
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function recovery(): (continued...)
{Part 3: deliver some messages}
73: compute a digital signature σ on (ID , queue, e, i, I)
74: send the message (ID , queue, e, i, I, σ) to all parties
75: (Ij , σj)← (⊥,⊥) (1 ≤ j ≤ n)
76: wait for n− t messages (ID , queue, e, j, Ij , σj) from distinct Pj such that
σj is a valid signature from Pj and Ij ∩ D = ∅
77: Q← [(I1, σ1), . . . , (In, σn)]
78: propose Q for multi-valued Byzantine agreement with tag ID |deliver.e
and predicate QID |deliver.e
79: wait for the Byzantine agreement with tag ID |deliver.e to decide some
Q¯ = [(I¯1, σ¯1), . . . , (I¯n, σ¯n)]
80: for m ∈ ⋃nj=1 I¯j \ D, in some deterministic order do
81: deliver(m)
82: init epoch()
83: for m ∈ I do
84: send (ID , initiate, e,m) to Pl
Figure 3.4: Protocol PABC for Atomic Broadcast (Part IV)
We describe the parsimonious mode of Protocol PABC by first detailing the normal
protocol operation when the leader functions properly, and then explaining the mechanisms
that ensure that the protocol switches to the recovery mode when the leader is not functioning
properly.
Normal Protocol Operation. When a party receives a request to a-broadcast a pay-
load m, it appends m to I and immediately forwards m using an initiate message to the
leader Pl of the epoch, where l = e mod n (lines 36–38). When this happens, we say Pi
initiates the payload.
The leader binds sequence numbers to the payloads that it receives in initiate mes-
sages, and conveys the bindings to the other parties through strong consistent broadcast.
For this purpose, all parties execute a loop (lines 12–35) that starts with an instance of
strong consistent broadcast (lines 12–23). The leader acts as the sender of strong consistent
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broadcast and the tag contains the epoch e and a sequence number s. Here, s starts from
0 in every epoch. The leader sc-broadcasts the next available initiated payload, and every
party waits to sc-deliver some payload m. When m is sc-delivered, Pi stores it in log , but
does not yet a-deliver it (line 27). At this point in time, we say that Pi has committed
sequence number s to payload m in epoch e. Then, Pi a-delivers the payload to which it has
committed the sequence number s − 2 (if available, lines 28–30). It increments s (line 33)
and returns to the start of the loop.
Delaying the a-delivery of the payload committed to s until sequence number s + 2
has been committed is necessary to prevent the above problem of payloads whose fate is
undefined. However, the delay results in another problem if no further payloads, those with
sequence numbers higher than s, are sc-delivered. We solve this problem by instructing the
leader to send dummy messages to eject the original payload(s) from the buffer. The leader
triggers such a dummy message whenever a corresponding timer T expires (lines 17–18); T
is activated whenever one of the current or the preceding sequence numbers was committed
to a non-dummy payload (lines 31–32), and T is disabled when the leader sc-broadcasts a
non-dummy payload (line 21). Thus, the leader sends at most two dummy payloads to eject a
non-dummy payload.
Failure Detection and Switching to the Recovery Mode. There are two conditions
under which the protocol switches to recovery mode: (1) when B payloads have been com-
mitted (line 35) and (2) when the leader is not functioning properly. The first condition
is needed to keep the buffer log bounded and the second condition is needed to prevent a
corrupted leader from violating liveness.
To determine if the leader of the epoch performs its job correctly, every party has access
to a leader failure detector Fl. For simplicity, Figures 3.1–3.4 do not include the pseudocode
for Fl. The protocol provides an interface complain(), which Fl can asynchronously invoke
to notify the protocol about its suspicion that the leader is corrupted. Our protocol synchro-
nously invokes an interface updateFl of Fl to convey protocol-specific information (during
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execution of the updateFl call, Fl has access to all variables of Protocol PABC).
An implementation of Fl can check whether the leader is making progress based on a
timeout and protocol information as follows. Recall that every party maintains a queue I
of initiated but not yet a-delivered payloads. When Pi has initiated some m, it calls
updateFl(initiate,m) (line 38); this starts a timer TFl unless it is already activated. When
a payload is a-delivered during the parsimonious mode, the call to updateFl(deliver,m)
(line 29) checks whether the a-delivered payload is the first undelivered payload in I, and if
it is, disables TFl . When TFl expires, Fl invokes complain().
When Pi executes complain(), it sends a complain message to all parties (line 43); it
also sets the complained flag (line 44) and stops participating in the sc-broadcasts by not
initializing the next instance. When a correct party receives 2t + 1 complain messages, it
enters the recovery mode. There is a complaint “amplification” mechanism by which a correct
party that has received t+1 complain messages and has not yet complained itself joins the
complaining parties by sending its own complain message. Complaint amplification ensures
that when some correct party enters the recovery mode, all other correct parties eventually
enter it as well.
Recovery Mode
The recovery mode consists of three parts: (1) determining a watermark sequence number,
(2) synchronizing all parties up to the watermark, and (3) delivering some payloads before
entering the next epoch.
Part 1: Agree on Watermark The first part of the recovery mode determines a wa-
termark sequence number w with the properties that (a) at least t + 1 correct parties have
committed all sequence numbers less than or equal to w in epoch e, and (b) no sequence
number higher than w + 2 has been committed by a correct party in epoch e.
Upon entering the recovery mode of epoch e, a party sends out a signed committed
message containing s− 1, the highest sequence number that it has committed in this epoch.
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It justifies s−1 by adding the bit string C that completes the sc-broadcast instance with tag
e and s− 1 (lines 50–51). Then, a party receives n− t such committed messages with valid
signatures and valid completion bit strings. It collects the received committed messages in
a watermark proposal vector W and proposes W for MVBA. Once the agreement protocol
decides on a watermark decision vector W¯ (lines 52–56), the watermark w is set to the
maximum of the sequence numbers in W¯ minus 1 (line 57).
Consider the maximal sequence number s¯j in W¯ and the corresponding C¯j. It may be
that Pj is corrupted or that Pj is the only correct party that ever committed s¯j in epoch e.
But the values contain enough evidence to conclude that at least n − 2t ≥ t + 1 correct
parties contributed to this instance of strong consistent broadcast. Hence, these parties
have previously committed s¯j − 1. This ensures the first property of the watermark above
(see also Lemma 2).
Although one or more correct parties may have committed w + 1 and w + 2, none of
them has already a-delivered the corresponding payloads, because this would contradict the
definition of w. Hence, these sequence numbers can safely be discarded. The discarding also
ensures the second property of the watermark above (see Lemma 5). It is precisely for this
reason that we delay the a-delivery of a payload to which sequence number s was committed
until s+ 2 has been committed. Without it, the protocol could end up in a situation where
up to t correct parties a-delivered a payload with sequence number w + 1 or w + 2, but it
would be impossible for all correct parties to learn about this fact and to learn the a-delivered
payload.
Part 2: Synchronize up to Watermark The second part of the recovery mode (lines 58–
72) ensures that all parties a-deliver the payloads with sequence numbers less than or equal
to w. It does so in a straightforward way using the transferability property of strong consis-
tent broadcast.
In particular, every correct party Pi that has committed sequence number w (there must
be at least t + 1 such correct parties by the definition of w) computes completing strings
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Ms for s = 0, . . . , w that complete the sc-broadcast instance with sequence number s. It
can do so using the information stored in log . Potentially, Pi has to send M0, . . . ,Mw to all
parties, but one can apply the following optimization to reduce the communication. Note
that Pi knows from at least n − t parties Pj their highest committed sequence number sj
(either directly from a committed message or from the watermark decision vector); if Pi
knows nothing from some Pj, it has to assume sj = 0. Then Pi simply sends a complete
message with Msj+1, . . . ,Mw to Pj for j = 1, . . . , n. Every party receives these completing
strings until it is able to a-deliver all payloads committed to the sequence numbers up to w.
Part 3: Deliver Some Messages Part 3 of the recovery mode (lines 73–84) ensures that
the protocol makes progress by a-delivering some messages before the next epoch starts. In
an asynchronous network, implementing this property must rely on randomized agreement
or on a failure detector [FLP85]. This part uses one round of MVBA and is derived from
the atomic broadcast protocol of Cachin et al. [CKPS01].
Every party Pi sends a signed queue message with all undelivered payloads in its ini-
tiation queue to all others (lines 73–74), collects a vector Q of n − t such messages with
valid signatures (lines 75–77), and proposes Q for MVBA. Once the agreement protocol has
decided on a vector Q¯ (lines 78–79), party Pi delivers the payloads in Q¯ according to some
deterministic order (lines 80–81).
Then Pi increments the epoch number and starts the next epoch by re-sending initiate
messages for all remaining payloads in its initiation queue to the new leader (lines 82–84).
3.3.3 Optimizations
Both the BFT and KS protocols process multiple sequence numbers in parallel using a
sliding window mechanism. For simplicity, our protocol description does not include this
optimization and processes only the highest sequence number during every iteration of the
loop in the parsimonious mode. However, Protocol PABC can easily be adapted to process
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Ω payloads concurrently. In that case, up to Ω sc-broadcast instances are active in parallel,
and the delay of two sequence numbers between sc-delivery and a-delivery of a payload is set
to 2Ω. In part 1 of the recovery mode, the watermark is set to the maximum of the sequence
numbers in the watermark decision vector minus Ω, instead of the maximum minus 1.
In our protocol description, the leader sc-broadcasts one initiated payload at a time.
However, Protocol PABC can be modified to process a batch of payload messages at a time
by committing sequence numbers to batches of payloads, as opposed to single payloads. The
leader sc-broadcasts a batch of payloads in one instance, and all payloads in an sc-delivered
batch are a-delivered in some deterministic order. This optimization has been shown to
increase the throughput of the BFT protocol considerably [CL02].
Although the leader failure detector described in Section 3.3.2 is sufficient to ensure live-
ness, it is possible to enhance it using protocol information as follows. The leader in the
parsimonious mode will never have to sc-broadcast more than two dummy messages consecu-
tively to evict non-dummy payloads from the buffer. The failure detector oracle can maintain
a counter to keep track of and restrict the number of successive dummy payloads sc-broadcast
by the leader. If m is a non-dummy payload, the call to updateFl(deliver,m) upon a-delivery
of payload m resets the counter; otherwise, the counter is incremented. If the counter ever
exceeds 2, then Fl invokes the complain() function.
3.3.4 Protocol Complexity
In this section, we examine the message and communication complexities of our protocol.
We assume that strong consistent broadcast is implemented by the echo broadcast protocol
using threshold signatures, and that MVBA is implemented by the protocol of Cachin et
al. [CKPS01], as described in Section 3.2.1.
For a payload m that is a-delivered in the parsimonious mode, the message complexity is
O(n), and the communication complexity is O(n(|m|+K)), where the length of a threshold
signature and a signature share are at most K bits.
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The recovery mode incurs higher message and communication complexities because it
involves Byzantine agreement. The MVBA protocol of Cachin et al. [CKPS01] has an
expected message complexity of O(n2). Hence, determining the watermark in part 1 of the
recovery involves expected O(n2) messages. The corresponding expected communication
complexity is O(n3(|m| +K)) since the proposal values contain O(n) 3-tuples of the form
(sj, Cj, σj), each of length O(|m| + K). Here, m denotes the longest payload contained in
the proposal.
In part 2 of the recovery mode, up to O(n2) complete messages are exchanged. Recall
that a complete message may encompass all payload messages that were previously a-
delivered in the parsimonious mode of the epoch. Each of the w ≤ B completing strings
in a complete message may be O(|m| + K) bits long, where m denotes the longest a-
delivered payload. Hence, the communication complexity of part 2 of the recovery mode is
O(n2B(|m|+K)).
Part 3 of the recovery mode is again dominated by the cost of the MVBA protocol.
Hence, the expected message complexity of part 3 is O(n2) and the expected communication
complexity is O(n3|m|) since the proposal values in MVBA are of length O(n|m|).
To summarize, for a payload that is a-delivered in the recovery mode, the cost is domi-
nated by the MVBA protocol, resulting in an expected message complexity of O(n2) and an
expected communication complexity of O(n2(n+B)(|m|+K)). Assuming that the protocol
stays in the parsimonious mode as long as possible and a-delivers B payloads before execut-





(|m| + K)) bits. It is reasonable to set B À n, so that we achieve
amortized expected message complexity O(n) as claimed.
3.4 Analysis
In this section, we prove the following theorem.
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Theorem 1 Given a digital signature scheme, a protocol for strong consistent broadcast, and
a protocol for multi-valued Byzantine agreement, Protocol PABC provides atomic broadcast
for n > 3t.
We first establish some technical lemmas that describe the properties of Protocol PABC.
Lemma 2 At the point in time when the first correct party has determined the watermark w
during the recovery mode of epoch e, at least t + 1 correct parties have committed sequence
number w in epoch e.
Proof 1 First note that the lemma holds trivially if w = −2, and we may assume w ≥ −1
in the rest of the proof. Let j∗ denote the index of the largest sequence number s¯1, . . . , s¯n
contained in the decision vector W¯ of the agreement with tag ID |watermark.e. Note that
w = s¯j∗ − 1 according to the protocol. By the predicate QID |watermark.e, the string C¯j∗ in
W¯ completes the strong consistent broadcast with tag ID |bind.e.j∗. According to the strong
unforgeability property of strong consistent broadcast, C¯j∗ contains evidence that at least
n − 2t distinct correct parties have participated in the sc-broadcast instance with sequence
number j∗. According to the logic of the parsimonious mode, a correct party initializes an
instance of strong consistent broadcast with tag ID |bind.e.s only after committing sequence
number s − 1. Hence, these n − 2t ≥ t + 1 correct parties have also committed sequence
number s¯∗j − 1 = w.
Lemma 3 If some correct party has entered the recovery mode of epoch e, then all correct
parties eventually enter epoch e+ 1.
Proof 2 To establish the above lemma, we prove the following two claims.
Claim 1: If some correct party has entered the recovery phase of epoch e, then all
correct parties eventually enter the recovery mode of epoch e.
Claim 2: If all correct parties have entered the recovery mode of epoch e, then all
correct parties eventually enter epoch e+ 1.
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By the transitive application of the two claims, the lemma follows.
We first prove Claim 1. Suppose that a correct party Pi enters the recovery mode of
epoch e. Pi does so only after receiving complain messages from 2t+ 1 distinct parties. At
least t+1 of these messages must have been from correct parties. Hence, every correct party
eventually receives t + 1 complain messages and sends its own complain message. Thus,
every correct party eventually receives n− t ≥ 2t+ 1 complain messages and transitions to
the recovery mode of epoch e.
To prove Claim 2, one has to show that a correct party that enters the recovery mode of
epoch e eventually completes all three parts of the recovery and moves to epoch e+ 1.
A correct party completes part 1 of the recovery because it eventually receives n− t valid
committed messages from all correct parties and because all correct parties eventually decide
in the MVBA protocol, according to its termination property.
Part 2 of the recovery mode is concerned with ensuring that all correct parties a-deliver the
set of non-dummy payloads to which sequence numbers less than or equal to w were committed.
Completion of part 2 by a correct party is guaranteed by the transferability property of strong
consistent broadcast as follows. A correct party Pi that has committed sequence number w
first a-delivers non-dummy payloads committed to sequence numbers w−1 and w (if it has not
already done so). Then it sends a message with a set of completing strings {Ms| 0 ≤ s ≤ w}
to all other parties and moves to part 3 of the recovery mode. Here, Ms is the string that
completes the sc-broadcast instance with sequence number s, which can be computed from the
information stored in log. A correct party Pj that has not committed all sequence numbers
less than w waits to receive the corresponding completing strings; Pj is guaranteed to receive
them eventually, since, by Lemma 2, there are at least t+1 correct parties that have committed
sequence number w. Pj then a-delivers all non-dummy payloads with sequence numbers up to
w and moves to part 3 of the recovery mode.
Analogous to part 1, completion of part 3 of the recovery is guaranteed by the fact that
n− t queue messages will eventually be received and by the termination property of MVBA.
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Lemma 4 Suppose e∗ is the largest epoch number at any correct party at the point in time
when t+ 1 correct parties have a-broadcast some payload m, and assume that some correct
party did not a-deliver m before entering epoch e∗. Then some correct party Pi a-delivers m
before entering epoch e∗ + 1.
Proof 3 The lemma is trivially satisfied if Pi a-delivers m during the parsimonious mode
of epoch e∗. Otherwise, m is still present in the initiation queue I of at least t + 1 correct
parties. Since the initiation queues of n − t parties are included in the decision vector of
MVBA in part 3 of the recovery phase, at least one of these queues also contains m, and the
lemma follows.
Lemma 5 Let w be the watermark of epoch e. No correct party commits a sequence number
larger than w + 2 in epoch e, and no correct party a-delivers a payload to which a sequence
number larger than w has been committed in epoch e before reaching part 3 of the recovery
mode.
Proof 4 The proof is by contradiction. Suppose that some correct party Pi has commit-
ted sequence number w′ = w + 3. Then, Pi has previously sc-delivered some m with tag
ID |bind.e.w′, and the strong unforgeability property of strong consistent broadcast implies
that at least n − 2t ≥ t + 1 correct parties have participated in this sc-broadcast instance.
Since correct parties initialize the sc-broadcast instance with tag ID |bind.e.w′ only after
committing the previous sequence number, they have also committed sequence number w′−1.
Therefore, these t+1 correct parties have also sent a signed committed message contain-
ing sequence number w′−1 during recovery. Hence, the decision vector W¯ with n− t entries
signed by distinct parties contained a triple (s¯j∗ , C¯j∗ , σ¯j∗) signed by one of those t+1 correct
parties with s¯j∗ = w
′ − 1. By the agreement property of MVBA, every correct party must
have computed the same W¯ and set w to the maximum among the s¯j values contained in W¯
minus 1, i.e. w = s¯j∗ − 1 = w′ − 2. But this contradicts our assumption that w′ = w + 3.
To prove the second part of the lemma, recall that the a-delivery of the payload to which
sequence number s− 2 has been committed is delayed until after sequence number s has been
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committed. But since no correct party commits a sequence number larger than w + 2, as
shown in the first part of the lemma, no correct party a-delivers any payload to which a
sequence number larger than w has been committed in the parsimonious mode of epoch e.
After the watermark in part 1 of the recovery mode has been determined, as can be seen from
the checks in lines 59 and 68, part 2 ensures that payloads are a-delivered only up to the
watermark; sequence numbers w + 1 and w + 2 are simply discarded.
Lemma 6 Suppose the watermark of epoch e satisfies w ≥ −1. Then all correct parties
eventually a-deliver all non-dummy payloads to which any correct party has committed a
sequence number less than or equal to w in epoch e.
Proof 5 By the agreement and termination properties of MVBA, a correct party Pi even-
tually determines the watermark w of epoch e. During the parsimonious mode, it has a-
delivered all non-dummy payloads with sequence numbers less than s− 2.
When Pi moves to part 2 of the recovery mode, the code in lines 59–62 ensures that Pi
also a-delivers those non-dummy payloads to which sequence numbers s − 2 and s − 1 have
been committed.
Note that w may be smaller or larger than s−1, the highest committed sequence number.
If w < s and Pi has already committed w, then by the logic of the parsimonious mode and
the loop in lines 59–62, Pi eventually a-delivers all non-dummy payloads to which a sequence
number less than or equal to w has been committed.
On the other hand, if w ≥ s and Pi has not yet committed w, it waits to receive a string
{Ms′} that completes the sc-broadcast instance with sequence number s′ for s′ ≤ w. Party Pi
is guaranteed to receive all of them eventually, since there are at least t+1 correct parties that
have committed all sequence numbers up to w by Lemma 2. Pj then a-delivers all non-dummy
payloads to which sequence numbers between s and w have been committed in epoch e.
Lemma 7 In every epoch e, there exists a sequence S of payloads such that any correct party
a-delivers all payloads in epoch e in the order of S.
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Proof 6 We first define a sequence S ′i for every correct Pi and show that the sequences
computed by distinct correct parties are equal.
S ′i is defined as follows. During the parsimonious mode, all payloads that Pi sc-delivers
are appended to S ′i in the order of their delivery. Suppose Pi has entered the recovery phase
and has computed the watermark w; note that S ′i contains s elements. If s > w+ 1, then S
′
i
is truncated to the first w+1 elements; if s ≤ w, then S ′i is extended to w+1 elements by the
payloads that are sc-delivered with tags ID |bind.e.v for v = s, . . . , w through the complete
messages in lines 68–72. During part 3 of the recovery mode, all payloads in ∪nj=1I¯j \ D are
appended to S ′i according to the given deterministic order, according to line 80.
It is easy to see that, except with negligible probability, S ′i = S
′
j for any two correct
parties Pi and Pj from the consistency property of strong consistent broadcast and from the
agreement property of MVBA. Hence, one may think of a global sequence S ′ = S ′i for all Pi.
Note that every party a-delivers all non-dummy payloads in S ′i during epoch e. Hence, the
sequence S is equal to S ′ with all dummy payloads removed.
Proof 7 (Proof of Theorem 8.) We have to show that Protocol PABC satisfies the valid-
ity, agreement, total order, and integrity properties of atomic broadcast.
Validity follows directly from Lemma 4. In fact, Lemma 4 proves a stronger version of
the validity property stated in Section 3.2.2. The reason is that while the validity property
specifies only an “eventual a-delivery” for a payload m that has been a-broadcast by t + 1
correct parties, Lemma 4 shows that m will be delivered relatively quickly.
To show Agreement, suppose that a correct party Pi has a-delivered some m in epoch e.
We have to show that eventually all correct parties a-deliver m.
We first distinguish two cases. In the first case, suppose Pi has a-delivered m before
entering part 3 of the recovery mode in epoch e. Then, Lemma 5 proves that a sequence
number less than or equal to the watermark w of epoch e has been committed to m. Lemma 6
shows that all correct parties eventually a-deliver all non-dummy payloads to which a sequence
number less than or equal to w has been committed, including m. This proves that the
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agreement property holds for the first case.
In the second case, m was a-delivered during part 3 of the recovery mode, after Pi had
terminated the MVBA protocol. Then the agreement and termination properties of MVBA
guarantee that all correct parties eventually terminate the MVBA protocol and a-deliver the
same sequence of payloads.
Hence, we have proved that if Pi a-delivers m in epoch e, all correct parties in epoch e
eventually a-deliver m. Extending the proof to the definition of agreement now only requires
us to show that all correct parties eventually reach epoch e. Lemma 3 implies exactly that.
Hence, by induction on the epoch, it can be easily seen that Protocol PABC satisfies agreement.
The total order property for a particular epoch e is proved by Lemma 7. Hence, by
induction on the epoch number, it can be easily seen that Protocol PABC satisfies total order.
For integrity, we first show that a payload m is a-delivered at most once by a correct party
Pi. Suppose that Pi a-delivers m in epoch e. Then, there are two possibilities, depending
on whether the a-delivery happened before or after part 3 of epoch e’s recovery mode was
entered. In the former case ( a-delivery before part 3 is entered), some sequence number less
than or equal to w must have been committed to m. The check in line 23 ensures that a
sequence number is committed to payload m only if m 6∈ D. In the latter case ( a-delivery
in part 3 of the recovery mode), payload m must have been a part of the decision vector Q¯.
The check in line 80 ensures that only payloads in Q¯ that are not in D are a-delivered in a
deterministic order. Hence, it is clear that a payload m is a-delivered at most once by Pi.
Even if corrupted parties a-broadcast payloads that have already been a-delivered, they are
not a-delivered again.
The second part of the integrity property, i.e., that our protocol only a-delivers payloads
that were previously a-broadcast by some party if all parties are correct, is trivially satisfied
by the protocol.
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Rampart [Rei95] yes yes yes O(n) unbounded
SecureRing [KMMS01] yes yes yes O(n) unbounded
ITUA [RPL+02] yes yes yes O(n) unbounded




BFT [CL02] no yes no O(n2) unbounded
KS [KS05] no no yes O(n2) expected
O(n2)
Protocol PABC no no yes O(n) expected
O(n2)
3.5 Discussion
In this section, we discuss the practical significance of our parsimonious protocol and compare
it with other efficient atomic broadcast protocols.
3.5.1 Practical Significance
In our formal system model, the adversary controls the scheduling of messages and hence the
timeouts; thus, the adversary can cause parties to complain about a correctly functioning
leader resulting in unnecessary transitions from the parsimonious mode to the recovery mode.
Unlike the adversary in our formal model, the network in a real-world setting will not
always behave in the worst possible manner. The motivation for Protocol PABC — or
any optimistic protocol such as the BFT and KS protocols for that matter — is the hope
that timing assumptions based on stable network conditions have a high likelihood of being
accurate. During periods of stability and when no new intrusions are detected, the optimistic
assumption will be satisfied and our protocol will make fast progress in the parsimonious
mode. However, both safety and liveness are still guaranteed even if the network is unstable,
as long as no more than t < n/3 parties are actively misbehaving.
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3.5.2 Comparison
Table 3.1 compares the synchrony assumptions, cryptographic requirements, and message
complexity of Protocol PABC with the other recent Byzantine-fault-tolerant atomic broadcast
protocols mentioned in the introduction. We devote the rest of this section to a more
elaborate comparison with the two protocols closest to ours, namely the BFT protocol and
the KS protocol.
Under stable network conditions and with a correct leader, all three protocols operate
in their optimistic modes. These conditions are likely to apply during most of the running
time of the system. In this case, the linear message and communication complexities of
Protocol PABC compare favorably with the quadratic complexities of the BFT and KS
protocols.
Under unstable network conditions, the deterministic BFT protocol can generate a po-
tentially unbounded number of protocol messages by repeatedly switching from one epoch
to another without making progress. This represents a violation of liveness and is prevented
in the KS protocol and in Protocol PABC, since their recovery modes rely on randomized
agreement and a-deliver some payloads. Naturally, using Byzantine agreement makes our
recovery mode more expensive than the one of the BFT protocol.
The recovery mode of Protocol PABC is slightly more efficient than that of the KS
protocol. The KS protocol requires four iterations of Byzantine agreement in addition to
one iteration for each concurrently handled reliable broadcast instance. The recovery mode
of our protocol uses only two iterations of Byzantine agreement, irrespective of the number
of strong consistent broadcast instances that are concurrently handled.
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3.5.3 Practical Issues
Keeping the Initiation Queue and Delivery Set Bounded
In the above description, Protocol PABC assumes an unbounded initiation queue I and
delivery set D. However, in the broader context, when the protocol is implemented as part
of the agreement phase in a replica, that assumption is not required due to the following
reasons. First, the only payloads that a correct replica initiates are requests from a finite
set of authorized clients.
Second, the number of requests from a given client both in the initiation queue and
delivery set can be limited. Client requests can be required to carry timestamps; then,
the agreement phase participant keeps track of the timestamp of the last initiated request
and the last a-delivered request from a given client. If a payload containing the request
from client C with timestamp t has been initiated or a-delivered by a correct agreement
phase participant, then from that point on, the replica will not accept payloads containing
requests from C with lower timestamps for initiation. Hence, a correct agreement phase
participant has at most one1 outstanding request from a given client in its initiation queue.
An additional check can be included in the deliver(m) function to check whether the payload
m representing some request from a client C carries a timestamp greater than that of the
last a-delivered request from C; if so, then m is discarded (just like dummy payloads) and not
a-delivered.
Third, we introduce an acknowledgment mechanism for the a-delivered payloads. The
agreement phase (Protocol PABC) and the execution phase (Protocol APE) have a producer-
consumer relationship, in which the delivery set at Protocol PABC serves as the input for the
execution phase. After a-delivering a payload containing a client request, Protocol PABC
blocks until the it has obtained a reply certificate for the request.
1It is straightforward to generalize to some finite number, say K, of outstanding requests.
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3.6 A Latency-Efficient Variant
In this section, we present the latency-efficient variant of Protocol PABC whose parsimonious
phase uses a variant of strong consistent broadcast called short strong consistent broadcast.
Short strong consistent broadcast provides the same properties as strong consistent broad-
cast; the only difference is in the implementation. The strong consistent broadcast imple-
mentation described in Section 3.2.1 and shown in Figure 3.5(a) uses a centralized approach
(based on the designated sender) first to collect the quorum of n− t signed echoes and then
to disseminate the collected echoes to other parties. Such an implementation involves 3
communication steps: one for the designated sender to convey the payload, one to collect
the echoes, and one to disseminate the echoes.
Short strong consistent broadcast is a simple variant that instead uses a decentralized
approach to collect the echoes. As Figure 3.5(b) shows, there are only two communication
steps: one for the designated sender to convey the payload and another for the parties to
exchange their signed echoes with each other.
If the designated sender is correct, then in both implementations, the parties obtain the
quorum of n−t echoes for the payload. On the other hand, if the designated sender is faulty,
it is possible in both implementations that some correct party obtains the quorum of n− t
echoes while other correct parties do not.
A consequence of using a decentralized approach to collect echoes is that the commu-
nication pattern in the second communication step is no longer many-to-one; instead, it is
many-to-many. Hence, short strong consistent broadcast trades communication steps for
message complexity.
3.7 Summary
We described an optimally resilient protocol that, for the first time, achieves asynchronous
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(b) Short Strong Consistent Broadcast
Figure 3.5: Strong Consistent Broadcast versus Short Strong Consistent Broadcast
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vious best solutions used Θ(n2) messages. We also described a variant protocol that, for
the first time, achieves asynchronous atomic broadcast with latency degree 2 per payload
message while providing optimal fault resilience. The previous best optimally resilient solu-
tions had latency degree 3. Despite intrusions and instability, our protocol guarantees both
safety and liveness as long as no more than t < n/3 parties are corrupted by the adver-
sary. Our use of strong consistent broadcast, instead of reliable broadcast as in the BFT
and KS protocols, introduces an additional digital signature computation at each party for
every delivered payload. However, the intended deployment environments for our protocol
are WANs, where message latency typically exceeds the time to perform digital signature





We propose a resource-efficient way to execute requests in Byzantine-fault-tolerant repli-
cation that is particularly well-suited for services in which request processing is resource-
intensive. Previous efforts took a failure-masking all-active approach of using all execution
replicas to execute all requests; at least 2t + 1 execution replicas are needed to mask t
Byzantine faulty ones. We describe an asynchronous protocol that provides resource-efficient
execution by combining failure masking with imperfect failure detection and checkpointing.
Our protocol is parsimonious since it uses only t + 1 execution replicas, called the primary
committee or PC, to execute the requests under normal conditions characterized by a sta-
ble network and no misbehavior by PC replicas; thus, a trustworthy reply can be obtained
with the same latency but with only about half of the overall resource use of the all-active
approach. However, a request that exposes faults among the PC replicas will cause the
protocol to switch to a recovery mode, in which all 2t + 1 replicas execute the request and
send their replies; then, after selecting a new PC, the protocol switches back to parsimonious
execution. Such a request will incur a higher latency using our approach than the all-active
approach mainly due to fault detection latency. Practical observations point to the fact that
failures and instability are the exception rather than the norm. That motivated our decision
to optimize resource efficiency for the common case, even if it means paying a slightly higher
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Figure 4.1: Successive Steps for Obtaining Efficient Execution in BFT Replication
4.1 Introduction
We propose a resource-efficient way to execute requests in BFT replication that is particularly
well-suited for services in which request execution is resource-intensive (e.g., computation-
intensive). The previous best way was the one proposed by Yin et al. that used 2t + 1
execution replicas. Previous work followed an all-active approach (Figures 4.1(a) and (b)),
in which all execution replicas executed the request. We observe that while 2t+1 execution
replicas is the minimum number of replicas needed to mask t corrupted ones, the client needs
only a set of t + 1 identical replies (we call this set the reply certificate) before considering
the reply to be trustworthy. The reason is that identical replies from t+1 execution replicas
will always include the reply from at least one correct replica. Hence, that reply value must
be correct. We leveraged the above observation and designed an optimistic protocol for the
execution replicas that normally uses only a fraction of the available resources (i.e., t+1 out
of 2t+ 1 replicas) for request execution; hence we call our protocol parsimonious.
Our protocol is based on the optimistic hope [Kur02] that normally the network is well-
behaved and a designated set of t+ 1 replicas function properly. When the optimistic hope
is satisfied, reply certificates are obtained with the same latency, but with only about half
of the overall resource use of the all-active approach. Overall resource use is the average
resource use at a replica times the number of replicas.
The approach does have a price: if the optimistic hope is not satisfied, the latency for
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obtaining the reply certificate is higher than it is in the all-active approach due to failure-
detection latency. However, even under such situations, our protocol guarantees safety and
liveness, subject only to the condition that messages are delivered eventually. Even in NISs
that are high-value attack targets, such situations are expected to be rare. Hence, it makes
sense to optimize for the common case, and be prepared for the rare situations in which a
higher price may be paid.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 describes an abstraction of
the agreement phase that simplifies our protocol presentation. The protocol is presented in
Section 4.3 and analyzed in Section 4.4. Section 4.5 discusses the practical significance of
our protocol, lists applications for it, and compares it with related work. Finally, Section 4.6
summarizes the chapter.
4.2 The Agreement Phase Abstraction
In the description of the parsimonious execution protocol, we consider the agreement phase
as an abstract service that guarantees certain properties relating to the ordering of client
requests. We use AS to denote that service. Abstracting the agreement phase participants
as one logical entity allows us to keep the focus on the execution replicas with whose behavior
the parsimonious execution protocol is concerned. Later, in Section 4.5.3, we remove this
assumption of a single-entity trusted agreement service. The functionality provided by AS is
the binding of sequence numbers (starting from 1 and without gaps) to request certificates,
and the conveying of the bindings to the execution phase through agreement certificate
messages. AS does not require any information about what execution replicas constitute
the PC and sends the agreement certificate messages to all the replicas. An agreement
certificate message binds a sequence number s to a client’s request certificate. In our protocol
description, the message has the form (agree, s, o,flag), where the retransmit flag is either
true or false. For notational simplicity, we include only the service operation o contained
in the client’s request certificate, rather than the full certificate. First, AS sends an agree
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message with the flag value false. IfAS does not receive a reply certificate before a timeout,
then it retransmits the agree message with the flag value true. We use the term first-time
agree(s) to denote the agree message with sequence number s and flag value false. We
use the term retransmit agree(s) to denote the agree message with sequence number s and
flag value true.
AS provides the following guarantees to the execution replicas:
Agreement If a correct execution replica receives an agreement certificate that binds se-
quence number s to request certificate rc, then no other correct execution replica receives
an agreement certificate that binds s to another request certificate rc′, where rc′ 6= rc.
Liveness If a client sends a request certificate r to AS, then all correct execution replicas
eventually receive an agreement certificate that binds some sequence number s to rc.
The above properties of AS allow the BFT-replicated service to tolerate an arbitrary
number of corrupted clients; even if corrupted clients’ requests are executed, those clients
cannot cause the service states of correct execution replicas to become inconsistent. Client
access control and request-filtering policies [CL02,YMV+03] can be enforced in the imple-
mentation of AS; the policies can effectively limit the number and scope of requests from
corrupted clients.
4.3 The Asynchronous Parsimonious Execution
(APE) Protocol
We now present Protocol APE, a protocol for the execution replicas that allows for asyn-
chronous parsimonious execution of client requests.
4.3.1 Protocol Properties
A protocol for the execution phase satisfies the following properties:
Total Order: For any two correct execution replicas Pi and Pj, their internal states just
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after execution of the request indicated by agree(s) are the same.
Update Integrity: Any correct execution replica updates its internal state in response to
the request indicated by agree(s) at most once, and only if AS actually sent that message.
Result Integrity: If r is the result value in the reply certificate received byAS for agree(s),
then at least one correct execution replica sent a reply message for agree(s) with result
value r.
Liveness: If AS sends agree(s) to the execution replicas, it eventually receives a reply
certificate for agree(s).
4.3.2 Protocol Overview
To generate a reply certificate for one client request, the execution replicas may go through
at most three modes of protocol operation: a parsimonious normal mode, a parsimonious
audit mode, and a recovery mode. Figure 4.2 shows a state transition diagram for the three
modes.
Normally, Protocol APE will operate in the parsimonious normal mode, in which only a
designated active set of t+ 1 execution replicas execute requests from the agreement phase
and reply directly to the agreement phase (Figure 4.1(c)). The t+1 active replicas constitute
what we call a primary committee, or PC for short. We call the t non-PC execution replicas
backups. There is no need for communication among the execution replicas, and the replies
to the agreement phase use cheap message authentication codes (MACs) for authentication.
Backups do nothing, aside from receiving the requests from the agreement phase. Non-receipt
of a reply certificate at the agreement phase before a timeout will cause the agreement phase
to resend the request to the execution phase. That will cause the protocol to transition to
the parsimonious audit mode.
The parsimonious audit mode is similar to the parsimonious normal mode, in that back-
ups do not execute the request. However, PC replicas execute the request (if they haven’t
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Figure 4.2: The Three Modes of Protocol Operation
digital signatures allows any execution replica that has received a reply certificate to forward
the reply certificate to the agreement phase in a verifiable manner. All replicas (whether PC
replicas or backups) monitor the progress made by the PC replicas; hence the name audit
mode. If the replicas receive a reply certificate in a timely manner from the PC, the protocol
will switch back to the parsimonious normal mode. Otherwise, the replicas can effectively
determine whether some PC replica is blocking progress, and if enough replicas determine
so, then the protocol switches to the recovery mode.
In the recovery mode, all replicas execute the request and send their signed replies to
other execution replicas (if they haven’t already). At backups, the execution of the request
will be preceded by updating of the state. Checkpointing is used to guarantee that backups
can bring their state up to date. Because all 2t+1 execution replicas reply, a reply certificate
is guaranteed to be obtained eventually, even if t replicas are faulty. The execution replicas
then change the PC and switch back to the parsimonious normal mode for the next request.
4.3.3 Protocol Details
We now describe Protocol APE’s operation in each of the three modes and the triggers that
cause the transitions among the modes. The line numbers refer to the detailed protocol
description in Figures 4.3–4.7.
In the following description, we use P1, P2, . . . , Pne to denote the execution replicas, where
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Protocol APE for execution replica Pi with input parameter δ (checkpoint interval)
initialization:
1: PC ← {P1, P2, . . . , Pt+1} {current primary committee}
2: corrupt ← ∅ {set of replicas for which Pi has sent convict messages}
3: slow ← ∅ {set of replicas for which Pi has sent indict messages since last reset}
4: c← 0 {counter indicating number of resets of the set slow}
5: certified ← ∅ {set of sequence numbers of requests for which Pi has reply certificates}
6: R← [] {array of size (δ − 1) containing operations requested by AS}
7: s← 0 {sequence number in the last agree message received from AS}
8: u← 0 {sequence number up to which Pi’s state is updated}
9: replies ← ∅ {set of reply messages received from replicas}
10: suspects ← ∅ {set of suspect messages for various replicas received}
11: must do ← ∅ {set of sequence numbers of requests that Pi must execute even if
Pi 6∈ PC}
Figure 4.3: Protocol APE for Byzantine-Fault-Tolerant Request Execution (Part I)
ne ≥ 2t+1 for a desired fault resilience t. The rank of replica Pi is i. 〈m〉σi is used to denote
a message m signed by replica Pi. Pi maintains a local sequence number variable s, where
s − 1 indicates the highest sequence number for which Pi is sure that AS has obtained a
reply certificate.
Pi maintains two sets, slow and corrupt , initialized to empty sets. The PC consists of
the (t + 1) lowest-ranked replicas that are neither in slow nor in corrupt . Hence, initially,
the primary committee at all replicas consists of the (t + 1) lowest-ranked replicas, namely
{P1, P2, . . . , Pt+1}. If two replicas have the same slow and corrupt sets, then their respective
primary committees will also be the same. For example, if t = 3, then the primary committee
at all replicas would initially be {P1, P2, P3, P4}. If replica P2 was later added to replica P4’s
slow or corrupt set, then the primary committee at replica P4 would become {P1, P3, P4, P5}.
To simplify the description of Protocol APE, we assume that AS sends its next request
after receiving the reply certificate for its previous request, i.e., AS has only one outstanding




12: wait for receipt of first-time agree(s+ 1) or retransmit agree(s) message from AS
{Mode 1: Parsimonious Normal Mode}
13: if message received was first-time agree(s+ 1) and (s+ 1) mod δ 6= 0 then
14: s← s+ 1
15: R[s mod δ]← o, where o is the service operation specified in the agree message
16: if Pi ∈ PC then
17: r ← obtain reply()
18: send reply(r, normal)
{Mode 2: Parsimonious Audit Mode}
19: else {retransmit agree(s) or first-time agree(s+ 1) checkpoint request}
20: if message received was first-time agree(s + 1) and (s + 1) mod δ = 0 then
{checkpoint}
21: s← s+ 1
22: repeat
23: oldpc← PC
24: if (Pi ∈ PC) then
25: r ← obtain reply()
26: send reply(r, audit)
27: updateFD(start-monitor, s)
28: wait for s ∈ certified or s ∈ must do or oldpc 6= PC
29: updateFD(stop-monitor, s)
30: until s ∈ certified or s ∈ must do
31: if (s ∈ certified) then
32: send reply certificate for agree(s) to AS
{Mode 3: Recovery Mode}
33: else {s ∈ must do}
34: r ← obtain reply()
35: send reply(r, recover)
Figure 4.4: Protocol APE for Byzantine-Fault-Tolerant Request Execution (Part II)
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function send reply(r,mode):
36: if (mode = normal) then
37: send the message (reply, i, s, r) to AS
38: else
39: send the message 〈reply, i, s, r〉σi to all replicas
function obtain reply():
40: if ∃ r: (replies contains 〈reply, k, s, r〉σk messages from t+ 1 distinct Pk or
(reply, i, s, r) ∈ replies) then
41: return r
42: else {need to actually execute request to obtain result}
43: if u 6= (s− 1) then
44: state update()
45: if (s mod δ 6= 0) then
46: o←R[s mod δ]
47: r ← execute(o)
48: else
49: r ← checkpoint() {take checkpoint, and return digest of internal state}
50: u← s
51: store reply((reply, i, s, r), i)
52: return r
function state update(): {update state to reflect execution of requests up to seq. number s− 1}
53: stable ← absolute(s/δ) ∗ δ
54: if (u < stable) then
55: find digest r : (replies contains 〈reply, k, stable, r〉σk messages from t+ 1 distinct
Pk)
56: certifiers ← set of t+1 distinct Pk whose reply messages form reply certificate for
stable
57: send the message (state-request, stable) to all Pk ∈ certifiers
58: wait for receipt of state updates such that digest of internal state after applying
them equals r
59: for u = (max (stable, u) + 1), . . . , (s− 1) do
60: o←R[u mod δ]
61: execute(o)
upon receiving message 〈reply, j, sj , rj〉σj from Pj 6∈ corrupt for the first time:
62: if i 6= j then
63: store reply(m, j)
Figure 4.5: Protocol APE for Byzantine-Fault-Tolerant Request Execution (Part III)
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function store reply(m, j): where m =
{
〈reply, j, sj , rj〉σj if j 6= i
(reply, i, si, ri) otherwise
64: replies ← replies ∪ {m}
65: if j 6= i then
66: for replicas Pk s.t. (〈suspect, k, j, sj , c〉σk ∈ suspects) do
67: forward m to Pk
68: if ∃ r: replies contains 〈reply, k, sj , r〉σk messages from t+ 1 distinct Pk then
69: certificate ← set of 〈reply, k, sj , r〉σk messages from t+ 1 distinct Pk
70: if (sj 6∈ certified) then
71: certified ← certified ∪ {sj}
72: if (sj ∈ must do) then
73: send certificate to AS
74: updateFD(got-reply, j, sj)
function pc refresh():
75: if |corrupt ∪ slow | > t then
76: c← c+ 1
77: slow ← ∅
78: suspects ← ∅
79: PC ← set of (t+ 1)-lowest-ranked replicas that are neither in slow nor in corrupt
function fault report(k, type, sk):
80: if type = mute-suspect then
81: send 〈suspect, i, k, sk, c〉σi to all replicas
82: else if type = implicate then
83: find Pj : (Pj 6∈ corrupt and 〈reply, j, sk, rj〉σj ∈ replies and
〈reply, k, sk, rk〉σk ∈ replies and rk 6= rj)
84: proof ← {〈reply, j, sk, rj〉σj , 〈reply, k, sk, rk〉σk}
85: send (implicate, sk, proof ) to all replicas
86: must do ← must do ∪ {sk}
87: else {type = convict}
88: certificate ← set of 〈reply, j, sk, r〉σj messages from t+ 1 distinct Pj
89: proof ← certificate ∪ {〈reply, k, sk, rk〉σk}
90: send (convict, k, sk, proof ) to all replicas
91: corrupt ← corrupt ∪ {Pk}
92: must do ← must do ∪ {sk}
93: pc refresh()
Figure 4.6: Protocol APE for Byzantine-Fault-Tolerant Request Execution (Part IV)
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upon receiving message 〈suspect, j, k, sj , c〉σj from Pj 6∈ corrupt for the first time:
94: if Pk’s reply message for agree(sj) is in replies then
95: forward Pk’s reply message for agree(sj) to replica Pj
96: suspects ← suspects ∪ {〈suspect, j, k, sj , c〉σj}
97: if Pk 6∈ slow and 〈suspect, h, k, sj , c〉σh messages from n− t distinct Ph are in suspects
then
98: not responsive(sj , k)
upon receiving message (indict, k, sj , c, proof ) from Pj 6∈ corrupt for the first time:
99: if (sj 6∈ must do) or (Pk 6∈ corrupt ∪ slow) then
100: if (proof contains 〈suspect, h, k, sj , c〉σh messages from n− t distinct Ph) then
101: suspects ← suspects ∪ proof
102: not responsive(sj , k)
function not responsive(s′, k):
103: send (indict, k, s′, c, proof ) to all replicas, where proof is set of 〈suspect, j, k, s′, c〉σj
messages from n− t distinct Pj
104: slow ← slow ∪ {Pk}
105: must do ← must do ∪ {s′}
106: pc refresh()
upon receiving message (implicate, sj , proof ) from Pj 6∈ corrupt for the first time:
107: if ∃ Pk, Ph : 〈reply, k, sj , rk〉σk ∈ proof and 〈reply, h, sj , rh〉σh ∈ proof and rh 6= rk
then
108: for m ∈ proof \ replies do
109: store reply(m, sender(m))
upon receiving message (convict, k, sj , proof ) from Pj 6∈ corrupt for the first time:
110: if proof contains 〈reply, h, sj , r〉σh messages from t+ 1 distinct Ph and
〈reply, k, sj , rk〉σk ∈ proof and r 6= rk then
111: for m ∈ proof \ replies do
112: store reply(m, sender(m))
Figure 4.7: Protocol APE for Byzantine-Fault-Tolerant Request Execution (Part V)
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Parsimonious Normal Mode
When Pi receives a first-time agree(s + 1) message, the protocol at Pi moves to the par-
simonious normal mode (lines 19–24). Pi maintains a queue of requested operations called
R, and adds the service operation indicated in the agree message to the queue. Because of
our assumption that AS has at most one outstanding request, Pi can be sure that AS has
obtained a reply certificate for agree(s) when it receives the first-time agree(s+1) message.
Hence, Pi increments its sequence number variable s.
If Pi 6∈ PC, then it does nothing more in this mode. On the other hand, if Pi ∈ PC, then
it executes the service operation indicated in the agree message, and sends the result r of
the execution to AS in a reply message of the form (reply, i, s, r). Pi also adds its reply
message to replies , a data structure that all replicas have to store reply messages from
themselves and other replicas. Since the replicated state machines are deterministic and the
request execution is done in sequence number order, the r values in the reply messages sent
by all correct replicas will be identical.
In the normal case, the reply messages from the PC replicas will be sufficient for AS to
obtain a reply certificate, which it then forwards to the respective client. AS can then issue
the agree message with the next sequence number s+ 1.
Transition from Normal to Audit Mode
The protocol at Pi transitions to the parsimonious audit mode from the parsimonious normal
mode when
• Pi receives a retransmit agree(s) message from AS and thereby learns that AS did
not get a reply certificate for agree(s) in a timely manner, or
• Pi receives a checkpoint request.
A checkpoint request is a message of the form (agree, s + 1, o, true), where s + 1 is
divisible by the checkpoint interval δ. After every δ − 1 agree messages, AS generates a
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special agree message in which the requested operation o is a checkpoint operation1. When
Pi receives the checkpoint request, Pi knows that AS must have received a reply certificate
for agree(s), and hence increments s. Executing a checkpoint operation involves taking a
snapshot of the replicated service states and computing the digest of the snapshot. The
result field r of the reply message for a checkpoint request will contain the checkpoint
digest. If Pi has obtained a reply certificate for a checkpoint request with sequence number
s, we say that the (s/δ)th checkpoint is stable at Pi. Checkpointing, as will be shown later,
is useful for the efficient update of a backup’s state when it has to switch to the recovery
mode. Checkpointing also allows the garbage collection of reply and agree messages with
sequence numbers less than that of the last stable checkpoint.
Parsimonious Audit Mode
In this mode (lines 25–38), though backups do not execute the request (hence, this mode
is labeled parsimonious), both backups and PC replicas monitor the progress made by the
PC replicas in generating a reply certificate for the request (hence, this is called the audit
mode). Specifically, upon switching to the audit mode, an execution replica Pi starts a timer
and expects to obtain a reply certificate before the timer expiry. If progress is not being
made, the replicas collectively switch the protocol to the recovery mode, in which all correct
replicas generate their own reply messages (if they hadn’t done so previously) and ensure
that AS obtains a reply certificate. If, on the other hand, the replicas indeed receive a reply
certificate in a timely manner from the PC, they forward the certificate to AS, and the
protocol will switch back to the parsimonious normal mode.
To enable the monitoring of progress, the PC replicas are required to send signed reply
messages to all execution replicas. A PC replica Pj retrieves the result value of the reply
message from the replies data structure if it had previously sent a reply message to AS
in the parsimonious normal mode. Otherwise, Pj obtains the result value by executing the
1Alternatively, execution replicas can self-issue a checkpoint request after δ requests from AS.
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operation specified in the corresponding agree message from AS.
Failure Detection and Transition from Audit to Recovery Mode
An execution replica Pi may not be able to obtain a reply certificate before its local timer
expiry for one or both of the following reasons:
• Slow Replies: A PC replica is (deliberately or unintentionally) slow in sending its reply
message.
• Wrong Replies: A PC replica did send its reply message, but with the wrong result
value.
To determine if the PC is performing its job correctly, every replica Pi has access to a
failure detector oracle FD. For simplicity, Figs. 4.3–4.7 do not include the pseudocode for
FD. The protocol provides an interface fault report that FD can asynchronously invoke to
notify the protocol about the misbehavior of some replica. FD, in turn, provides an interface
updateFD that Protocol APE synchronously invokes to convey protocol-specific information.
During the execution of the updateFD function, FD can read the global data structures and
variables of Protocol APE.
An implementation of FD at a replica Pi can check whether the PC replicas are function-
ing properly based on a local timeout and protocol information as follows. When Pi is in the
audit mode, the call to updateFD(start-monitor, s) starts a timer TFD (line 33). If the PC
changes, or if Pi obtains a reply certificate for agree(s), or if the protocol switches to the re-
covery mode, the call to updateFD(stop-monitor, s) disables the timer TFD (line 35). When
TFD expires, FD notifies Protocol APE by invoking the fault report(k, mute-suspect, s) for
each PC replica Pk whose reply message for agree(s) has not yet been received. Pi sends
a signed suspect message for Pk to all execution replicas (line 104). The suspect message
for Pk has the form 〈suspect, i, k, s, c〉σi , where s is the sequence number and c is a variable
called the reset counter. The reset counter is an artefact of imperfect failure detection and
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is used to keep track of the number of times the slow set is reset or cleared to account for
that imperfection. We discuss this in detail in section 4.3.4.
Consider the point in time when Pi’s suspect message for Pk is received at a correct
replica Pj. If Pj (has received or) later receives Pk’s reply message with sequence number s,
then Pj simply forwards Pk’s replymessage to Pi upon receiving Pi’s suspectmessage. This
reply forwarding (lines 89–90 and lines 117–118) ensures that if at least one correct replica
has received Pk’s reply message for agree(s), then all correct replicas will eventually receive
Pk’s message. On the other hand, if no correct replica has received Pk’s reply message for
agree(s) in a timely fashion (determined by the replicas’ respective local timers), then each
of the n − t correct replicas will generate a suspect message for Pk. A correct replica Pi
keeps track of all the suspect messages it receives by storing them in a data structure,
suspects (line 119).
After receiving 〈suspect, j, k, s, c〉σj messages from n − t distinct Pjs (lines 120–121),
replica Pi adds Pk to its slow set and sends an indict
2 message of the form (indict, k, s, c, proof )
to all replicas, where proof contains the signed suspect messages. Pi also adds s to a set
must do that is used to keep track of the sequence numbers of those requests that caused
the protocol to switch to recovery mode; the set is so named because all replicas, whether
PC or backup, must send their own reply messages for those requests. Having added the
PC replica Pk to its slow set, Pi updates its PC accordingly. Any replica Pj at which
Pk 6∈ slow ∪ corrupt that receives Pi’s indict message will add Pk to its slow set, add s to
the must do set, send its own similar indict message for Pk to all replicas, and update its
PC (lines 122–125).
To identify wrong replies, Protocol APE invokes the updateFD(got-reply, j, sj) function
(line 97) when the protocol receives Pj’s reply message for agree(sj). FD compares the
result value in the reply message with the values in the reply messages received from other
2The legal term “indict” means “to make a formal accusation against a party by the findings of a jury.”
In Protocol APE, the “jury” comprising the n− t replicas, having not received replica Pk’s reply message for
agree(s) in a timely manner, accuses replica Pk of being slow.
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replicas for agree(sj). Because the state machines are deterministic and request execution
is done in sequence number order, any difference in the result values of reply messages from
two replicas indicates that at least one of them is corrupted. However, to be able to pinpoint
in a provable manner which of those two replicas is corrupt, a reply certificate is needed; any
replica whose replymessage contains a result value different from that in a reply certificate is
corrupt. When Pj’s result value differs from that in a previously received reply (say from Pk)
but a reply certificate for agree(sj) has not yet been obtained, FD notifies Protocol APE by
invoking the fault report(k, implicate, sk) function. Replica Pi then sends an implicate
3
message of the form (implicate, s, proof ) to all replicas, where proof contains Pj and Pk’s
reply messages (lines 106–108). A recipient Pk of Pi’s implicate message will not know
which of the implicated replicas is actually corrupt, but will be convinced of the need to
switch to the recovery mode and add s to the must do set.
Repeated Transitions from Normal to Audit Mode A corrupted PC replica can
cleverly degrade protocol performance by repeatedly refraining from sending a replymessage
to AS, thereby forcing a transition from the normal to audit mode, while behaving properly
in the audit mode. That would result in frequent transitions from the normal to audit mode
and back to normal mode, without a change in the PC.
Protocol APE addresses the above problem as follows. If the fraction of requests that
resulted in a transition from the normal to audit mode exceeds a fixed threshold, the protocol
operates semi-permanently in the audit mode until the next transition to the recovery mode.
After the PC is changed in the recovery mode, the protocol reverts back to the normal mode.
3The legal term “implicate” means “to bring into incriminating connection.” In Protocol APE, the
implicate message brings two or more replicas into connection with a malicious fault, yet does not pinpoint
which replica(s) are actually the corrupted one(s).
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Recovery Mode
Only the PC replicas send reply messages in the normal and audit modes. In the recovery
mode (lines 39–41), however, backups are also required to send signed reply messages to
other replicas. Because at least t+1 replicas are correct, the recovery mode guarantees that
a reply certificate for agree(s) will eventually be obtained. As in the audit mode, the reply
certificate is then forwarded to AS.
To send a reply message, a backup first has to determine the result value corresponding
to the request contained in agree(s). As before, the result is obtained from a reply certificate
(if previously received), or otherwise by actual execution of the request. Before executing
the operation specified in the agree(s) message, however, a backup Pi has to ensure that
its state is up-to-date. For this purpose, all replicas maintain a variable u to keep track
of how up-to-date their state is. Only when u becomes equal to s − 1 can Pi execute the
operation specified in the agree(s) message. Bringing the state up to date may involve two
steps (lines 76–84):
• If u < stable at Pi, where stable is the sequence number of Pi’s last stable checkpoint,
then Pi first obtains the state corresponding to the execution of all requests with se-
quence numbers up to stable (lines 77–81). Pi determines the t+1 replicas whose reply
messages form the reply certificate for agree(stable). Pi then requests the state corre-
sponding to that checkpoint by sending a message of the form (state-request, stable)
to those t + 1 replicas. Since at least one of the replicas is correct, Pi is guaranteed
eventually to obtain the state corresponding to that checkpoint. Pi can easily verify
whether the state transferred is correct; Pi computes the digest of a copy of the state
obtained after it has applied the updates indicated in the state transfer, and then
compares the digest with the one present in the certificate for the stable checkpoint.
If the two digests are equal, then the state transferred is correct. Pi then changes the
value of u to be equal to stable.
• Pi updates its state to reflect the execution of requests with sequence numbers from
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u+1 to s−1 (lines 82–84). To perform the update, Pi retrieves those requests from the
agree messages stored in the local R queue, and then actually executes those requests.
Computation of checkpoint digests and state transfer can be made efficient through the
use of incremental checkpointing techniques described in [CL02].
Once a reply certificate has been obtained, it is easy to pinpoint which of the previously
implicated replicas (if any) are actually corrupt. If the call to updateFD(got-reply, k, sk)
function detects that Pk’s result value for agree(sk) differs from that in a reply certificate,
then FD notifies Protocol APE that Pk is corrupted by invoking the fault report(k, convict, sk)
function. Replica Pi adds Pk to its local corrupt set, updates its PC accordingly, and shares
this information about Pk with other replicas by sending a convict message to all replicas
(lines 110–116). The convict4 message has the form (convict, k, s, proof ), where proof
contains the reply certificate and replica Pk’s reply message for agree(s). Once a correct
replica has added Pk to its corrupt set, it discards any further protocol messages received
directly from Pk.
Primary Committee Changes
At a correct execution replica, any PC change (line 102) is the result of a change in the sets
slow or corrupt and is always accompanied by the sending of indict or convict messages
respectively. Thus, it is not possible for corrupted replicas to force a change in the PC when
the PC indeed consists of correct and timely replicas. Those messages contain sufficient
proof to convince any other correct execution replica to effect the same change in its own
local slow or corrupt sets. As a result, even though correct replicas may temporarily differ
in their perspectives of the primary committee, their perspectives will eventually concur.
4The legal term “convict” means “to find or prove guilty.”
70
4.3.4 Neutralizing the Effect of Inaccurate Muteness Failure
Detection
Since the adversary corrupts at most t replicas and the only replicas added to the corrupt set
are those that actually exhibited malicious failures, the corrupt set at a correct replica never
exceeds t. However, due to inaccurate failure detection, it is possible that correct replicas
will get added to the slow set, and subsequently, |slow ∪ corrupt | may exceed t (line 98).
To allow the next PC to be chosen, whenever |slow ∪ corrupt | = t+1, the slow set is reset
to the empty set, ∅ (line 100). A reset counter c is used to keep track of the number of resets
(line 99). Both suspect and indict messages carry an indication of the reset counter value.
This allows the garbage collection of all suspect messages with lower reset-counter values,
whenever c is incremented (line 101).
Since a correct replica Pi sends an indict message for each new entry to its local slow set
and a convict message for each new entry to its local corrupt set, if Pi encounters a situation
in which |slow ∪ corrupt | > t, then any correct replica Pj will also eventually encounter a
situation |slow ∪ corrupt | > t. Thus, if the reset-counter c at replica Pi is incremented, then
eventually all correct replicas will also increment their respective reset-counters to c+ 1.
4.4 Analysis
In this section, we prove the following theorem.
Theorem 8 Given an agreement phase abstraction, Protocol APE provides BFT replication
for n > 2t.
We first establish some technical lemmas that describe the properties of Protocol APE.
Lemma 9 (Total Order) At any two correct execution replicas Pi and Pj, their internal
states just after executing the request indicated by agree(s) are the same.
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Proof 8 The replicas implement deterministic state machines and are initialized to the same
internal state. Recall that AS satisfies the agreement property specified in Section 4.2. These
facts directly imply that the lemma is trivially satisfied for s = 1. For s > 1, Pi and Pj will
execute the request indicated by agree(s) (line 70) only after the internal state has been
brought up to date to reflect the execution of all requests up to sequence number s− 1, i.e.,
u must be equal to s− 1.
As can be seen in the state update() function (lines 76–84), the state update may involve
two parts. If u < stable, then the state update is done up to the last stable checkpoint. Any
replica that obtains state updates in response to its state-request message checks (using
the digest of the last stable checkpoint) whether the received state updates are correct before
actually applying them (line 81). When u = stable, the requests corresponding to sequence
numbers from stable+1 to s−1 are executed in sequence number order (lines 82–84). Thus,
when u = s − 1 at two correct execution replicas Pi and Pj, their internal states will be
identical. Then, it follows from the determinism of the state machines and the agreement
property of AS that Pi and Pj’s internal states will be the same after they have executed the
request indicated by agree(s).
Lemma 10 (Update Integrity) Any correct execution replica updates its internal state
in response to the request indicated by agree(s) at most once, and only if AS actually sent
that message.
Proof 9 We first show that the request indicated by the agree(s) message is executed at
most once by a correct execution replica Pi. The only time when the request indicated by the
agree(s) message is executed by Pi is during the obtain reply() function at line 70. After
obtaining the result value r, Pi stores its own reply message for agree(s) in the replies data
structure (line 74). Any subsequent invocations of the obtain reply() function (lines 23, 31,
and 40) will not execute the request again, since the function will retrieve the reply from the
replies data structure (lines 63–64). Hence, Pi executes the request at most once.
The second part of the update integrity property which states that Pi only updates its
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internal state in response to the requests actually sent by AS is trivially satisfied by the
protocol. The reason is that the execution of the request indicated by agree(s) (line 70 in
the obtain reply() function) is always preceded by receipt of the agree(s) message directly
from AS (line 12). Hence, Protocol APE satisfies update integrity.
Lemma 11 (Result Integrity) If r is the result value in the reply certificate received by
AS for agree(s), then at least one correct execution replica sent a reply message for
agree(s) with result value r.
Proof 10 Result integrity is trivially satisfied by Protocol APE since, by definition, the reply
certificate consists of reply messages from t+1 distinct replicas, out of which at most t are
corrupt.
Lemma 12 (Liveness) If AS sends agree(s) to the execution replicas, it eventually re-
ceives a reply certificate for agree(s).
Proof 11 Once the first-time agree(s) message has been received from AS, the next mes-
sage a correct replica Pi waits to receive from AS is a first-time agree(s+1) or a retransmit
agree(s) message from AS (line 12). If Pi receives a first-time agree(s+1) message, then
by our assumption that AS has only one outstanding request, it is clear that AS has obtained
a reply certificate for agree(s); hence, liveness is trivially satisfied.
On the other hand, if Pi receives a retransmit agree(s) message, then AS has not
obtained a reply certificate in a timely manner. In that case, all replicas will eventually
switch to the parsimonious audit mode, in which signed reply messages for agree(s) are
expected from all the PC replicas.
It is clear that if s is added to Pi’s must do set when Pi is in the parsimonious audit
mode, then Pi switches to the recovery mode (lines 39–41), in which, irrespective of whether
Pi is a PC replica or not, Pi’s reply message will be received at AS. At replica Pi, the
addition of s to its must do set (lines 109, 115, and 128) is always preceded by Pi sending
an implicate, convict, or indict message with valid proof that will convince any correct
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recipient replica Pj to add s to its must do set as well. Hence, all other correct replicas will
also eventually add s to their respective must do sets, switch to the recovery mode, and send
their own reply messages for agree(s); hence, AS will eventually obtain a reply certificate
for agree(s).
It is easy to see that if s is added to Pi’s certified set when Pi is in the parsimonious
audit mode, then liveness is satisfied, since Pi will forward the reply certificate to AS.
Then, the key to showing that Protocol APE satisfies liveness is to show that the clause
(s ∈ certified or s ∈ must do) eventually holds at a replica Pi that is in the parsimonious
audit mode. We show exactly that by proving Claim 1 below. Hence, Protocol APE satisfies
liveness.
Claim 1 At a replica Pi that enters the parsimonious audit mode because of receipt of a
retransmit agree(s) message from AS, (s ∈ certified or s ∈ must do) holds eventually.
Proof 12 Suppose that the claim is false, i.e., the clause (s ∈ certified or s ∈ must do) is
never true. Then that implies that Pi never comes out of the repeat until loop (lines 28–
36). That is possible only in two cases: (1) the repeat until loop iterates infinitely and
the wait for clause in line 34 is satisfied by the clause (oldpc 6= PC) becoming true at each
iteration of the repeat until loop, or (2) the control gets stuck at the wait for clause in
line 34. We now show that both cases result in contradictions.
Case (1): In this case, the repeat until loop iterates infinitely and at each iteration of
the loop, there is a PC change. Every PC change at Pi is the result of adding some new
replica to the set slow ∪ corrupt. Recall that the next PC is chosen to consist of the t + 1
lowest-ranked replicas that are not in slow ∪ corrupt. Hence, after n− (t + 1) PC changes,
all correct replicas will have been on the PC at least once. As mentioned before, a correct
PC replica in the parsimonious audit mode sends its reply message for agree(s) to all
replicas. Thus, after at most n − (t + 1) PC changes in the parsimonious audit mode, all
correct replicas will have sent their reply messages for agree(s). Hence, a reply certificate
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for agree(s) is guaranteed to be obtained eventually at a correct replica, which implies that
s ∈ certified eventually, contradicting our assumption.
Case (2): The control can get stuck at the wait for clause in line 34 only if the clause
(oldPC 6= PC) never became true at Pi, i.e., the PC set at Pi never changed. The PC set
at Pi would never change only if there had been no further additions to Pi’s slow or corrupt
sets. That would be possible only if the slow and corrupt sets at any other correct replica
were proper subsets of Pi’s slow and corrupt sets respectively.
Since every addition to Pi’s slow set is preceded by Pi sending an indict message with
valid proof to all replicas, all correct replicas will eventually have the same slow set as
Pi. Similarly, since every addition to Pi’s corrupt set is preceded by Pi sending a convict
message with valid proof to all replicas, all correct replicas will eventually have the same
corrupt set at Pi. Hence, the PC set at all correct replicas will eventually be the same as
Pi’s.
To recap, we have so far shown that if the control at Pi gets stuck at the wait for clause
in line 34, then the PC set at all correct replicas will eventually be the same as Pi’s. Consider
the point in time when PC sets at all correct replicas are the same; then, from that point on,
the PC sets at all correct replicas will remain the same by our assumption that the PC set at
Pi never changes. Recall that the reply forwarding done in lines 89–90 and lines 117–118
ensures that if at least one correct replica has received a PC replica Pk’s reply message for
agree(s), then all correct replicas will eventually receive Pk’s message. This reply-forwarding
logic coupled with our initial assumption that s is never added to the certified set implies
that there must be some PC replica Pk that did not send its reply message to any correct
replica. However, the failure detectors at all correct replicas would then eventually timeout
causing all correct replicas to send suspect messages for Pk with sequence number s. When
those suspect messages are eventually received at Pi, Pi invokes the not responsive(s, k)
function, resulting in the addition of s to the set must do. However, that contradicts our
initial assumption that the clause (s ∈ certified or s ∈ must do) is never true.
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Proof of Theorem 8: Lemmas 9, 10, 11, and 12 have shown that Protocol APE satisfies
the total order, update integrity, result integrity, and liveness properties of BFT replication
respectively. Hence, Protocol APE provides BFT replication for n > 2t.
4.5 Discussion
In this section, we discuss the practical significance of our protocol, present examples of
applications that would benefit from our protocol, and compare our protocol with related
work.
4.5.1 Practical Significance
The all-active approach is clearly a failure-masking one; despite t corrupted execution repli-
cas, a reply certificate will eventually be obtained at AS for every request, since all replicas
execute all requests and send the results to AS. Protocol APE has the same fault resilience
and guarantees the same property as the all-active approach, but does so in a manner that
is normally much more resource-efficient by additionally employing failure detection and
checkpointing.
In our formal system model, the adversary controls the scheduling of messages and hence
the timeouts of the failure detector; thus, the adversary can cause a correctly functioning PC
replica to be added to the slow sets of correct replicas. Such inaccurate failure detection will
result in Protocol APE unnecessarily switching from the parsimonious modes to the recovery
mode.
Unlike the adversary in our formal model, the network in a real-world setting will not
always behave in the worst possible manner. The motivation for an optimistic protocol such
as ours is the hope that timer values that are set based on stable network conditions have a
high likelihood of being accurate. During periods of stability and when the PC replicas do
not actively misbehave, the optimistic hope will be satisfied, and our protocol will provide
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resource-efficient request execution with roughly the same latency as the all-active approach.
Even if the optimistic hope is not satisfied, our protocol guarantees safety and liveness.
Safety mainly relates to replica state consistency. Since replicas always execute a request
bound to sequence number s only after a state update that reflects the execution of all
lower-sequence-numbered requests, safety is never violated. Liveness, which is the ability to
obtain a reply certificate eventually, is also guaranteed; inaccurate failure detection can, at
worst, cause correct PC replicas to be added to the slow sets at correct replicas, but then
the protocol will switch to the recovery mode, which guarantees that a reply certificate will
be obtained.
4.5.2 Practical Applications
Our protocol can yield significant benefits in many applications. Below are two examples:
1. The web service infrastructures for many companies are no longer operated by the com-
panies themselves, but are outsourced to third parties called Application Service Providers
or ASPs. The ASPs own, operate, and maintain the servers running the applications that
provide the companies’ web services, saving the companies the cost burden of having to set
up specialized information technology infrastructures. The ASPs’ servers may be shared
among several companies. Usually, an ASP charges an outsourcing company a consump-
tion fee based on the actual resource use. In such a situation, BFT replication can be very
useful in enhancing the trustworthiness of computations, and our protocol can be used to
obtain significant reductions in overall execution costs (compared to the all-active execution
approach) and thereby the fee that the outsourcing company has to pay to the ASP. The
benefits are especially pronounced if the web service application is resource-intensive. An
example of a web service for which request processing is computation-intensive would be
a financial web service that has to solve multi-parameter financial models to predict stock
trends.
2. In the computational Grid, many services are computation-intensive. BFT replication
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can be used to obtain a trustworthy system from untrusted participating Grid nodes. Since
Grid nodes may be shared among several Grid services, our protocol can help significantly
reduce the performance impact (compared to the all-active execution approach) that one
service has on other services running in the same Grid node.
4.5.3 From a Trusted Agreement Service to Agreement Replicas
For the sake of simplicity, the description of Protocol APE given in this chapter assumes
a single-entity trusted agreement service. There are two advantages of the parsimonious
normal mode over the parsimonious audit mode. The first advantage is that there is no inter-
replica communication; the primary committee replicas send their reply messages directly
to the agreement service. The second advantage is that the reply messages need not be
digitally signed; MAC authentication is sufficient.
In the system model described in Section 2.2, the trusted agreement service is imple-
mented by a set of at least 3t+1 agreement replicas to achieve a fault resilience t. Although
a logical separation between the agreement phase and execution phase is maintained, Pro-
tocol APE runs in the same replica as Protocol PABC. In such a model, the first advantage
(concerning inter-replica communication) is lost, since sending the reply message to the
agreement service is equivalent to sending the reply message to all agreement phase par-
ticipants (i.e., to all replicas). Hence, Protocol APE should be run only in two modes, the
parsimonious audit mode and the recovery mode. Although such an optimization will result
in the loss of the second advantage (concerning digital signatures), that loss is not a signifi-
cant one in the context of our target applications. Recall that the target applications for our
parsimonious execution protocol involve resource-intensive request processing; one can ex-
pect the request-processing overhead in such applications to be significantly more expensive
than digital signature computations.
The above optimization of running Protocol APE in two (as opposed to three) modes
has two additional benefits. First, it obviates the need for checkpointing and state transfer.
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The reason is that in the parsimonious audit mode, a backup replica obtains reply messages,
and hence the reply certificate, from all primary committee members. If information about
the update to the internal state caused by the request execution is piggybacked on the reply
message, then a reply certificate for a request indicates the correct value of the state update
corresponding to that request. Using that information, a backup replica can update its
internal state after obtaining a reply certificate. Hence, backup replicas can keep their states
up-to-date for each request and there is no need for state transfer (and hence checkpointing)
when switching to the recovery mode. The second benefit of the above optimization is that
it avoids the situation (described in Section 4.3.3) in which a corrupted PC replica cleverly
degrades protocol performance by causing repeated transitions from the normal to audit
mode and back to normal mode, without a change in the PC.
4.5.4 Related Work
BFT replication techniques are of two categories: quorum replication and state machine
replication. Quorum replication (e.g., [MR98, MAD02a]) uses subsets of replicas (called
quorums) to implement read/write operations on the variables of a data repository, such
that any two subsets intersect in enough correct replicas. State machine replication can be
used to perform arbitrary computations accessing arbitrary numbers of variables; quorum
replication is less generic and cannot handle concurrent requests by clients to update the
same information. Our protocol is similar to quorum systems in that it uses a subset of
replicas to perform operations. However, the similarity is only superficial; our protocol is
concerned with the execution phase of state machine replication, our use of a (t+ 1)-subset
of replicas to execute requests is based on whether the system is stable or not (a distinction
that quorum systems do not make), and (unlike quorum systems) we do not use different
subset sizes for read and write operations.
Our protocol is both unique and novel. While most work on BFT replication has fo-
cused on the hard problem of Byzantine agreement (e.g., [CL02,Rei95]), our work focuses
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on the often-overlooked but practically significant execution phase of BFT replication. Yin
et al.’s work reduces the deployment costs of BFT replication by reducing the number of
execution replicas from 3t+1 to 2t+1. However, our work deals with reducing the run-time
or operational costs of BFT replication, which are likely to be at least as important as de-
ployment costs in many long-lived and resource-intensive applications. While parsimonious
execution has been routinely used in primary-backup systems that tolerate benign faults
(e.g., [BSTM93,DS02]), our protocol is novel in that it is the first to apply parsimony to
Byzantine fault tolerance.
Since our protocol is for the execution phase, our work is complementary to the BASE
work [RCL01] and the BASE extension by Yin et al. [YMV+03]. In particular, one could
combine our protocol with (1) the proactive recovery and abstraction techniques of BASE
to overcome the drawbacks of state machine replication in many applications (namely, the
determinism requirement and the assumption that at most one-third of the replicas are
corrupt), and (2) the privacy firewall architecture of [YMV+03] to obtain BFT confidentiality.
In the context of parallel computing, Sarmenta [Sar02] proposed mechanisms for tolerat-
ing erroneous results submitted by malicious volunteers in the Grid, SETI@home, and other
volunteer computer systems. The mechanisms, called credibility-based fault-tolerance mech-
anisms, estimate the credibility of a node and use these probability estimates in limiting the
amount of redundant computations necessary to meet desired error rates. However, their
scheme trades off correctness for performance and is not relevant to applications that are
stateful or cannot tolerate any errors at all (e.g., banking or financial applications). Also,
their mechanisms operate in a system and fault model that is very restrictive (e.g., it requires
synchronous computations and non-collusion among malicious nodes) and less generic than
our system and fault model.
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4.6 Summary
We described a protocol for executing requests in a resource-efficient way while providing
trustworthy results in the presence of up to t Byzantine faults. Previous best solutions were
based on the all-active approach, which requires all n > 2t execution replicas to execute a
request. Despite failures and instability, our protocol always guarantees both safety and live-
ness as long as no more than t < n/2 execution replicas are corrupted. Our protocol reduces
service-specific resource use costs to about half of what they are for all-active execution
under perceived normal conditions by using only a PC consisting of t+ 1 execution replicas
to execute the request. The benefits are more pronounced for larger group sizes, and when
request processing is resource-intensive. The trade-off for the benefits is the higher latencies






5.1 Motivation and Approach
The parsimonious protocols described in the previous chapters are based on a static group,
i.e., the group of nodes that constitute the agreement and execution replicas are fixed at
system startup and remain unchanged throughout the system lifetime. In order to subvert
the service, the adversary has to compromise more than t agreement replicas or more than
t execution replicas. Proactive recovery mechanisms can help reduce the time available for
the adversary to accomplish this objective from practically infinity (for long-lived services)
to a reasonable window of vulnerability. For example, Castro and Liskov [CL02] use a
watchdog timer at each replica node to interrupt the node activities periodically; the node is
rebooted and a copy of the service code is reloaded from a tamper-resistant read-only disk.
A combination of checkpointing and state-transfer techniques is used to restore the service
state in case of corruption. As another example, refreshing replica keys [CKLS02,CL02] has
also been suggested as a proactive recovery technique.
In a real-world setting, it is important to complement the implementations of our par-
simonious protocols with proactive recovery and replica diversity techniques to improve the
coverage of the assumption that at most t replicas are faulty. However, those techniques
alone may not be sufficient. While key-refresh-only proactive recovery [CKLS02] makes
cryptographic keys of corrupt nodes stolen by an attacker useless in the subsequent windows
of vulnerability, it does not offer any immunization against an attacker who can replace
the service code binaries running at the corrupted replicas. The periodic reboot strategy
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of [CL02] helps recover from binary code replacement; however, it requires special-purpose
hardware, and its effectiveness is still limited for the following reason. An attacker having
physical control of the corrupted nodes would be able to tamper with their recovery. Once
an attacker has successfully compromised a node, it is very likely that, using the same attack
strategy as before, the attacker can easily and quickly compromise the node again. Thus,
with each new node corruption, the attacker has a better chance of subverting the service
operation in the next window of vulnerability. Even if there are only less than t corrupted
nodes and the replicated service as a whole is still operational, the corrupted nodes could
act as a nuisance. For example, they could force frequent transitions from the parsimo-
nious modes to the high-overhead recovery modes, thereby making it difficult to provide
performance guarantees.
Situations such as the above render the use of proactive recovery techniques alone in-
adequate. That fact, coupled with the growing need to make NISs adaptive in the face of
attacks, makes a strong case for augmenting BFT replication with the ability to dynamically
alter the composition of the replication group.
The ability to add new nodes and remove suspected corrupt nodes has been previ-
ously explored in the context of Byzantine fault-tolerant group communication systems
(e.g., [Rei96, KMMS01, RPL+02]). However, the replication protocols and even the group
management protocols required the removal of suspected corrupt nodes in order to provide
their specified properties. Such a requirement opens up an easily exploitable vulnerability
for the attacker. The attacker may cause (for example, by slowing down the communication
links) the misclassification of correct nodes as nodes suspected of being corrupt. Such a mis-
classification would result in those nodes being removed from the group, thereby resulting
in violations of safety properties or even the disintegration of the group.
Our approach to obtaining reconfigurable BFT replication systems without the above
pitfalls of the status quo is to design replication protocols that never require the removal of
faulty replicas, so that reconfigurability of the replication group can be kept as a capability
83




Agreement on Next View
Conveying Next Membership 
to New Members (if Any)
Non−Member Added to








to New Members (if Any)
Figure 5.1: Steps Involved in Dynamic Group Reconfiguration
We have developed a suite of protocols called RMan (which stands for Reconfiguration
Management) that defines a group abstraction for the replicas and allows for the dynamic
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alteration of the composition of the replication group. RMan comprises the following mod-
ules:
1. Protocol Admission: At a party that is not a group member, Protocol Admission helps
the party join the group. At a group member, the protocol regulates, based on specified
admission control policies, the entry of new members into the group.
2. Algorithm FD (which stands for failure detection): At group members, Algorithm FD
identifies, based on specified member removal policies, potential candidates for removal
from the group.
3. Protocol GMA: At group members, Protocol GMA (which stands for group membership
agreement) ensures that all correct group members agree on the next group member-
ship.
4. Protocol D-PABC (which stands for dynamic PABC): Protocol D-PABC is an extension
of Protocol PABC that provides interfaces for changing the set of agreement phase
participants and for receiving notifications about an impending change.
5. Protocol D-APE (which stands for dynamic APE): Protocol D-APE is extension of
Protocol APE that provides interfaces for changing the set of execution replicas and
for receiving notifications about an impending change.
6. Algorithm Reconf: Algorithm Reconf is responsible for coordinating the transition of
Protocol D-PABC and Protocol D-APE from one group membership to the next in a
manner that allows the provision of view synchrony [BJ87] properties. It also notifies
all other modules about when the reconfiguration procedure is complete so that they
can re-initialize their local data structures based on the new membership and re-start
normal operation.
The triggers for group reconfiguration and the steps involved in reconfiguration are shown
at a high level in Figure 5.1. The trigger for reconfiguration comes in one of two forms:
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(1) when Protocol Admission has identified a party that is currently not a group member
to be worthy of inclusion in the group, or (2) when Algorithm FD has identified a group
member as a potential candidate for exclusion from the group. The above triggers are fed to
Protocol GMA, which then starts an MVBA instance to agree on the next group membership.
Protocol GMA notifies Algorithm Reconf about the agreed-upon next membership.
From that point on, Algorithm Reconf directs the view installation, which is a series of
steps by which a party systematically transitions from the current view or membership of
the group to the next. Algorithm Reconf instructs Protocol D-PABC to determine a syn-
chronization point at which current group members can suspend their operations and block
until the membership change is effected. Prior to blocking, Protocol D-PABC ensures that
all correct group members atomically deliver all payloads up to that synchronization point
and no more. Algorithm Reconf then instructs Protocol D-APE to update the (replicated)
service state to reflect the execution of all client requests corresponding to payloads that
were atomically delivered up to that synchronization point. That ensures that the service
states at all correct members at the end of the current membership are the same. If the
agreed-upon next membership includes any new members, then Algorithm Reconf instructs
Protocol Admission to convey to those new members the new membership information and
a digest of the stable service state. That is followed by the reconfiguration of secure authen-
ticated channels that are used for communication among group members; channels that a
group member shares with a previous member that is not present in the new membership are
severed, and new channels are established with new group members. If the new membership
includes new members, then those members request transfer of the service state from old
members. Once state transfer is completed, Algorithm Reconf instructs all other modules
to re-initialize their local data structures and variables to reflect the new membership and
to begin normal operation in the new membership. At that point, Protocol D-PABC and
Protocol D-APE unblock and resume normal operation in the new membership.
At a party that is about to be admitted into the group, the view installation procedure
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begins when the party receives confirmation of its admission from “enough” members of
the previous view. That confirmation is accompanied by information about the internal
service state at which operations in the previous view ended. The new member establishes
secure authenticated channels with other members of the new view. Then, Algorithm Reconf
instructs Protocol D-APE to bring the internal service state up-to-date. Protocol D-APE
requests state transfer from parties that were members of both the previous view and the
new view. Once state transfer is completed, Algorithm Reconf instructs all other modules
to re-initialize their local data structures and variables to reflect the new membership and
to begin normal operation in the new membership.
5.3 Preliminaries
5.3.1 System Model
In this section, we extend the system model described in Section 2.2 by defining a group
abstraction and allowing for the group composition to be altered dynamically. As before,
we consider an asynchronous distributed system in which all participants (including the
adversary) are computationally bounded and the adversary schedules messages on the net-
work connecting the parties subject only to the condition that messages exchanged between
correct parties are eventually delivered unmodified (i.e., every run of the system is complete).
The RMan modules are concerned with one universal set U of parties that wish to be in
a replication group, G, for which successive memberships are defined by views V1, V2, . . ..
Each view is a subset of U and is an ordered set of identifiers of parties that are members of
the view. The parties in a single view Vx have ranks from 0 to |Vx| − 1 and are denoted by
P0, . . . , P|Vx|−1. We assume that each party in U is uniquely identifiable, e.g., by the combi-
nation of host IP address and a public key certificate obtained from a trusted certification
authority.
For the sake of simplicity, we assume only logical (as opposed to physical) separation
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between the agreement and execution phases. Any party Pi ∈ Vx plays the role of an
agreement phase participant in view Vx. The RMan modules satisfy their specified properties
in view Vx as long as no more than t < |Vx|/3 parties are under the control of the adversary.
In view Vx, the parties with ranks from 0 to |Vx|−t−1 also play the role of execution replicas.
Thus, the set A of agreement phase participants in view Vx consists of P0, . . . , P|Vx|−1, and
the set E of execution replicas in view Vx consists of P0, . . . , P|Vx|−t−1. Every pair of parties
in a given view is linked by an authenticated asynchronous channel that provides message
integrity. A group member establishes the channel with another party when the latter
becomes a member of the group and severs the channel when that party is removed from
the group.
There is also a trusted dealer that performs setup of the first view V0. The members
constituting the view V0 and the fault resilience of the group in that view are given as input
to the dealer, which then generates the state information that is used to initialize each party
of view V0. As part of the system initialization, the dealer generates the public key/private
key pair for each party in the set U and gives every party in the view V0 its private key
and the public keys of all parties. At later points in time, the dealer may instantiate other
parties in the set U and initialize them with information about their respective private keys,
public keys of all parties in the set U , and the latest view. Those dynamically instantiated
parties use that information to attempt to join the group G. We assume that parties are not
corrupted by the adversary before they join the group G for the first time.
5.3.2 Specification of Properties
Protocol D-PABC provides all the properties of the Protocol PABC specified in Section 3.2.2.
Similarly, Protocol D-APE provides all the properties of the Protocol APE specified in Sec-
tion 4.3.1. The combination of the RMan modules provides additional properties relating to
view synchrony and group membership. In this section, we specify those properties.
Suppose there is a group G for which successive memberships are defined by views
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V1, V2, . . .. Then, the modules in RMan provide the following properties:
Group Membership Monotonicity If a party P installs view Vx after installing view Vy,
then x > y.
Group Membership Agreement If P and Q are two correct parties, then the view Vx
(if installed) at both parties will have the same membership.
Group Membership Self-Inclusion If a correct party P installs a view Vx, then Vx in-
cludes P .
Group Membership Validity If a correct party P installs a view Vx, then any correct
party Q such that Q ∈ Vx will (eventually) install view Vx.
View Synchrony If two parties P and Q both install a new view Vx+1 in the same previous
view Vx, then
(1) View Synchronous Atomic Delivery: the sequence of messages a-delivered by
both P and Q in view Vx is the same.
(2) View Synchronous State Consistency: the internal service state just after the
installation of view Vx+1 at both P and Q is the same.
Admission Validity If party P is such that P ∈ Vx+1 − V x, then PID(x, P, ϑ) = true,
where PID is the predicate specifying the admission control policy and ϑ is the admis-
sion credential presented by P .
Removal Validity If party P is such that P ∈ Vx − V x+ 1, then there exists ϑ such that
FID(x, P, ϑ) = true, where FID is the set of predicates specifying the member removal
policy.
Liveness If a membership change is desired by t+1 correct members of view Vx, then some
correct party P ∈ Vx will eventually install view Vx+1.
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Protocol Admission for party P and tag ID with input parameters PID (predicate
specifying the admission control policy) and ϑ (admission credential)
initialization:
1: curr view ← {P1, P2, . . . , Pn} {current membership of target group}
2: vn ← 0 {current view number}
3: recommend ← ⊥ {candidate for admission into the group}
4: X ← ∅ {set of new-view messages received at P 6∈ curr view}
5: if P 6∈ curr view then
6: send request join()
function send request join():
7: compute a signature σ on (ID , request-join, vn, id , ϑ)
8: send the message (ID , request-join, vn, id , ϑ, σ) to all Pj ∈ curr view
function validateadmission(view num, id , ϑid):




function send new viewadmission(next view , vn, digest):
13: compute a signature σ on (ID , new-view, vn,next view , digest)
14: send the message (ID , new-view, vn,next view , digest , σ) to each party in next view \
curr view
upon receiving message (ID , new-view, vn+ 1,next view , digest , σj) from Pj for the first time:
15: if (P 6∈ curr view) and (P ∈ next view) and (Pj ∈ curr view) and
(σj is a valid signature by party Pj on (ID , new-view, vn + 1,next view , digest))
then
16: X ← X ∪ (ID , new-view, vn+ 1,next view , digest , σj)
17: if X has (ID , new-view, vn+ 1,next view , digest , σk) messages from
b |curr view |−13 c+ 1 distinct Pk ∈ curr view then
18: updatereconf (start-reconf, [next view , vn+ 1, digest ])
Figure 5.2: Protocol Admission for Controlling and Aiding Admission of New Parties (Part
I)
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upon receiving message (ID , request-join, vn, id , ϑid, σid) from party id for the first time:
19: if (id 6∈ curr view) and (recommend = ⊥) and
(σid is a valid signature by party id on (ID , request-join, vn, id , ϑid)) and
(validateadmission(vn, id , ϑid) = true) then
20: recommend ← id
21: trigger view changegma(add, id , ϑid)
function update viewadmission(new view , view num): {called by Algorithm Reconf at
P 6∈ curr view}
22: curr view ← new view
23: vn← view num
24: send request join()
function done reconfigureadmission(new view , view num):
25: curr view ← new view
26: vn← view num
27: X ← ∅
28: recommend ← ⊥
Figure 5.3: Protocol Admission for Controlling and Aiding Admission of New Parties (Part
II)
5.4 Protocol Admission
We now describe Protocol Admission in detail. The line numbers refer to the detailed protocol
description in Figures 5.2–5.3.
Consider a party P ∈ U \G that wants to join the group G. At the time of its creation, P
is in its own singleton group, and its sole aim is to become part of G; the replication protocols,
Protocol D-PABC and Protocol D-APE, do not begin regular operation until P ∈ G.
At P , there is an array, curr view , that is initialized with the latest membership of the
group G by the trusted dealer; if the membership changes before P succeeds in joining the
group, then the dealer re-initializes the array with the latest membership information.
Pairwise secure authenticated channels are established only among members of G. Hence,
until P succeeds in becoming a part of G, all communication between P and the group
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members is authenticated using digital signatures.
After initialization, the party P invokes the function send request join() (lines 7– 8).
The function sends out a signed request-join message containing the party’s identifier id
and its admission credential ϑ to each party Pi ∈ curr view . The admission credential is
provided as an input parameter to Protocol Admission by the trusted dealer as part of the
system startup.
In a given view Vvn, a group member Pi recommends at most one party as a candidate
for inclusion in the next view. Upon receiving the request-join message from a non-
member P , a group member Pi that has not yet identified a candidate verifies the signature
on the message and invokes the validate function passing the current view number vn, P ’s
identifier, and its admission credential as input arguments (line 19). The function (lines 9–
12) verifies whether P ’s credential satisfies the admission control policy in view Vvn. The
admission policy is specified by a global, polynomial-time computable predicate PID , which
is provided as an input parameter to Protocol Admission by the trusted dealer as part of the
system startup. A number of admission control policies are described in [KMT03]. Later,
in Section 6.6.3, we describe the implementation of two example admission control policies,
one for first-time admission into the group and another for parties seeking readmission into
the group.
If the party P satisfies the admission control policy, then Protocol Admission recom-
mends P as a candidate for inclusion in the next view by invoking the trigger view change
interface provided by Protocol GMA and passing P ’s identifier and admission credential as
input arguments (line 21). We guarantee that if, in a given view Vvn, a non-member P is
recommended as the candidate for inclusion in the next view by t + 1 correct members of
Vvn (where t <
|Vvn|
3
), then P will eventually become a member of view Vvn+1.
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5.5 Algorithm FD
In a view Vx, Protocol PABC ensures safety and liveness as long as no more than b |Vx|−13 c
participants in the agreement phase are corrupted by the adversary. Similarly, in view Vx,
Protocol APE ensures safety and liveness as long as no more than b |Vx|−1
2
c participants in
the execution phase are corrupted by the adversary. Neither protocol makes the removal
of corrupt members from the group a requirement to ensure correctness. Despite that fact,
there may be situations in which the capability to remove members from the group may be
desirable and beneficial from the dependability or performance point of view, e.g., when a
group member exhibits a fault that exposes its corruption without any doubt.
When providing the capability to remove members from the group, it is useful to ensure
the following two properties. First, it must not be possible for corrupted members alone to
effect the removal of a member from the group; if it were, then the corrupted parties may
act in collusion to cause the disintegration of the group. Second, if, in a given view, enough
correct members want a member to be removed from the group, then that member must be
eventually removed.
Algorithm FD helps provide the above two guarantees by controlling the removal of mem-
bers from the group. In a given view Vvn, the algorithm at a group member Pi recommends
at most one group member as a candidate for exclusion from the next view. The algorithm
ensures the first property above by requiring that if, in a given view Vvn, if Pi ∈ Vvn recom-
mends the removal of Pj ∈ Vvn, then the recommendation must be transferable in that view,
i.e., Pi must be able to present information upon the examination of which any correct party
Pk ∈ Vvn will be convinced of the validity of the recommendation; we call such information
validation data. We ensure the second property above by guaranteeing that if, in a given
view Vvn, a member Pj is recommended as the candidate for exclusion from the next view
by t+ 1 correct members of Vvn (where t <
|Vvn|
3
), then Pi 6∈ Vvn+1.
We now describe Protocol FD. The line numbers refer to the detailed protocol description
in Figure 5.4. Algorithm FD provides an interface remove that can be invoked by other RMan
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modules when they want to suggest the removal of a group member. The arguments to the
interface are the current view number view num, identifier of the group member id whose
removal is being suggested, and a removal credential ϑ. The removal credential ϑ contains
three pieces of information: (1) the module that invoked the remove interface to suggest
the removal of id, (2) the fault type exhibited by id, and (3) validation data that makes the
recommendation for removing id from the group transferable in view Vview num.
In a given view Vvn, a group member Pi recommends at most one party as a candidate
for exclusion from the next view. When the remove interface is invoked by some RMan
module at a group member Pi in a given view, Algorithm FD recommends id as a candidate
for exclusion from the next view by invoking the trigger view change interface provided by
Protocol GMA and passing id and the removal credential ϑ as input arguments (line 12).
A module that invokes the remove interface as described above must also provide a corre-
sponding removal policy that is specified by a global, polynomial-time computable predicate
and that can be used by Algorithm FD to verify whether an input removal credential is
transferable in a given view (line 6). The set of all such predicates corresponding to various
modules and various fault types is provided as an input parameter to Algorithm FD by the
trusted dealer as part of the system startup.
5.6 Protocol GMA
We now describe Protocol GMA in detail. The line numbers refer to the detailed protocol
description in Figures 5.5–5.6.
Protocol GMA is responsible for maintaining consistent group membership information
at all correct members of the group G. The protocol ensures that the view Vx at any correct
member of Vx consists of the exact same set of replicas.
In a given view Vvn, the protocol at a party Pi ∈ Vvn iterates exactly once through an
event loop (lines 12–25) that starts with the acceptance of some valid suggestion to change
the membership (line 12). The suggestion may come from the local modules, Protocol Admis-
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sion or Protocol FD, through the trigger view change interface provided by Protocol GMA
(lines 6–7). The suggestion may also be “adopted” from a valid pre-proposal message
received from another party. The verify(type, id , ϑ, σ, j) function (lines 8–11) checks the va-
lidity of the pre-proposal message from party Pj carrying a signature σ (supposedly from
Pj) and suggesting either the inclusion of non-member id with admission credential ϑ or
the exclusion of member id with removal credential ϑ. The validity check helps ensure the
admission validity and removal validity properties specified in Section 5.3.2.
Upon accepting a valid suggestion to change the membership, party Pi sends the sugges-
tion to other members of Vvn through a signed pre-proposal message with an appropriate
admission or removal credential (line 14). Then, the party waits until it receives n − t
such pre-proposal messages from distinct members of Vvn with valid signatures and admis-
sion/removal credentials that are valid in the current view Vvn. The adoption mechanism
mentioned above ensures that if any correct party sends a pre-proposal message, it will
eventually receive valid pre-proposal messages from n− t distinct parties (including itself).
The party collects the received pre-proposal messages in a membership change proposal
vector C and proposes C for MVBA. Once the agreement protocol decides on membership
change decision vector C¯ (lines 15–18), the party obtains the next view Vvn+1 deterministi-
cally from the current view and C¯ (lines 19–23). By the agreement property of MVBA, any
two correct members of Vvn that decided will decide on the same value for Vvn+1. Hence, the
group membership agreement property specified in Section 5.3.2 is satisfied. By the liveness
property of MVBA, all correct members of Vvn will eventually decide on that value. That
helps ensure the group membership validity property for all parties in Vvn ∩ Vvn+1.
Suppose a particular membership change is suggested by t+ 1 correct members of view
Vvn. Since the pre-proposal messages of n− t parties are included in the decision vector of
MVBA, at least one of these messages contains that membership change suggestion. Hence,
view Vvn+1 will incorporate that suggestion.
After determining the next view, Protocol GMA notifies Algorithm Reconf to start the
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sequence of steps that will transition the party from the current view to the new view
(line 24). After the notification, Protocol GMA blocks until the transition is completed
(line 25).
5.7 Algorithm Reconf and the View Installation
Procedure
The notification from Protocol GMA to Algorithm Reconf after the determination of the next
view results in the latter coordinating a series of steps that transition the RMan modules
from the current view to the next. We call that series of steps the view installation procedure.
The detailed algorithm description for Algorithm Reconf is given in Figures 5.7–5.8.
The first step in the view installation procedure is to ensure that the Protocol D-PABC
and Protocol D-APE at all correct replicas stabilize, i.e., suspend their operation in the
current view at the same protocol state. That means that, at all correct replicas, Protocol D-
PABC must atomically deliver the same set of messages in the same order in a given view.
Similarly, at all correct execution replicas, the service state must reflect the execution of
all and only those requests specified in the payloads that were atomically delivered in the
current and previous views, where the execution order is specified by order of atomic delivery.
5.7.1 Stabilization of Protocol D-PABC
Protocol D-PABC is an extension to the original atomic broadcast protocol presented in
Chapter 3, in which the set of communicating parties may be dynamically changed. In
addition to the properties provided by Protocol PABC, Protocol D-PABC provides the view
synchronous atomic broadcast property specified in Section 5.3.2.
Protocol PABC guarantees epoch synchrony, i.e., in a given epoch, all correct parties a-
deliver the same sequence of payloads (Lemma 7). The protocol also guarantees that if some
correct party enters epoch e, then all correct parties eventually enter epoch e (Lemma 3).
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Given these properties of Protocol PABC, view synchronous atomic broadcast can be ob-
tained simply by ensuring that all correct parties terminate a given view in the same epoch.
The line numbers in this section refer to the detailed protocol description for Protocol D-
PABC given in Figures 5.9–5.13. The figures use the club suite (♣) symbol to indicate the
lines or functions that are new or modified compared to the original protocol.
The stabilization of Protocol D-PABC in the current view Vvn is triggered when Al-
gorithm Reconf invokes the stabilize() interface at Protocol D-PABC. At a group member
Pi ∈ Vvn, the stabilize() method (lines 74–75) a-broadcasts a signed close payload con-
taining the current view number vn.
The deliver function keeps track of the number of close payloads from distinct group
members that have been passed as arguments to the function in the current view (lines 50–
55). When close payloads from t + 1 distinct group members have been obtained, the
function marks the current epoch as the last epoch for the current view Vvn by setting
the Boolean variable block to true (line 54). If the protocol is in the parsimonious mode,
then once the deliver function returns, the protocol will switch to the recovery mode of
the current epoch. If the protocol is already in the recovery mode, then it will complete
the recovery mode. When part 3 of the recovery mode completes, instead of starting the
next epoch (as in the case of the original Protocol PABC), the Protocol D-PABC notifies
Algorithm Reconf that stabilization is complete (line 86) and also sends an indication of the
sequence number of the last a-delivery in the current view; then, Protocol D-PABC blocks
(line 87) until Algorithm Reconf notifies it about the completion of the view installation
procedure by invoking the done reconfigure() function (lines 66–73). Due to the epoch
synchrony property mentioned above, all correct parties will a-deliver the t + 1st close
payload in the same epoch. Hence, all correct parties will terminate a given view in the
same epoch, thereby ensuring view synchrony.
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5.7.2 Stabilization of Protocol D-APE and Service State
Protocol D-APE is an extension to the original parsimonious execution protocol presented in
Chapter 4, in which the set of execution replicas may be dynamically changed. In addition
to the properties provided by Protocol APE, Protocol D-APE provides the view synchronous
state consistency property specified in Section 5.3.2.
Recall that Protocol APE performs updates to the internal service state strictly in the
atomic delivery order defined by Protocol PABC. In Section 5.7.1, we described how Pro-
tocol D-PABC provides view synchronous atomic broadcast. Then, view synchronous state
consistency can be obtained simply by ensuring that all correct parties terminate a given
view only after bringing their states up to date to reflect the execution of all requests up to
the last atomically delivered request for that view.
The line numbers in this section refer to the detailed protocol description for Protocol D-
APE given in Figures 5.14–5.19. The figures use the club suite (♣) symbol to indicate the
lines or functions that are new or modified compared to the original protocol.
The stabilization of Protocol D-APE in the current view Vvn is triggered when Algo-
rithm Reconf invokes the stabilize() interface at Protocol D-APE. The input argument to the
method invocation indicates the sequence number of the last a-delivery in the current view.
At a group member Pi ∈ Vvn, the stabilize() method (line 47) stores that sequence number
in the local variable last . Thereafter, upon receiving an agreement certificate containing the
sequence number last or if such a certificate has already been received, the protocol invokes
the finish view() function (lines 16–18).
The finish view function (lines 42–46) first ensures that the service state reflects the
execution of all requests up to sequence number last by invoking the obtain reply function.
That is followed by the taking of a checkpoint of the service state. Then, Protocol D-APE
sends Algorithm Reconf a notification that stabilization is complete (line 45) along with
an indication of the digest of the last checkpoint in the current view. Protocol D-APE
then blocks (line 46) until Algorithm Reconf notifies it about the completion of the view
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installation procedure by invoking the done reconfigure() function (lines 48–55).
5.7.3 Conveying the Next Membership to the Joining Replica
If the next view Vvn+1 includes new member(s), then upon receiving the notification that
Protocol D-APE has stabilized, Algorithm Reconf instructs the Protocol Admission to send
the new view and service state information to the new member(s) (Figure 5.7, lines 11–13).
The instruction comes in the form of the send new view function invocation at Proto-
col Admission. The function (Figure 5.2, lines 13–14) sends a signed new-view message to
each new member of Vvn+1. The message contains the new view Vvn+1 and the digest of the
service state in which the new member should begin request processing upon joining the
group.
Protocol Admission at a party P ∈ Vvn+1 \Vvn keeps track of new-view messages received
from members of view Vvn (Figure 5.2, lines 15–18). Once P has obtained new-viewmessages
from |Vvn|
3
+1 distinct members of Vvn with identical information about the next view and the
service state digest, party P considers itself a part of group G from view Vvn. Then, the view
installation procedure is triggered at P by Protocol Admission notifying Algorithm Reconf
(Figure 5.2, line 18). At the new member P , the view installation procedure consists of two
steps: (1) establishment of authenticated channels with all other members of Vvn+1 and (2)
obtaining of transfer of the service state.
5.7.4 Reconfiguration of Pairwise Authenticated Channels
As part of the view installation procedure, a new member (i.e., a party P ∈ Vvn+1 \ Vvn)
establishes pairwise authenticated channels with other members of Vvn. A party Pi ∈ Vvn+1∩
Vvn severs previously established channels with members excluded from the new view (i.e.,
with any party P ′ ∈ Vvn\Vvn+1). Such reconfiguration of communication channels is initiated
when Algorithm Reconf invokes the reconfigure function at the underlying network layer
passing the new view Vvn+1 as input argument. At a party Pi ∈ Vvn+1 ∩ Vvn, the invocation
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is made (Figure 5.7, line 15) after Protocol Admission at Pi has sent a new-view message to
all new members of Vvn+1. At a new member, the invocation is made (Figure 5.7, line 17)
as the first step of the view installation procedure. Later, in Sections 6.6.2 and 6.6.3, we
describe one way of implementing the establishment and reconfiguration of authenticated
channels using message authentication codes (MACs).
5.7.5 Obtaining Transfer of Service State at a Joining Replica
After establishing authenticated channels with other members of the new view Vvn+1, the
next step in the view installation procedure at a party P ∈ Vvn+1\Vvn is to obtain transfer of
service state. That is the responsibility of the state updateape function at Protocol APE. The
function (Figure 4.5, lines 56–58) sends out a state-request message to all parties in the
view Vvn and waits for state transfer. Party P can easily verify whether the state transferred
is correct; P computes the digest of a copy of the state obtained through state transfer, and
then compares the digest with the one that was vouched for by |Vvn|
3
members of Vvn through
their new-view messages. If the two digests are equal, then the state transferred is correct.
At that point, Protocol D-APE notifies Algorithm Reconf that the transfer of service state
is complete (Figure 4.5, line 58).
5.7.6 Beginning Regular Operation in the New Membership
The last step in the view installation procedure is to re-initialize the local variables and
data structures at the various RMan modules to reflect the new group membership Vvn+1.
That step, represented by function begin regular operation at Algorithm Reconf (Figure 5.8,
lines 30–36), is taken at a party Pi ∈ Vvn+1 ∩ Vvn upon the reconfiguration of the pairwise
authenticated channels (Figure 5.7, line 19). At a party P ∈ Vvn+1 \ Vvn, that step is taken
after the correct transfer of service state has been obtained (Figure 5.7, line 29).
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5.8 Summary
We described a suite of protocols called RMan that defines a group abstraction for the
replicas and allows for the dynamic alteration of the composition of the replication group.
The suite includes a protocol for controlling and aiding the addition of new members into
the group, a protocol for controlling the removal of members from the group, a protocol
for ensuring consistency of group membership information at all correct group members,
and an algorithm that coordinates the transition from one membership of the group to the
next in a way that ensures view synchrony properties. Since our replication protocols were
designed never to require the removal of faulty replicas to make progress, the ability provided
by RMan to dynamically reconfigure the replication group can be used very selectively and
conservatively.
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Protocol FD for party Pi and tag ID with input parameters FID (set of predicates
specifying the member removal policy)
initialization:
1: curr view ← {P1, P2, . . . , Pn} {current group membership}
2: vn ← 0 {current view number}
3: remove ← ⊥ {candidate for removal from the group}
function validatefailure detect(view num, id , ϑ):
4: ft← ϑ.failure type
5: mt← ϑ.module type
6: if (id ∈ curr view) and (view num = vn) and




function removefailure detect(id , ϑ): {called by some module at Pi to suggest removal of
id from the group}
10: if remove = ⊥ then
11: remove ← id
12: trigger view changegma(remove, id , ϑ)
function done reconfigureadmission(new view , view num):
13: curr view ← new view
14: vn ← view num
15: remove ← ⊥
Figure 5.4: Algorithm FD for Aiding Member Removal
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Protocol GMA for party Pi and tag ID
initialization:
1: curr view ← {P1, P2, . . . , Pn} {current group membership}
2: vn ← 0 {current view number}
3: init view()
function init view():
4: p← 0 {number of pre-proposal messages received}
5: (typej , id j , ϑj , σj)← (⊥,⊥,⊥,⊥) (1 ≤ j ≤ n)
function trigger view changegma(type, id , ϑ):
6: if (typei, id i, ϑi) = (⊥,⊥,⊥) then
7: (typei, id i, ϑi)← (type, id , ϑ)
function verify(type, id , ϑ, σ, j):
8: if σ is a valid signature by Pj on (ID , pre-proposal, vn, type, id , ϑ) and(
(type = add and validateadmission(vn, id , ϑ) = true) or







12: wait for (typei, id i, ϑi) 6= (⊥,⊥,⊥)
13: compute a signature σ on (ID , pre-proposal, vn, typei, id i, ϑi)
14: send the message (ID , pre-proposal, vn, typei, id i, ϑi, σ) to all parties
15: wait for p = n− t
16: C ← [(type1, id1, ϑ1, σ1), . . . , (typen, idn, ϑn, σn)]
17: propose C for multi-valued Byzantine agreement with tag ID |membership.vn
and predicate QID |membership.vn
18: wait for the Byzantine agreement protocol with tag ID |membership.vn
to decide some C¯ = [( ¯type1, i¯d1, ϑ¯1, σ¯1), . . . , ( ¯typen, i¯dn, ϑ¯n, σ¯n)]
19: next view ← curr view
20: for id ∈ ⋃nj=1{i¯dj | ¯typej = add}, in some deterministic order do
21: next view ← next view ⋃{id}
22: for id ∈ ⋃nj=1{i¯dj | ¯typej = remove}, in some deterministic order do
23: next view ← next view \ {id}
24: updatereconf (start-reconf, [next view , vn+ 1])
25: wait for p = 0
Figure 5.5: Protocol GMA for Group Membership Agreement (Part I)
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upon receiving message (ID , pre-proposal, vn, type, id , ϑ, σ) from Pj for the first time:
26: if (verify(type, id , ϑ, σ, j) = true) then
27: (typej , id j , ϑj , σj)← (type, id , ϑ, σ)
28: p← p+ 1
29: if (typei, id i, ϑi) = (⊥,⊥,⊥) then
30: (typei, id i, ϑi)← (typej , id j , ϑj)
function done reconfiguregma(new view ,num):
31: n← |next view |
32: t← bn−13 c
33: vn← num
34: curr view ← new view
35: i← find(next view ,Pi)
36: for j = 1, . . . , n do
37: Pj ← next view [j]
38: init view()
Let QID |membership.v be the following predicate:
QID |membership.v
(
[(type1, id1, ϑ1, σ1), . . . , (typen, idn, ϑn, σn)]
) ≡(
for at least n− t distinct j, typej 6= ⊥
)
and(
for all j = 1, . . . , n, either (typej = ⊥) or (verify(typej , id j , ϑj , σj , j) = true)
)
Figure 5.6: Protocol GMA for Group Membership Agreement (Part II)
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Algorithm Reconf for party P and tag ID
initialization:
1: curr view ← {P1, P2, . . . , Pn} {current membership of target group}
2: vn ← 0 {current view number}
3: next view ← ⊥ {next group membership}
function updatereconf (type, arg):
4: if P ∈ curr view then
5: if (type = start-reconf) then {Protocol GMA triggers transition to next view}
6: next view ← arg .view {arg ≡ [next view, next view number]}
7: vn ← arg .view num
8: stabilizepabc()
9: else if (type = pabc-stabilized) then
10: stabilizeape(arg) {arg ≡ last a-delivery sequence number in current view}
11: else if (type = ape-stabilized) then
12: if next view \ curr view 6= ∅ then {new member(s) admitted}
13: send new viewadmission(next view , vn, arg) {arg ≡ stabilized service state
digest}
14: else
15: reconfigurenetwork (next view)
16: else if (type = new view sent) then
17: reconfigurenetwork (next view)
18: else if (type = network ready) then
19: begin normal operation() {start regular operation in next view}
20: else {P not member of target group yet}
21: if (type = start-reconf) then {Protocol Admission triggers transition to next
view}
22: next view ← arg .view {arg ≡ [next view, next view number, stable state digest]}
23: vn ← arg .view num
24: state digest ← arg .digest
25: reconfigurenetwork (next view)
26: else if (type = network ready) then
27: state updateape(curr view , state digest)
28: else if (type = ape state updated) then
29: begin normal operation() {start regular operation in next view}
Figure 5.7: Algorithm Reconf for Coordinating Group Reconfiguration (Part I)
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function begin normal operation():
30: done reconfigureadmission(next view , vn)
31: done reconfigurefailure detect(next view , vn)
32: done reconfiguregma(next view , vn)
33: done reconfigurepabc(next view , vn)
34: done reconfigureape(next view , vn)
35: curr view ← next view
36: next view ← ⊥
function update view(view ,num): {external directive at P 6∈ curr view for
updating curr view}
37: curr view ← view
38: vn← num
39: update viewadmission(view ,num) {notify Protocol Admission of change in target group}
Figure 5.8: Algorithm Reconf for Coordinating Group Reconfiguration (Part II)
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Protocol D-PABC for party Pi and tag ID
initialization:
1: I ← [] {initiation queue, list of a-broadcast but not a-delivered payloads}
2: D ← ∅ {set of a-delivered payloads}
3: e← 0 {current epoch}
4: vn ← 0 {♣} {current view number}
5: curr view ← {P1, P2, . . . , Pn} {♣} {current membership of target group}
6: init view()
7: init epoch()
function init view(): {♣}
8: block ← false {indicates if the procedure of switching to next view is currently
underway}
9: d ← 0 {number of a-deliveries thus far in current view}
10: close[j]← false, 1 ≤ j ≤ n {indicates if a close payload initiated by Pj has been
a-delivered}
11: closes ← 0 {number of close payloads initiated by distinct parties a-delivered}
12: if (ID , close, vn, i, σi) ∈ I then
13: remove((ID , close, vn, i, σi), I)
function init epoch():
12: l← (e mod n) + 1 {Pl is leader of epoch e}
13: log ← [] {array of size B containing payloads committed in current epoch}
14: s← 0 {sequence number of next payload within epoch}
15: complained ← false {indicates if this party already complained about Pl}
16: start recovery ← false {signals the switch to the recovery mode}
17: c ← 0 {number of complain messages received for epoch leader}
18: S ← D {set of a-delivered or already sc-broadcast payloads at Pl}
upon (ID , in, a-broadcast,m):
19: append(m, I)
20: if ¬block then {♣}
21: send (ID , initiate, vn, e,m) to Pl
22: updateFl(initiate,m)
Figure 5.9: Protocol D-PABC for Reconfigurable Atomic Broadcast (Part I)
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forever: {parsimonious mode}
23: if ¬complained then {leader Pl is not suspected}
24: initialize an instance of strong consistent broadcast with tag ID |bind.vn.e.s
25: m← ⊥
26: if i = l then
27: wait for timeout(T ) or receipt of a message (ID , initiate, vn, e,m) such that
m 6∈ S
28: if timeout(T ) then
29: m← dummy
30: else
31: S ← S ∪ {m}
32: stop(T )
33: sc-broadcast the message m with tag ID |bind.vn.e.s
34: wait for start recovery or sc-delivery of some m with tag ID |bind.vn.e.s
such that m 6∈ D ∪ log
35: if start recovery then
36: recovery()
37: else
38: log [s]← m
39: if s ≥ 2 then
40: updateFl(deliver, log [s− 2])
41: deliver(log [s− 2])
42: if i = l and (log [s] 6= dummy or (s > 0 and log [s− 1] 6= dummy)) then
43: start(T )
44: s← s+ 1
45: if s mod B = 0 then
46: recovery()
function deliver(m):
47: if m 6= dummy then
48: remove(m, I)
49: D ← D ∪ {m}
50: if m = (ID , close, vn, j, σj) and σj is a valid signature by Pj on (ID , close, vn, j)
and close[j] = false then {♣}
51: close[j]← true {♣}
52: closes ← closes + 1 {♣}
53: if closes = t+ 1 then {♣}
54: block ← true {♣}
55: start recovery ← true {♣}
56: else
57: output (ID , out, a-deliver,m)
58: d ← d + 1 {♣}
Figure 5.10: Protocol D-PABC for Reconfigurable Atomic Broadcast (Part II)
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function complain():
59: send (ID , complain, vn, e) to all parties
60: complained ← true
upon receiving message (ID , complain, vn, e) from Pj for the first time:
61: c← c+ 1
62: if (c = t+ 1) and ¬complained then
63: complain()
64: else if c = 2t+ 1 then
65: start recovery ← true
function done reconfigurepabc(new view ,num): {♣}
66: n← |new view |
67: t← bn−13 c
68: vn← num
69: curr view ← new view
70: i← find(new view ,Pi)
71: for j = 1, . . . , n do
72: Pj ← new view [j]
73: block ← false
function stabilizepabc(): {♣}
74: compute a signature σ on (ID , close, vn, i)
75: (ID , in, a-broadcast, (ID , close, vn, i, σ))
Let QID |watermark.vn.e be the following predicate:
QID |watermark.vn.e
([
(s1, C1, σ1), . . . , (sn, Cn, σn)
]) ≡(
for at least n− t distinct j, sj 6= ⊥
)
and(
for all j = 1, . . . , n, either sj = ⊥ or
(σj is a valid signature by Pj on (ID , committed, vn, e, sj , Cj) and
(sj = −1 or Cj completes the sc-broadcast with tag ID |bind.vn.e.sj))
)
Let QID |deliver.vn.e be the following predicate:
QID |deliver.vn.e
([
(I1, σ1), . . . , In, σn)
]) ≡ for at least n− t distinct j,(Ij ∩ D = ∅ and σj is a valid signature by Pj on (ID , queue, vn, e, j, Ij))
Figure 5.11: Protocol D-PABC for Reconfigurable Atomic Broadcast (Part III)
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function recovery():
{Part 1: agree on watermark}
76: compute a signature σ on (ID , committed, vn, e, s− 1)
77: send the message (ID , committed, vn, e, s− 1, C, σ) to all parties, where C denotes
the bit string that completes the sc-broadcast with tag ID |bind.vn.e.(s− 1)
78: (sj , Cj , σj)← (⊥,⊥,⊥) (1 ≤ j ≤ n)
79: wait for n− t messages (ID , committed, vn, e, sj , Cj , σj) from distinct Pj such that Cj
completes
the sc-broadcast instance ID |bind.vn.e.sj and σj is a valid signature on
(ID , committed, vn, e, sj)
80: W ← [(s1, C1, σ1), . . . , (sn, Cn, σn)]
81: propose W for MVBA with tag ID |watermark.vn.e and predicate QID |watermark.vn.e
82: wait for MVBA with tag ID |watermark.vn.e to decide some W¯ =
[(s¯1, C¯1, σ¯1), . . . , (s¯n, C¯n, σ¯n)]
83: w ← max{s¯1, . . . , s¯n} − 1
{Part 2: synchronize up to watermark}
84: s′ ← s− 2
85: while s′ ≤ min{s− 1, w} do
86: if s′ ≥ 0 then
87: deliver(log [s′])
88: s′ ← s′ + 1
89: if s > w then
90: for j = 1, . . . , n do
91: u← max{sj , s¯j}
92: M ← {Mv} for v = u, . . . , w, where Mv completes the sc-broadcast instance
ID |bind.vn.e.v
93: send message (ID , complete,M) to Pj
94: while s ≤ w do
95: wait for a message (ID , complete,M¯) such that M¯s ∈ M¯ completes sc-broadcast
with tag ID |bind.vn.e.s
96: use M¯s to sc-deliver some m with tag ID |bind.vn.e.s
97: deliver(m)
98: s← s+ 1
Figure 5.12: Protocol D-PABC for Reconfigurable Atomic Broadcast (Part IV)
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function recovery(): (continued...)
{Part 3: deliver some messages}
76: compute a digital signature σ on (ID , queue, vn, e, i, I)
77: send the message (ID , queue, vn, e, i, I, σ) to all parties
78: (Ij , σj)← (⊥,⊥) (1 ≤ j ≤ n)
79: wait for n− t messages (ID , queue, vn, e, j, Ij , σj) from distinct Pj such that
σj is a valid signature from Pj and Ij ∩ D = ∅
80: Q← [(I1, σ1), . . . , (In, σn)]
81: propose Q for MVBA with tag ID |deliver.vn.e and predicate QID |deliver.vn.e
82: wait for MVBA with tag ID |deliver.vn.e to decide some Q¯ = [(I¯1, σ¯1), . . . , (I¯n, σ¯n)]
83: for m ∈ ⋃nj=1 I¯j \ D, in some deterministic order do
84: deliver(m)
85: if block then {♣}
86: updatereconf (pabc-stabilized, d) {♣}
87: wait for block = false {♣}
88: e← 0 {♣}
89: init view() {♣}
90: init epoch()
91: for m ∈ I do
92: send (ID , initiate, vn, e,m) to Pl
Figure 5.13: Protocol D-PABC for Reconfigurable Atomic Broadcast (Part V)
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Protocol D-APE for execution replica Pi with input parameter δ (checkpoint interval)
initialization:
1: curr view ← {P1, P2, . . . , Pn} {♣} {current membership of target group}
2: vn ← 0 {♣} {current view number}
3: init view()
function init view():
4: PC ← {P1, P2, . . . , Pt+1} {current primary committee}
5: corrupt ← ∅ {set of replicas for which Pi has sent convict messages}
6: slow ← ∅ {set of replicas for which Pi has sent indict messages since last reset}
7: c← 0 {counter indicating number of resets of the set slow}
8: certified ← ∅ {set of sequence numbers of requests for which Pi has reply certificates}
9: R← [] {array of size (δ − 1) containing operations requested by AS}
10: s← 0 {sequence number in the last agree message received from AS}
11: u← 0 {sequence number up to which Pi’s state is updated}
12: replies ← ∅ {set of reply messages received from replicas}
13: suspects ← ∅ {set of suspect messages for various replicas received}
14: must do ← ∅ {set of sequence numbers of requests that Pi must execute even if
Pi 6∈ PC}
15: last ← −1 {♣} {sequence number of final request to execute in current view}










17: if s = last then {♣}
18: finish view() {♣}
{Mode 1: Parsimonious Normal Mode}
19: else if message received was first-time agree(s+ 1) and (s+ 1) mod δ 6= 0 then
20: s← s+ 1
21: R[s mod δ]← o, where o is the service operation specified in the agree message
22: if Pi ∈ PC then
23: r ← obtain reply()
24: send reply(r, normal)
{Mode 2: Parsimonious Audit Mode}
25: else {retransmit agree(s) or first-time agree(s+ 1) checkpoint request}
26: if message received was first-time agree(s + 1) and (s + 1) mod δ = 0 then
{checkpoint}
27: s← s+ 1
28: repeat
29: oldpc← PC
30: if (Pi ∈ PC) then
31: r ← obtain reply()
32: send reply(r, audit)
33: updateFD(start-monitor, s)
34: wait for s ∈ certified or s ∈ must do or oldpc 6= PC
35: updateFD(stop-monitor, s)
36: until s ∈ certified or s ∈ must do
37: if (s ∈ certified) then
38: send reply certificate for agree(s) to AS
{Mode 3: Recovery Mode}
39: else {s ∈ must do}
40: r ← obtain reply()
41: send reply(r, recover)
Figure 5.15: Protocol D-APE for Reconfigurable Parsimonious Execution (Part II)
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function finish view(): {♣}
Require: s = last {precondition}
42: r ← obtain reply() {update state to reflect execution of all requests up to seq.
number last}
43: send reply(r, recovery)
44: r ← checkpoint() {compute state digest after all requests in current view executed}
45: updatereconf (ape-stabilized, r) {notify Protocol Reconf that stabilization is
complete}
46: wait for last = −1
function stabilizeape(d): {♣}
47: last ← d
function done reconfigureape(new view ,num): {♣}
48: n← |new view |
49: t← bn−13 c
50: vn← num
51: curr view ← new view
52: i← find(new view ,Pi)
53: for j = 1, . . . , n do
54: Pj ← new view [j]
55: init view()
function state updateape(view , digest): {♣} {called by Algorithm Reconf when admitted
to the target group}
56: send the message (state-request, digest) to all Pk ∈ view




59: if (mode = normal) then
60: send the message (reply, vn, i, s, r) to AS
61: else
62: send the message 〈reply, vn, i, s, r〉σi to all replicas
Figure 5.16: Protocol D-APE for Reconfigurable Parsimonious Execution (Part III)
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function obtain reply():
63: if ¬(last = s and u 6= s) and
∃ r: (replies contains 〈reply, vn, k, s, r〉σk messages from t+ 1 distinct Pk or
(reply, vn, i, s, r) ∈ replies) then {♣}
64: return r
65: else {actually need to execute request to obtain result}
66: if u 6= (s− 1) then
67: state update()
68: if (s mod δ 6= 0) then
69: o← R[s mod δ]
70: r ← execute(o)
71: else
72: r ← checkpoint() {take checkpoint, and return digest of internal state}
73: u← s
74: store reply((reply, vn, i, s, r), i)
75: return r
function state update(): {update state to reflect execution of requests up to seq. number s−1}
76: stable ← absolute(s/δ) ∗ δ
77: if (u < stable) then
78: find digest r : (replies contains 〈reply, vn, k, stable, r〉σk messages from t+1 distinct
Pk)
79: certifiers ← set of t+ 1 distinct Pk whose reply messages form reply certificate for
stable
80: send the message (state-request, stable) to all Pk ∈ certifiers
81: wait for receipt of state updates such that digest of internal state after applying
them equals r
82: for u = (max (stable, u) + 1), . . . , (s− 1) do
83: o←R[u mod δ]
84: execute(o)
upon receiving message 〈reply, vn, j, sj , rj〉σj from Pj 6∈ corrupt for the first time:
85: if i 6= j then
86: store reply(m, j)
Figure 5.17: Protocol D-APE for Reconfigurable Parsimonious Execution (Part IV)
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function store reply(m, j): where m =
{
〈reply, vn, j, sj , rj〉σj if j 6= i
(reply, vn, i, si, ri) otherwise
87: replies ← replies ∪ {m}
88: if j 6= i then
89: for replicas Pk s.t. (〈suspect, vn, k, j, sj , c〉σk ∈ suspects) do
90: forward m to Pk
91: if ∃ r: replies contains 〈reply, vn, k, sj , r〉σk messages from t+ 1 distinct Pk then
92: certificate ← set of 〈reply, vn, k, sj , r〉σk messages from t+ 1 distinct Pk
93: if (sj 6∈ certified) then
94: certified ← certified ∪ {sj}
95: if (sj ∈ must do) then
96: send certificate to AS
97: updateFD(got-reply, j, sj)
function pc refresh():
98: if |corrupt ∪ slow | > t then
99: c← c+ 1
100: slow ← ∅
101: suspects ← ∅
102: PC ← set of (t+ 1)-lowest-ranked replicas that are neither in slow nor in corrupt
function fault report(k, type, sk):
103: if type = mute-suspect then
104: send 〈suspect, vn, i, k, sk, c〉σi to all replicas
105: else if type = implicate then
106: find Pj : (Pj 6∈ corrupt and 〈reply, vn, j, sk, rj〉σj ∈ replies and
〈reply, vn, k, sk, rk〉σk ∈ replies and rk 6= rj)
107: proof ← {〈reply, vn, j, sk, rj〉σj , 〈reply, vn, k, sk, rk〉σk}
108: send (implicate, vn, sk, proof ) to all replicas
109: must do ← must do ∪ {sk}
110: else {type = convict}
111: certificate ← set of 〈reply, vn, j, sk, r〉σj messages from t+ 1 distinct Pj
112: proof ← certificate ∪ {〈reply, vn, k, sk, rk〉σk}
113: send (convict, vn, k, sk, proof ) to all replicas
114: corrupt ← corrupt ∪ {Pk}
115: must do ← must do ∪ {sk}
116: pc refresh()
Figure 5.18: Protocol D-APE for Reconfigurable Parsimonious Execution (Part V)
116
upon receiving message 〈suspect, vn, j, k, sj , c〉σj from Pj 6∈ corrupt for the first time:
117: if Pk’s reply message for agree(sj) is in replies then
118: forward Pk’s reply message for agree(sj) to replica Pj
119: suspects ← suspects ∪ {〈suspect, vn, j, k, sj , c〉σj}
120: if Pk 6∈ slow and 〈suspect, vn, h, k, sj , c〉σh messages from n − t distinct Ph are in
suspects then
121: not responsive(sj , k)
upon receiving message (indict, vn, k, sj , c, proof ) from Pj 6∈ corrupt :
122: if (sj 6∈ must do) or (Pk 6∈ corrupt ∪ slow) then
123: if (proof contains 〈suspect, vn, h, k, sj , c〉σh messages from n− t distinct Ph) then
124: suspects ← suspects ∪ proof
125: not responsive(sj , k)
function not responsive(s′, k):
126: send (indict, vn, k, s′, c, proof ) to all replicas, where proof is the set of
〈suspect, vn, j, k, s′, c〉σj
messages from n− t distinct Pj
127: slow ← slow ∪ {Pk}
128: must do ← must do ∪ {s′}
129: pc refresh()
upon receiving message (implicate, vn, sj , proof ) from Pj 6∈ corrupt :
130: if ∃ Pk, Ph : 〈reply, vn, k, sj , rk〉σk ∈ proof and 〈reply, vn, h, sj , rh〉σh ∈ proof and
rh 6= rk then
131: for m ∈ proof \ replies do
132: store reply(m, sender(m))
upon receiving message (convict, vn, k, sj , proof ) from Pj 6∈ corrupt :
133: if proof contains 〈reply, vn, h, sj , r〉σh messages from t+ 1 distinct Ph and
〈reply, vn, k, sj , rk〉σk ∈ proof and r 6= rk then
134: for m ∈ proof \ replies do
135: store reply(m, sender(m))





We have developed a software toolkit that implements protocols for efficient and dynamic
replication of a stateful service. We call this toolkit, the Component-Based Framework for
Intrusion Tolerance, or CoBFIT. We use the term “component” here in the classic software
engineering sense of the word, i.e., a component is a coherent, encapsulated part of the toolkit
that provides its service operations in the form of clearly defined event/object interfaces
that other components can use. The class of services that can benefit from our CoBFIT
toolkit are those that can be implemented as deterministic state machines. The CoBFIT
toolkit can be used to make such a service fault-tolerant using the state machine replication
approach [Sch90], i.e., by replicating the service on multiple nodes of a distributed system
and then coordinating client interactions with the replicas. In addition to the protocol
components, the CoBFIT toolkit implements many “framework” components that provide
a common foundation for implementing not only the specific protocols described in this
chapter, but similar distributed fault-tolerant protocols as well.
6.1.1 Overview of Various Components
We now provide an overview of the various protocol and framework components in the CoB-
FIT toolkit. Figure 6.1 shows the instantiation hierarchy of components in the CoBFIT
toolkit. The top-level component is the Main component; the term “replica start” is synony-





















Figure 6.1: Component Instantiation Hierarchy
that creates the framework components and the highest-level protocol components.
There are four framework components:
1. The Network component is responsible for all of a replica’s communication with the
outside world (i.e., including other replicas and clients).
2. The Cryptlib Interface component provides interfaces for performing cryptographic
operations required by the protocol components.
3. The Instance Handler is the component that instantiates all protocol components;
the Main component asks the Instance Handler to instantiate the highest-level proto-
col components, which may in turn ask the Instance Handler to instantiate lower-level
protocol components.
4. The Protocol Dispatcher de-multiplexes and dispatches incoming messages received
from the peer protocol components at other replicas to the appropriate protocol com-
ponent.
The highest-level protocols in the CoBFIT toolkit include:
1. A message-efficient atomic broadcast protocol implemented in the PABC component
that represents the agreement phase of state machine replication,
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2. A resource-efficient execution protocol implemented in the APE component that repre-
sents the execution phase of state machine replication, and
3. A set of protocols implemented in the Reconfiguration, Failure Detect, Admission,
and GMA components that utilize the group membership information stored in the
Membership Info component, provide a group abstraction called CoBFIT-group for
the set of replicas, and make it possible to change the group membership dynamically
while maintaining replica consistency.
The atomic broadcast protocol totally orders incoming requests from clients of the repli-
cated service, and the execution protocol invokes requests at the service in the total order.
The PABC component does not directly interact with the clients; instead, a Client Interface
component communicates with the clients, filters out unauthorized requests, forwards only
the authorized requests to the PABC component, and forwards reply certificates back to the
corresponding clients. Similarly, the APE component does not interact with the service di-
rectly, but only through a Server Interface component, which serves as an adapter and
hides service-specific details from the APE component.
The CBroadcast, ABBA, and MVBA components implement protocols for consistent broad-
cast, binary Byzantine agreement, and multi-valued Byzantine agreement respectively. Both
the atomic broadcast protocol and the group membership agreement protocol (implemented
in the GMA component) use consistent broadcast and multi-valued Byzantine agreement as
primitives; hence, both the PABC and GMA components instantiate the CBroadcast and MVBA
components during their operation. The multi-valued Byzantine agreement protocol imple-
mented in the MVBA component uses consistent broadcast and binary Byzantine agreement as
primitives; hence, the MVBA component instantiates the CBroadcast and ABBA components
during its operation.
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6.1.2 The ACE Toolkit
The CoBFIT toolkit was developed in C++ using an object-oriented network programming
toolkit called the Adaptive Communication Environment or ACE [SH02][SH03]. The ACE
toolkit is open-source and widely used, and has proved to be a robust platform for building
high-performance communication services. ACE provides a rich set of reusable C++ wrap-
per facades and framework components that perform common communication software tasks
across a range of operating systems and platforms. In the following sections, classes prefixed
with ACE (such as the ACE Message Block, ACE Task, and ACE Input CDR classes) are all
provided by the ACE toolkit. Where necessary, we provide a brief overview of the ACE
classes used; however, for detailed documentation of the ACE classes used by the CoBFIT
toolkit, we refer the reader to two books by Schmidt and Huston, C++ Network Program-
ming: Systematic Reuse with ACE & Frameworks [SH02] and C++ Network Programming:
Mastering Complexity with ACE & Patterns [SH03].
6.1.3 Organization of the Chapter
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.2 describes in detail the framework
components that form the foundation upon which protocol components are built. Sec-
tions 6.3 and 6.4 describe the implementation of the consistent broadcast protocol and
agreement protocols (respectively) that serve as primitives for implementing higher-level
protocols such as the atomic broadcast protocol and the group membership agreement pro-
tocol. The PABC and APE components that implement protocols for the agreement and
execution phases (respectively) of state machine replication are described in Section 6.5.
Section 6.6 describes the components that implement protocols for the formation and dy-
namic membership management of the CoBFIT-group. Finally, Section 6.7 describes the
Client Interface component that interfaces with the clients of the replicated service and
the Server Interface component that interfaces with the replicated service.
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6.2 Framework Components
The CoBFIT toolkit implements a number of distributed protocols that collectively accom-
plish efficient, Byzantine-fault-tolerant state machine replication. Although each protocol
provides a distinct set of properties and serves a distinct purpose, the fact is that a number
of implementation requirements are common to many of the protocols. Here, we provide a
few examples of such requirements. Several protocols require communication among peer
protocol instances running at the replicas. Protocols such as ABBA, MVBA, and CBroadcast
are all instantiated by some higher-level protocol that expects them to provide an output
before termination. All our protocols are designed as reactive protocols, i.e., they respond
to the occurrence of an event (e.g., timeout), receipt of a message, or an input action. Since
the fault model is Byzantine, no single party can be trusted; hence, all protocols make their
progress from one stage to the next contingent upon the participation of enough correct par-
ties. In many cases, the fact that enough correct parties participated in a particular stage
has to be recorded in a manner that is provable to a third party (e.g., using cryptographic
schemes), so that the third party can be convinced to advance to the next stage. The pur-
pose of the CoBFIT framework components is to provide the requirements that are common
to several protocols (such as the above) in a reusable manner that can result in significant
savings in the implementation effort. In this section, we describe each of the four framework
components in detail.
6.2.1 Network Communication
The Network component is responsible for all of a replica’s communication with the out-
side world (i.e., including other replicas and clients). At a replica that is a member of
CoBFIT-group, the component maintains multiple TCP-Link components. Each TCP-Link
is used for the replica’s exclusive communication with another group member and imple-
ments a secure authenticated channel abstraction using MAC-based authentication. The set















Figure 6.2: Message Inflow at a Party Pi
joining of the CoBFIT-group, and changes as the group membership changes. At a replica,
a TCP-C-Link is established when an authorized client connects to a special port called the
client acceptor port. The Network component spawns a separate TCP-C-Link component for
exclusive communication with the client. A TCP-C-Link may span several requests and is
garbage-collected when the client has closed the connection or after a period of inactivity
(i.e., no valid client requests). Each TCP-C-Link is used for the replica’s exclusive communi-
cation with a client and implements a secure authenticated channel abstraction using digital
signatures. The Network component also instantiates a UDP-Link component for commu-
nication between a group member and a replica that is not yet a member but wants to be
one.
Figure 6.2 depicts how incoming messages at a replica are dispatched from the Network
component to the appropriate higher-level components. The Protocol Dispatcher compo-
nent subscribes to all messages that are received at the Network component via TCP-Links.
All protocol instances at a group member that communicate with peer protocol instances at
another group member register with the Protocol Dispatcher. Any message received via a















Figure 6.3: Message Outflow at a Party Pi
propriate protocol instance (we describe the dispatching in detail in Section 6.2.2). Requests
received from clients via the corresponding TCP-C-Link components are directly dispatched
to the Client Interface component, which in turn forwards the requests that are autho-
rized to the PABC component. Messages from replicas that are not yet group members are
received via the UDP-Link and directly dispatched to the Admission component.
Figure 6.3 shows how messages from various components are sent over the network. All
protocol components at a group member send messages to protocol components at another
group member through the corresponding TCP-Link. The PABC component passes the reply
certificate for a client request to the Client Interface, which then forwards the certificate
through the corresponding TCP-C-Link to the client. The Admission component at a non-
member sends messages to the peer component at a group member through the UDP-Link;
the component at a member also sends messages to a peer component at a non-member
through the UDP-Link.
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6.2.2 Management of CoBFIT Protocol Components
The Protocol Instance, the Protocol Dispatcher, and the Instance Handler classes
are central to the management of protocol instances in the CoBFIT toolkit. All CoBFIT
protocol implementations derive from the Protocol Instance base class. As the name
indicates, the Protocol Dispatcher is responsible for dispatching incoming messages from
other CoBFIT-group members to the appropriate protocol instance. The Instance Handler
provides methods for instantiating and destroying protocol instances. In this section, we
describe the functionalities provided by the three classes.
Brief Overview of the ACE Task Framework
We defined a Service Component class that inherits from the ACE Service Object class,
which in turn inherits from the ACE Task class [SH03]. The Protocol Dispatcher and the
Protocol Instance classes derive from this Service Component class.
The ACE Task class [SH03] provides capabilities for queueing and processing messages
and reactive handling of events (such as timeouts). A consequence of inheriting from the
ACE Task class is that each protocol instance runs in its own thread of control. ACE Task
has an instance of the ACE Message Queue class; the message queue helps separate data and
requests from their processing. The ACE Task class provides a putq() method that can be
used to enqueue a message onto the ACE Message Queue and a getq() method that block
waits until a message is available on the message queue and then dequeues the message.
The ACE Task class provides a method activate() that is invoked to convert a task
into an active object. An active object is an object that implements the Active Object
pattern [SSRB01][SH03] and executes service requests in a thread separate from the caller’s
thread. This method is invoked only once at the task, soon after it is instantiated. The
ACE Task activate() method in turn calls the svc() method, which is overridden by its
subclasses to implement the task’s service processing.
A consequence of inheriting from the ACE Service Object class is that all components
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are not only ACE Tasks but also services that can be dynamically linked/unlinked by the
ACE Service Config framework through a configuration file if need be.
Instantiating and Destroying Protocol Instances using the Instance Handler
There is a singleton Instance Handler component through which all Protocol Instance
components are instantiated and destroyed. Each Protocol Instance component is uniquely
identified by a string called the tag. At replica creation time, the Main component creates
the Instance Handler, and it is through the latter that all the highest-level protocol compo-
nents (such as the PABC and APE components) are created. All protocol instances maintain a
reference to the Instance Handler whose services they utilize to create lower-level protocol
instances. For example, protocols such as PABC and GMA create lower-level protocols such as
MVBA and CBroadcast through the Instance Handler component.
The Instance Handler maintains the following data structures:
• A hash table, creations, that maps protocol tags to the actual protocol instances. The
table contains an entry for each protocol instance instantiated by the Instance Handler
that has not yet been garbage-collected.
• A list destroyed of protocol tags corresponding to protocol instances that were in-
stantiated and subsequently garbage-collected.
• A hash table, notify, that maps protocol tags with sets of components. Upon the
creation of a protocol instance whose identifier is one of the tag entries present in the
table, the Instance Handler has to notify the corresponding set of components.
The Instance Handler provides three create protocol instance interfaces for instan-
tiating protocol instances; soon after instantiating a protocol instance, the Instance Handler
invokes the activate() method at the instance and converts it into an active object. All
three interfaces, given below, include a tag parameter, which specifies the unique protocol
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identifier, and a type parameter, which specifies the protocol type (i.e., PABC, APE, ABBA,
etc.).
Protocol Instance* create protocol instance (ACE CString tag,
int type, ACE Message Block* start value, Validation* val);
Protocol Instance* create protocol instance (ACE CString tag,
int type, ACE Message Block* payload, int sender, bool strong);
Protocol Instance* create protocol instance (ACE CString tag, int type);
The first interface is used in the creation of validated agreement protocols such as the ABBA
and MVBA protocols. The start value parameter is used to provide the input value for the
agreement protocol, and the val parameter is a Validation object whose validate input
function implements the validation predicate to determine whether a specified input value
is valid from the perspective of the higher-level protocol that instantiated the agreement
protocol. The second interface is used in the creation of the consistent broadcast protocol
implemented by the CBroadcast component. The sender parameter is used to specify the
rank of the designated sender replica. The payload parameter, as the name indicates, is the
payload to be broadcast; the parameter is relevant only at the sender. The Boolean strong
parameter is used to specify whether the instantiated CBroadcast protocol instance needs
to satisfy strong or ordinary protocol semantics (we detail this later in Section 6.3). The
third interface is a generic interface used to create all other protocol types (PABC, APE, etc.).
The Instance Handler provides the get protocol instance interface to obtain a ref-
erence to a previously created protocol instance.
Protocol Instance* get protocol instance (ACE CString tag, int &errno);
If there is an entry for the protocol instance with identifier tag in the hash table creations,
then the reference to the protocol instance will be returned; otherwise, the return value will
be NULL. There are two cases in which the return value would be NULL: (1) if the protocol
instance with identifier tag has never been created before, and (2) if the protocol instance was
created and then subsequently destroyed using the destroy protocol instance interface
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provided by the Instance Handler. In the latter case, tag will be part of the destroyed
list maintained at the Instance Handler. The errno parameter returns the error status of
the execution of the get protocol instance function, and is used to distinguish between
the two cases. An errno value of 1 indicates the former case, while a value of 2 indicates
the latter case. A value of 0 is used when the Protocol Instance returned is non-NULL.
Components can also register with the Instance Handler to be notified later when
a particular protocol instance is created. That is done using the notify upon creation
interface.
void notify upon creation (ACE CString tag, Service Component *caller);
Here, tag is the identifier of the protocol instance, and the caller is the component that
is interested in receiving the notification when the protocol instance with identifier tag is
created sometime in the future. The Instance Handler adds a map entry for tag and
caller in its notify hash table. When a protocol instance with identifier tag is actually
created through the invocation of one of the three create protocol instance methods, the
Instance Handler enqueues a special instance-created message on the message queue
of the interested component, caller. This notification mechanism is mainly used by the
Protocol Dispatcher as will be explained below.
The destroy protocol instance is an interface provided by the Instance Handler for
shutting down a protocol instance.
void destroy protocol instance (ACE CString tag);
The method is typically invoked by the component at whose behest the protocol instance with
identifier tag was created by the Instance Handler. The method looks up the creations
table for a protocol instance with identifier tag; if the instance is present, the method simply
enqueues a special terminate message in the message queue of that instance and waits until
the thread corresponding to the protocol instance exits. At that point, the method adds tag
to the destroyed list and deletes the reference to the protocol instance. When a protocol
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Figure 6.4: Garbage Collection of Protocol Instance
in its svc() method (see below), which will result in the ACE task framework calling the
close() method at the protocol instance; the close() method performs protocol-defined
shutdown activities. When the close() method returns, the thread corresponding to the
protocol instance exits.
The Operation of Protocol Instances
All subclasses of Protocol Instance must implement three virtual methods declared by the
Protocol Instance class, namely:
virtual void start();
virtual void add message (ACE InputCDR &inputcdr);
virtual void close();
Recall that when an ACE Task becomes an active object, the svc() method is invoked.
At the Protocol Instance class, the svc() method invokes the virtual start() hook
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method that subclasses override to perform protocol-specific initialization activities. Af-
ter the start() method returns, the svc() method then starts an event loop that uses
the getq() method of ACE Task to wait for a message to arrive on the protocol instance’s
message queue. After the getq() method returns, the svc() method invokes the virtual
add message() function implemented by all protocol instances to perform protocol-defined
message processing. The event loop exits, and thereby the svc() method returns, only when
the getq() method returns a shutdown message. Once the svc() method completes, the
ACE Task framework will invoke the close() method at the protocol instance; the method
will implement all protocol-defined shutdown activities.
In addition to the ACE Message Queue that a Protocol Instance inherits from the
ACE Task class, the Protocol Instance class itself defines another ACE Message Queue ob-
ject called result channel. A protocol instance uses the result channel to pass results or
outputs to the higher-level protocol instance that was responsible for the creation of the for-
mer protocol instance. A higher-level protocol instance maintains references to all lower-level
protocol instances it creates (through the Instance Handler); it then uses the reference of
a lower-level protocol instance to obtain a reference to the corresponding result channel
and retrieve results synchronously or asynchronously. To obtain results synchronously, the
higher-level protocol instance simply calls the dequeue head() method at the lower-level
protocol instance’s message queue; the method will block wait until some result is enqueued.
Results can also be obtained asynchronously as follows. The lower-level protocol sends a
signal through the ACE Reactor framework [SH02][SH03] when the results are enqueued on
the result channel. For handling the signal, the higher-level protocol must implement an
event handler, which is invoked by the ACE Reactor framework; the handler will dequeue
the result and perform protocol-specific processing.
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Message Dispatching by the Protocol Dispatcher
The Protocol Dispatcher subscribes to all messages received through the TCP-Links at
the Network component. The Network component enqueues any messages received through
the TCP-Links at the message queue of the Protocol Dispatcher. All messages carry
the destination protocol tags in their headers, which enables the Protocol Dispatcher to
determine the protocol instance for which a message is destined.
The Protocol Dispatcher invokes the get protocol instance() interface at the
Instance Handler to obtain a reference to the destination protocol instance for a mes-
sage. After determining the destination protocol instance for a message received via a
TCP-Link, the Protocol Dispatcher in turn enqueues the message onto the message queue
of that protocol instance by invoking the putq() method. If the value returned by the
get protocol instance() method indicates that the protocol instance has already been
destroyed, then the Protocol Dispatcher simply discards the message. If the return value
indicates that the protocol instance has never been created before, the Protocol Dispatcher
registers with the Instance Handler to be notified when the instance is created at some
time in the future and, thereafter, buffers the messages destined for that protocol in-
stance. When such a protocol instance is actually created, the Instance Handler en-
queues a special instance-created message (specifying the tag of the protocol instance) on
the message queue of the Protocol Dispatcher. Upon receiving the notification from the
Instance Handler that the protocol instance has been created, the Protocol Dispatcher
obtains a reference to the protocol instance (through the get protocol instance interface
of the Instance Handler) and then enqueues all the buffered messages onto the message
queue of that protocol instance.
The implementation of the svc() method (inherited from the ACE Task class) in the
Protocol Dispatcher component is basically an event loop whereby the method dequeues
the message in the component’s ACE Message Queue, determines the protocol instance to
which the message has to be dispatched, and then enqueues/buffers the message in the
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ACE Message Queue of the destination protocol instance.
6.2.3 Implementation of Cryptography Primitives
CoBFIT components use many cryptographic primitives, such as cryptographic hash func-
tions, message authentication codes or MACs, digital signatures, and a pseudo-random num-
ber generator (PRNG). Cryptographic hash functions are used to compute message digests.
MAC authentication is used to establish a secure authenticated point-to-point channel ab-
straction between any two members of the CoBFIT-group. Digital signatures are used to
authenticate clients as well as for signing any message that needs to be provable to a third
party (i.e., any party besides the sender and receiver of that message). A PRNG is used to
generate the secret key used to obtain MACs. We used Peter Gutmann’s Cryptlib [cry] as
the core cryptographic library and wrote wrapper functions around it. All the functions are
contained in the CoBFIT Cryptlib Interface component, which we describe in the rest of
this section.
Symmetric keys used for MAC authentication at the TCP-Link level are generated by
invoking the following method:
int get random data (ACE UINT32 buf len, void* buf);
The method call fills the input data buffer buf with the required number buf len of random
bytes; the call returns 0 on success and -1 on failure. Internally, the method uses the RC4
PRNG algorithm [VvOM96] to generate the random bytes.
The cryptographic hash or the digest of a message is obtained by invoking the following
method:
int crypt hash buf (void* buf, ACE UINT32 buf len, void* hash);
The method call computes the digest of the message buf of length buf len using the SHA
secure hash algorithm and fills the buffer hash with the digest. The parameter hash must
be an allocated buffer of size CRYPT MAX HASHSIZE (= 32 bytes). The method call returns
the actual length of the digest (which is expected to be 20 bytes).
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The crypt verify hash method is used to check that the hash stored in a buffer corre-
sponds to the contents of a message.
int crypt verify hash (void* buf, ACE UINT32 buf len, void* hash);
The method call checks whether hash is the correct digest for the message buf of length
buf len. The method call returns 0 if the digest is correct; otherwise, it returns -1.
For a MAC-authenticated message m to be sent from group member Pi to another mem-
ber Pj, the sender Pi computes the hash of the string obtained by concatenating m with
the symmetric key that Pi and Pj share; Pi then sends both m and the hash. The receiver
Pj computes the hash in a similar way and checks whether the computed hash is the same
as the hash received from Pi. MAC-authentication thwarts the threat posed by a malicious
interceptor who could modify the message and replace the digest with the digest of the
modified message, for the interceptor won’t have access to the secret key.
The Cryptlib Interface component implements wrapper functions around Cryptlib for
key generation, signing, and verification using the RSA algorithm. The public key/private
key pairs for all parties in the universal-list and client-list are generated a priori. When a
replica is created, as part of the initialization procedure, it is handed over its private key and
the public keys of all parties. This information is used to populate the universal table
and the private key data structures in the Membership Info object, and the client table
data structure in the All Clients Info object.
The crypt sign buf method is used to generate a digital signature on the contents of a
buffer buf of length buf len. The computed signature is stored in the buffer sign provided
as input. The buffer sign must have been allocated before the method call and must have a
size CRYPT MAX SIGNSIZE (= 4096 bytes). For efficiency, the signature is generated around
a hash of buf rather than buf itself. When an optional input parameter, hash, of non-zero
value is provided, the hash of the buffer is stored in hash. The method call returns the
actual length of the signature.
int crypt sign buf (void* buf, ACE UINT32 buf len, void* sign, void* hash=0);
133
The crypt verify sign method is used to verify whether a digital signature is correct.
int crypt verify sign (void* buf, ACE UINT32 buf len, void* sign,
ACE TCHAR* key id, bool hash=false);
The method obtains the public key of the party identified by key id and checks whether
the buffer sign contains the correct signature of the party. The method call returns 0 if the
signature is correct; otherwise, it returns -1. If the optional parameter hash is false, then
the method checks whether the buffer sign contains the correct signature of the party on
the hash of the buffer buf of length buf len. Otherwise, if hash is set to true, then the
method checks whether the buffer sign contains the correct signature of the party on simply
the buffer buf of length buf len.
The crypt encrypt buf method is used to encrypt a buffer buf of length buf len using
the public key of the buffer’s intended receiver which is identified using key id. The encryp-
tion is done in place, so the encrypted data is also stored in buf. The method call returns
a positive integer indicating the length of the encrypted buffer on success and -1 otherwise.
int crypt encrypt buf (void* buf, ACE UINT32 buf len, ACE TCHAR* key id);
The crypt decrypt buf method is used to decrypt an encrypted buffer using the private
key.
int crypt decrypt buf (void* buf, ACE UINT32 buf len);
The method decrypts the buffer buf of length buf len and stores the decrypted information
in place. The method call returns a positive integer indicating the length of the decrypted
buffer on success and -1 otherwise.
6.3 Broadcast Protocol
The CBroadcast component implements transferable consistent broadcast [CKPS01]. In
consistent broadcast, there is a designated sender party that is supposed to send the payload
to be delivered to all parties. The protocol ensures consistent delivery, i.e., the payload
delivered at any two correct parties is the same. If the sender is faulty, it is possible that
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one or more correct parties do not deliver anything. In such cases, transferability is a useful
mechanism that allows a correct party that did deliver the payload to send information
called the completing string to convince other parties to also deliver the payload.
Only after the designated sender has gathered signed approvals or echoes for its payload
from a large enough quorum can the payload be consistently delivered at a correct party.
The completing string essentially contains the quorum of signatures. Although a quorum size
of dn+t+1
2
e is sufficient to ensure the standard properties of consistent broadcast, a version
of the consistent broadcast protocol called strong consistent broadcast that has a quorum
size of n − t is useful in some situations, for example, in Protocol PABC. Consequently, we
developed the CBroadcast component in a manner that makes it possible to specify in the
constructor (given below) whether an instantiated consistent broadcast protocol instance
needs to satisfy strong or standard quorum size.
CBroadcast (ACE CString tag, int type, ACE Message Block* payload,
int sender, bool strong);
Just as at any subclass of Protocol Instance, the start()method implements protocol-
specific initialization tasks. At a party that is not the designated sender, the method does
nothing; only at the designated sender, the method marshals and sends a c-send message
containing the payload. After the start() method returns, the svc() method enters the
event loop that invokes the add message() method for each message dequeued from the pro-
tocol instance’s ACE Message Queue. The add message() method demarshals and processes
messages as specified in the protocol [CKPS01].
The CBroadcast protocol instance at a party is ready to output or consistently deliver
a payload when the designated sender’s c-final message that includes a quorum of signed
echoes for that payload has been received. At that point, the CBroadcast protocol instance
outputs an ACE Message Block containing the payload to be delivered and the c-final mes-
sage that serves as the completing string needed to ensure transferability. After enqueueing
that ACE Message Block on the result channel, the CBroadcast protocol instance is ready
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to be garbage-collected. Garbage collection is triggered when the higher-level protocol in-
stance (PABC, GMA, or MVBA) that created the CBroadcast protocol instance invokes the
destroy protocol instance() method at the Instance Handler passing as an argument
to the identifier of the CBroadcast protocol instance.
6.4 Agreement Protocols
There are two validated agreement protocols currently implemented in the CoBFIT toolkit.
They are the binary agreement protocol implemented in the ABBA component, and the multi-
valued agreement protocol implemented in the MVBA component. The former protocol allows
a group of parties to decide on a binary decision value despite the malicious corruption of up
to one-third of the members of the group. The latter protocol allows a group of parties to
decide on an arbitrary bit string that is acceptable to the higher-level protocol or application
that created the MVBA component despite the malicious corruption of up to one-third of the
members of the group.
There is an abstract Agreement class from which both the MVBA and ABBA classes derive.
The class provides the following constructor:
Agreement (ACE CString tag, ACE Message Block* start value, Validation* val);
The start value denotes the input value that the agreement protocol instance at this
replica proposes to be considered as a candidate for the decision value. The val parameter,
an instance of the Validation class, provides a way to verify whether the proposals put forth
by other parties are valid from the point of view of the higher-level protocol or application
that instantiated this agreement protocol instance. The decision value agreed upon by the
parties may be the proposal of any party (even a corrupted one) as long as the proposed
value is valid.
The Validation class is an abstract class that declares the following pure virtual method:
virtual bool validate (ACE Message Block* input)=0;
Corresponding to every higher-level protocol at whose behest an agreement protocol instance
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is created, a subclass of the Validation class that implements the validate() method has
to be defined. The method should take an ACE Message Block* object that represents some
party’s input to the agreement protocol instance as a parameter, and implement the logic
for checking whether the input is valid from the point of view of the higher-level protocol.
6.4.1 The ABBA Component
Before terminating, the ABBA protocol instance outputs either a 0 or 1 on its result channel.
The protocol ensures that the output binary value is the same at all correct parties. The
ABBA class implements Cachin et al.’s asynchronous binary agreement protocol described
in [CKS05], with two major differences (1) The implementation replaces threshold signatures
with an equivalent array of digital signatures, called multi-signatures ; thus, where threshold
signatures shares from k distinct parties are needed, the implementation instead uses digital
signatures from k distinct parties. (2) The threshold coin-tossing primitive has been replaced
with a pseudo-random function implemented using the AES block cipher; implicit in this
substitution is the assumption that the adversary that corrupts and gains control of parties
is distinct from and does not collude with the adversary that controls message scheduling
on the network.
Just as at any subclass of Protocol Instance, the start()method implements protocol-
specific initialization tasks. In the ABBA class, the method marshals and sends a pre-process
message with the input value (0 or 1). After the start() method returns, the svc() method
enters the event loop that invokes the add message() method for each message dequeued
from the protocol instance’s ACE Message Queue. The add message() method demarshals
messages as specified in the protocol [CKS05]. Just before enqueuing the binary decision
value b on the result channel, the ABBA protocol instance sends a special decided message
to the peer protocol instances at other parties that will convince the recipients also to decide
on value b. At that point, the ABBA protocol instance is ready to be garbage collected;
garbage collection is triggered when the higher-level protocol instance that created the ABBA
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protocol instance invokes the destroy protocol instance() and passes the identifier of the
ABBA protocol instance as an argument.
At present, the only protocol among the CoBFIT protocols that uses the binary agree-
ment as a primitive is the MVBA protocol, which requires that the ABBA protocol’s decision
value be biased towards 1. To “bias the ABBA decision value towards 1” is to guarantee
that if t + 1 correct parties propose 1 along with appropriate validation information, then
the ABBA protocol must decide 1. The MVBA protocol involves a round in which all parties
convey their proposed input values to other parties through consistent broadcast. Then, for
each “candidate” party in succession, an ABBA protocol instance is created to decide whether
the candidate party’s proposal was indeed consistently delivered by enough correct parties.
When some ABBA protocol instance decides 1, the MVBA protocol decides on the value pro-
posed by the corresponding candidate party and then terminates. For a given candidate
party Pi, the MVBA protocol at a correct party Pj will instantiate the ABBA protocol with a
start value of 1 only if the Pj had consistently delivered Pi’s proposed input value. To prove
that Pj did indeed consistently deliver Pi’s proposal and hence that its ABBA input value of 1
for candidate Pi is indeed valid, the MVBA protocol at Pj must provide validation information
through the start value argument of the following ABBA constructor.
ABBA (ACE CString tag, ACE Message Block* start value, Validation* val);
There is an ABBA MVBA Validation class derived from the abstract Validation class;
the validate() method in the ABBA MVBA Validation class checks whether a given input
ACE Message Block* object contains proof of consistent delivery of the candidate’s proposal.
A pointer to an object of the ABBA MVBA Validation class is passed as the argument val to
the ABBA constructor.
6.4.2 The MVBA Component
Before terminating, the MVBA protocol instance outputs a bit string representing the decision
on its result channel. The protocol ensures that the output bit string is the same at all
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correct parties. The MVBA class implements Cachin et al.’s multi-valued validated Byzantine
agreement protocol described in [CKPS01]. The MVBA class has the following constructor:
MVBA (ACE CString tag, ACE Message Block* start value, Validation* val);
The value to be proposed by a party is passed to the MVBA protocol instance through
the start value parameter; that parameter also includes the proof that the proposed value
would be acceptable as output to the higher-level protocol that instantiated the MVBA protocol
instance. The val parameter provides a way to validate the proposals of various parties.
Currently, the MVBA protocol may be instantiated either by the PABC protocol or the GMA
protocol. As described in Chapter 3, Protocol PABC proceeds in epochs, and in each epoch,
the protocol creates two MVBA protocol instances, one to agree on the watermark sequence
number and the other to agree on the set of payloads to deliver before switching to the next
epoch. For each of the above three uses of the MVBA protocol, a subclass of the Validation
class is defined to help validate the values proposed by various parties.
After enqueuing the decision value on the result channel, an MVBA protocol instance is
ready to be garbage-collected. Just as in the case of the ABBA protocol instances, garbage
collection is triggered when the higher-level protocol instance (PABC or GMA) that created the
MVBA protocol instance invokes the destroy protocol instance() and passes the identifier
of the MVBA protocol instance as an argument.
The start() method implementation at the MVBA class creates n CBroadcast instances,
where n is the size of the CoBFIT-group. If the rank of a party is k, then the party plays the
role of the designated sender for the kth CBroadcast instance at which the party consistently
broadcasts its proposed input value (for MVBA) along with validation information; the input
value and validation information are obtained from the start value parameter passed as
an argument to the MVBA constructor. After the consistent delivery of payloads (i.e., MVBA
proposals) that satisfy the specified validity condition at n− t distinct CBroadcast protocol
instances, the start() method marshals and sends a v-vote message [CKPS01] for the
first candidate; the vote is either 0 or 1 depending on whether or not the party received
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the candidate’s consistently broadcast proposal satisfying the validity condition. A 1 vote is
accompanied by proof of consistent delivery of the candidate’s proposal that will convince any
third-party to also consistently deliver the candidate’s proposal. After sending the v-vote
message, the start() method returns and the svc() method that invoked the start()
method now enters that event loop waiting for messages to arrive on the MVBA protocol
instance’s message queue.
In the event loop of the svc() method, the MVBA protocol demarshals and processes
v-vote messages. For a given candidate party, once v-vote messages with proper justifi-
cations have been obtained from n − t distinct parties, an ABBA protocol instance biased
towards 1 is started to decide whether the candidate’s proposal was consistently delivered at
enough correct parties. The input value for the ABBA protocol instance is 1, if a single valid
v-vote for the candidate was received with value 1. As mentioned before in Section 6.4.1,
the validity of ABBA input values is checked using the ABBA MVBA Validation object; the
validate method of the object checks for proof that the candidate’s proposal was consis-
tently delivered if the input value is 1, while no justification is needed for an input value
of 0. If the ABBA protocol instance corresponding to a given candidate party decides 1, the
MVBA protocol decides on the value proposed by the candidate party and then terminates;
otherwise, the v-vote messages for the next candidate party are exchanged, followed by a
binary agreement to decide whether the new candidate’s MVBA proposal was consistently
delivered at enough correct parties, and so on.
6.5 State Machine Replication Protocols
The PABC and APE components respectively implement the agreement and execution phases
of state machine replication. The message-efficient atomic broadcast protocol described in
Chapter 3 is implemented in the PABC component. The resource-efficient execution protocol
described in Chapter 4 is implemented in the APE component.
Figure 6.5 shows the components and steps involved in client request processing. At a
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Figure 6.5: Steps Involved in Client Request Processing
replica, authorized client requests from the local Client Interface component serve as the
input to the PABC component. The a-delivery messages that bind a sequence number to a
client request form the output of the PABC component; this output is sent to the local APE
component. At the APE component, an a-delivery message received from the local PABC
component binding a unique sequence number to a particular client request forms an agree-
ment certificate. Agreement certificates define a total order on the sequence of client requests,
and the APE component schedules the execution of requests (via the Server Interface) at
the Server process in that order. The Server process represents the service that is state-
machine-replicated for fault-tolerance whose state has to be kept consistent at all the exe-
cution replicas. After obtaining the result of the executed request from the Server process
(via the Server Interface), the APE component forwards the result in the form of a reply
message to the PABC components at all the replicas. For a particular a-delivered client
request, reply messages with identical result values from t + 1 distinct execution replicas
constitute a reply certificate. After obtaining a reply certificate, the PABC component passes
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the certificate to the local Client Interface, which can then forward it to the appropriate
client.
Unlike the MVBA and ABBA, which output a single decision value and then terminate,
the PABC and APE components, once instantiated, can handle an unlimited number of client
requests. We now describe the implementation of the PABC and APE protocol components; we
also detail their interaction with each other and other components in the CoBFIT toolkit.
6.5.1 The PABC Component
The PABC class derives from the Protocol Instance class and has the following constructor:
PABC (ACE CString tag);
It is the Instance Handler component that creates the PABC component at the behest of
the top-level Main component.
Just as at any subclass of Protocol Instance, the start()method implements protocol-
specific initialization tasks. The method invokes a private init epoch() method that ini-
tializes the protocol variables; the init epoch() method in pseudocode form is given in
Figure 5.9. After the start() method returns, the svc() method enters the event loop that
invokes the add message() method for each message dequeued from the protocol instance’s
ACE Message Queue. The add message() method demarshals and processes messages as
specified in Protocol D-PABC. The Client Interface passes authorized client requests to
the PABC component through the latter’s a broadcast interface. These requests form the
payloads that need to be atomically delivered to the APE component at the execution replicas.
So as to not overwhelm the APE component with a-delivery messages, the PABC com-
ponent implements the following “acknowledgment” mechanism. After sending out each
a-delivery message to the APE components at the execution replicas, the PABC component
waits until it obtains a reply certificate correponding to that a-delivery before sending out
the next a-delivery message to the APE components. Such an acknowledgment mechanism
ensures that, at a PABC component, the number of a-delivery messages sent is equal to
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either the number of received reply certificates or the number of received reply certificates
plus one. After obtaining a reply certificate, the PABC component invokes the from CoBFIT()
method (described in Section 6.7) to pass the certificate to the local Client Interface com-
ponent.
We have also implemented mechanisms to ensure that the set of payloads a-delivered by
the PABC component at all correct replicas in any particular membership of the CoBFIT-group
is the same. We describe these mechanisms later in Section 6.6 when discussing group
reconfiguration.
6.5.2 The APE Component
The APE class derives from the Protocol Instance class and has the following constructor:
APE (ACE CString tag);
It is the Instance Handler component that creates the APE component at the behest of the
top-level Main component.
The start() method initializes the protocol variables according to the initialization
pseudocode given in Figure 5.14. After the start() method returns, the svc() method
enters the event loop that invokes the add message() method for each message dequeued
from the protocol instance’s ACE Message Queue. The add message() method demarshals
and processes messages as specified in Protocol D-APE. After obtaining an agreement certifi-
cate that binds the next expected sequence number to a client request, the APE component
passes the client request to the Server Interface component by making a blocking call to
the from CoBFIT() method (described in Section 6.7) at the latter component. The method
returns the result of executing the client request; the APE method encapsulates the result in
a reply message that is sent to the PABC component at all replicas.
We have also implemented mechanisms to ensure that the state of the Server process at
all correct execution replicas at the end of any particular membership of the CoBFIT-group
is the same. We describe these mechanisms later in Section 6.6 when discussing group
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reconfiguration.
6.6 Group Membership and Reconfiguration
The protocols in the CoBFIT toolkit are concerned with a set of replicas that constitute
a group called the CoBFIT-group. In this section, we describe the formation and dynamic
membership management of the CoBFIT-group.
6.6.1 The Membership Info object
As the name indicates, the Membership Info object stores all information regarding the
membership (view) of CoBFIT-group. The object maintains the view number x, which is
initialized to 0. At a CoBFIT-groupmember, x indicates the number of times the membership
of CoBFIT-group has changed since the formation of the initial group.
There is a list of identifiers of all replicas that are ever allowed to join CoBFIT-group,
called the universal-list. A replica’s identifier consists of its IP address and its acceptor port.
We call the specified port the acceptor port since it is through this port that replicas accept
connections from other intended members.
The Membership Info object maintains a hash-table universal table that maps the
identifier of each replica Pi in the universal-list to a Replica Info object that contains the
following information:
• Pi’s public key,
• a convict flag (initialized to false) indicating whether Pi was previously removed
from CoBFIT-group for exhibiting a provable Byzantine fault (explained later in Sec-
tion 6.6.3).
• removal time (initialized to 0) indicating the local clock time when Pi was last removed
from the group.
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• join time (initialized to 0) indicating the local clock time when Pi most recently
became a member of the group.
• rejuv time (initialized to a fixed value Rt); the rejuvenation time for Pi indicates
the minimum time that Pi has to spend as a non-member before being considered for
readmission into CoBFIT-group (explained later in Section 6.6.3).
• max rtt, which indicates the expected maximum round-trip time between Pi and this
replica. In a real-world setting, this information would be based on round-trip message
delays measured under stable network conditions.
• the symmetric key, sym key, used for MAC-authenticated point-to-point communica-
tion with Pi through the TCP-Link component.
• an integer, role, that indicates whether Pi participates only in the agreement phase
or in both phases.
The Membership Info object also contains an array view of identifiers of members of
CoBFIT-group. The array view is always a subset of the universal-list. The position at
which a replica’s identifier appears in the array indicates that replica’s rank in the group.
For notational simplicity, let us use Vx to denote the contents of the view array after the
xth update. Vx is a totally ordered list, where the ≤ relation defines a total order on the
elements of Vx based on their rank. Each element of Vx has a distinct rank that ranges from
1 to Vx.
The Membership Info object also stores the private key of the replica and the fault
resilience t of the CoBFIT-group.
6.6.2 Formation of the Initial Group
We use the term initial group to denote the first membership of CoBFIT-group. We assume
that the replicas constituting the initial group do not get corrupted until after the formation
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of the initial group. The initial group must have a fault resilience of at least 1, i.e., there
must be at least four initial members.
At a replica Pi that is intended to be part of the initial group, the view array of the
Membership Info object is initialized with the identifiers of the initial group members in
the order of their intended ranks. Information about the universal-list of replicas and their
public keys is provided to all initial group members; the information is used to initialize
the universal table of the Membership Info object. Pi is also initialized with its private
key, which is stored in the Membership Info object. The fault resilience variable t in the
Membership Info object is also appropriately initialized.
Formation of the initial group involves establishment of a TCP-Link between each pair of
the initial group members that use the acceptor-connector paradigm. The rank determines
which replica plays the role of acceptor and which replica plays the role of connector based
on the following rule: If Pi and Pj are two intended members of the initial group, where Pi
has a lower rank than Pj, then Pi is the acceptor and Pj is the connector. For example, if the
initial group consists of four members P1, P2, P3, and P4 listed in order of increasing rank,
then replica P3 will play the role of connector for establishing the TCP-Link components
with P1 and P2, and the role of acceptor for the TCP-Link with P4. There is a TCP-Link
that each replica Pi establishes for sending messages to itself; in establishing this particular
TCP-Link, Pi simultaneously plays the role of both acceptor and connector.
Establishment of a two-way TCP-Link between an acceptor Pi and connector Pj proceeds
as follows. The Network component at connector Pj instantiates a TCP-Link component for
exclusive communication with Pi. The TCP-Link at Pj then tries to establish a socket
connection with the acceptor port of Pi. Pj keeps trying until it finally succeeds. Acceptor
Pi just waits for a socket connection at its acceptor port. When a connection is made, Pi
accepts the connection, spawns a new socket, and instantiates its own TCP-Link with the
new socket information.
Messages exchanged between Pi and Pj through the TCP-Link are MAC-authenticated.
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For this purpose, each pair of replicas shares a symmetric key. The symmetric keys are
generated using the RC4 pseudo-random number generator (PRNG). The MAC of a message
m is obtained by applying a collision-free hash function (SHA-1) on the string obtained by
concatenating m and the symmetric key.
After the acceptor and connector have established a TCP-Link for exclusive communica-
tion with the other replica, they perform the following handshake procedure to verify the
authenticity of the MAC keys.
1. The TCP-Link at the connector generates a key using the RC4 pseudo-random number
generator, encrypts the key with the public key of the acceptor, and sends the encrypted
key to the acceptor.
2. The TCP-Link at the acceptor decrypts the received key using its private key, and
sends a random challenge.
3. The TCP-Link at the connector waits to receive the challenge and in turn sends its
own challenge.
4. The connector Pj then uses the symmetric key shared between Pi and Pj to compute
the MAC of the string obtained by the concatenation of Pj’s rank, Pj’s identifier, Pi’s
identifier, Pj’s challenge, and Pi’s challenge. The connector then sends the MAC to
the acceptor Pi.
5. Acceptor Pi then verifies the received MAC, and then computes a MAC of a similar
string obtained by the concatenation of Pi’s rank, Pi’s identifier, Pj’s identifier, Pi’s
challenge, and Pj’s challenge. Pi then sends the MAC to the connector Pj.
6. The connector verifies the received MAC. At this time, the authenticity of the channel
is established.
Once a replica has established one TCP-Link with every member of the initial group
(including itself), the Network component of that replica is ready to provide communication
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service for a higher-level protocol (such as atomic broadcast) with the peer protocols at other
group members. At that time, the Network component invokes the network ready()method
at the Reconfiguration component The Reconfiguration component in turn invokes the
done reconfigure() method at the PABC component. After that point, the PABC component
can begin its regular operation.
6.6.3 Dynamic Changes to the Group Membership
After the initial CoBFIT-group has formed, non-members that are specified in the universal-
list can be dynamically added to the group and members can be dynamically removed from
the group. Figure 5.1 shows at a high level the triggers and steps for dynamically changing
the membership of the CoBFIT-group while maintaining consistency of service state and
membership information at all correct group members. The trigger for group reconfiguration
can come either from the Admission component when it recommends that a non-member
be added to the group or from the Failure Detect component when it determines that a
member should be removed from the group. This section describes the implementation of
each of those triggers and steps in detail.
Adding a Non-Member to the Admission Component’s recommend list
Consider a replica Pk that wants to become a member of CoBFIT-group. When Pk is started,
it is in its own singleton group. We now describe the steps by which Pk becomes a member
of the CoBFIT-group.
At Pk, the view array of the Membership Info object is initialized with the identifiers
of the replicas constituting the current membership of the CoBFIT-group in the order of
their ranks. The fault resilience variable t in the Membership Info object is also appro-
priately initialized. Information about the universal-list of replicas and their public keys
is also provided to Pk; the information is used to initialize the universal table of the
Membership Info object. Pk is also initialized with its private key, which is stored in the
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Membership Info object. All the above initialization information is provided to Pk at the
time of its instantiation by the entity that instantiated Pk.
Each replica has an Admission component. At a non-member replica Pk, the component
helps Pk to join CoBFIT-group. At a replica Pi that is already a member of CoBFIT-group,
the component controls which non-members are allowed to join the group dynamically.
Since the TCP-Link components are established only among CoBFIT-group members,
communication between a non-member and current members is done using UDP datagrams.
It is for this purpose that the Network component at each replica has a UDP-Link. The
UDP-Link components at all replicas are initialized with the same fixed UDP port.
The Admission component at a member Pi maintains a recommend list of non-members
that Pi recommends to be added to CoBFIT-group. If non-member Pk is added to the
recommend lists of t + 1 correct replicas, then we guarantee that Pk will eventually become
a member of CoBFIT-group.
We now describe the implementation of two example admission control policies, one for
first-time admission into the group and another for parties seeking readmission into the
group.
Becoming a First-time Member. Consider a replica Pk in the universal-list that has
never been a member of CoBFIT-group. We assume that Pk is not corrupted at the time
when it joins CoBFIT-group for the first time. The adversary, however, is free to corrupt Pk
anytime after Pk has become a first-time member of CoBFIT-group.
The Admission component at Pk generates a request-join message that contains its
identifier (as it appears in the universal-list) and signs the digest of the message using
its private key. The signed message is then sent to the UDP-Links of all members of the
CoBFIT-group. The Admission component at a recipient group member Pi first checks
whether Pk’s identifier is in the universal table of the Membership Info object. If it
is, the component checks whether the removal time for Pk in the universal table is 0.
If it is, then that would confirm that Pk has never been part of the group. Then, the
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component verifies the validity of Pk’s signature on the request-join message by using the
corresponding public-key information stored in the universal table. If the signature is
valid, then Pk is added to the recommend list.
Readmission to the Group. It is possible that a correct replica is removed from the
group for being slow due to imperfections in failure detection or transient load/network
conditions. To account for that factor, we allow the readmission of replicas that were removed
from the group for the sole reason of being slow. Note that if a replica had been removed
from the group for exhibiting a provable Byzantine fault, then the convict flag for the
replica in the universal table would be set to true at the time of membership change.
Such a replica will never be readmitted into the group.
Readmission has to be done carefully; otherwise, it may be exploited by a corrupt process
to create a cycle of removals and readmissions. Since group reconfigurations are expensive
and involve blocking the operation of the agreement and execution phases, such a cycle
would essentially be a denial-of-service (DoS) in which the group members spend all their
time in group reconfiguration without getting any useful work done.
Our readmission policy is based on the heuristic that a replica Pk that has been removed
from the group for being slow is likely to be slow if readmitted to the group soon after its
removal. Hence, group members consider Pk for readmission only after a sufficient rejuvena-
tion time has elapsed since Pk’s last removal from the group. The rejuvenation time for each
replica in the universal-list is stored in the rejuv time field of the universal table. When
Pk is removed from the group, the removal time field for Pk’s entry in the universal table
is updated, and the rejuvenation time for Pk is recalculated as:
rejuv time← max(TR, 2 · rejuv time− log2(1 + removal time− join time)).
The 2 ·rejuv time factor increases the Pk’s rejuvenation time exponentially every time Pk is
removed from the group for being slow; the exponential growth ensures that, for sufficiently
large TR, the above DoS is avoided. Since the average group reconfiguration time is expected
to be relatively large, TR may be set to that time value. The log2(1 + removal time −
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join time) factor allows Pk to earn a form of “good behavior credit” based on how long
it stayed in the group since its last admission. The credit allows a correct replica that
was removed from the group (perhaps multiple times) for being slow because of temporary
load/network conditions to negate the high rejuvenation time once stable conditions return.
However, this credit grows very slowly compared to the exponential growth factor.
For a replica Pk seeking readmission, the addition of Pk to the recommend list at a group
member Pi involves the following steps:
1. Pk first sends a signed pre-join message (containing Pk’s identifier as it appears in
the universal-list) to all the group members.
2. A recipient CoBFIT-group member Pi will respond to Pk’s pre-join message only
after Pk has fulfilled its rejuvenation time outside the group; Pi checks whether Pk has
done so from the rejuv time and removal time fields corresponding to Pk’s entry in
universal table and from Pi’s current local clock time. If it did, then Pi sends Pk a
random challenge encrypted with Pk’s public key.
3. Pk echoes back the challenge to Pi.
4. If Pi has received the echo from Pk in a timely fashion, then Pi sends a signed approval
message containing the current view number (obtained from the variable x of the
Membership Info object) to Pk. Timeliness of the echo is determined from Pi’s local
clock and the max rtt field of the Replica Info object corresponding to Pk maintained
at Pi’s Membership Info object.
5. Pk waits until it has collected t+1 approvalmessages with the same view number from
distinct group members and then sends a signed request-join message containing
those approval messages.
6. After verifying that the request-join message has a set of t + 1 valid approval
messages from distinct group members with the same view number as itself, a group
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member Pi will add Pk to its recommend list.
Note that all the above communication between Pk and Pi takes place through UDP-Links.
Steps 3 and 4 are included to decrease the likelihood that a replica Pk previously removed
for being slow because of temporary load/network conditions gets readmitted into the group
when those conditions still prevail. Although the steps cannot completely eliminate that
likelihood, they are still included, because the cost of executing them is considerably less
than the cost of a potential group reconfiguration if the replica were to be removed again
after readmission.
Adding a Member to the Failure Detect Component’s remove list
We provide the capability for removing members dynamically from the group. The fact that
removal of corrupt members is not required allows us to be very conservative in using that
capability. An example situation in which the capability may be useful from a performance
point of view is when a member exhibits a fault that shows without any doubt that the
member is corrupted.
Since a group member corrupted by the adversary can behave perfectly normally, a mem-
ber can be labeled faulty only if it exhibits a detectable Byzantine fault [KMMS03][DGGS99],
i.e., a fault that can be observed by other members based solely on the messages they receive
from that member, or a fault that can be attributed to that member. Detectable Byzantine
faults can be classified into muteness and malicious faults. A muteness fault occurs when a
replica does not send a required message to one or more correct replicas. A malicious fault
occurs when a replica sends a message that it should not have sent according to the system
specifications.
As previously described in Section 5.5, when removing members from the group, it is
useful to ensure the following two properties. First, if enough correct members want a
member to be removed from the group, then that member must be eventually removed.
Second, it must not be possible for corrupted members alone to effect the removal of a
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member from the group; if it were, then the corrupted parties may act in collusion to cause
the disintegration of the group.
The Failure Detect component helps provide the above two guarantees by exercising
control over which members will be removed from the group. The component at each
CoBFIT-group member Pi maintains a remove list of group members that it recommends
be removed from the group. We ensure the first property by guaranteeing that if a member
Pk is added to the remove lists of t + 1 correct replicas in a given view Vx, then Pk will be
removed from CoBFIT-group in the next view. We ensure the second property by imposing
the restriction that entries in the remove list must be transferable. The remove list of a
member Pi is transferable if and only if for each member Pk in its remove list, Pi can present
information called validation data that will cause any correct member Pj to add Pk to its
remove list too. The validation data for member Pk in Pi’s remove list will differ based on
the type of fault that Pk exhibited and also on the particular component (PABC, APE, MVBA,
ABBA, CBroadcast, etc.) that helped identify the fault.
Validation data for ensuring the transferability of malicious faults take the form of mes-
sage(s) signed by the faulty member proving deviation from component specification, e.g.,
two signed c-broadcast messages with different payloads for the same c-broadcast protocol
instance. Since muteness faults cannot be perfectly detected in an asynchronous system,
one can place the restriction that validation data for labeling a member as mute include
signatures from at least 2t+ 1 members.
For a given CoBFIT component, there may potentially be many ways to deviate from
the component specification. It is up to the component to specify which of those deviations
warrant removal from the group. For each deviation that warrants removal, a subclass of
the abstract Validation class is defined; the subclass implements the validate interface
declared in the abstract class.
bool validate (ACE Message Block* validation data);
The interface implementation helps make the deviation exhibited by replica Pk and ob-
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served by replica Pi transferable to a third replica Pj in the following manner. If the
Failure Detect component at Pj invokes the validate interface implementation in the
subclass with validation data supplied by Pi and the invocation returns true, then Pj will
be convinced that Pk indeed exhibited that deviation.
Since there may be multiple CoBFIT protocols specifying deviations that warrant removal
from the group, there must be a way for the Failure Detect component to select the
appropriate Validation subclass. To provide that way, the validation data itself indicates
the deviation type and protocol type, and the Failure Detect component maintains a hash
table fault validation map that maps the protocol type and the deviation type to an
instantiation (i.e., object) of the appropriate Validation subclass.
Each CoBFIT component implements hooks for identifying detectable and transferable
Byzantine faults exhibited by the peer component at another replica. When a component
has validation data that warrants removal of a member Pk from the group, then the com-
ponent enqueues a fault-detected message containing the Pk’s identifier and validation
data at the Failure Detect component’s message queue. After dequeuing that message,
the Failure Detect component adds Pk to the remove list.
Group Membership Agreement - GMA component
The GMA component is responsible for maintaining consistent group membership information
at all correct members of CoBFIT-group. The component ensures that Vx at any correct
member of the CoBFIT-group consists of the exact same set of replicas.
The Admission component enqueues an admit message in the GMA component’s mes-
sage queue when a replica Pk is added to the recommend list. The message contains the
identifier of replica Pk as it appears in the universal-list and the justification for adding Pk
to the recommend list, namely a valid request-join message signed by Pk. Similarly, the
Failure Detect component enqueues a remove message in the GMA component’s message
queue when a replica Pk is added to the remove list. The message contains the identi-
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fier of replica Pk as it appears in the universal-list and the validation data that justifies
Pk’s addition to the remove list, and ensures transferability. Note that in a given view,
the Admission component enqueues at most one admit message, and the Failure Detect
component enqueues at most one remove message in the GMA component’s message queue.
The start() method of the GMA component initializes the protocol variables according
to the initialization pseudocode given in Figure 5.5. After the start() method returns, the
svc() method enters the main event loop that invokes the add message() method for each
message dequeued from the protocol instance’s ACE Message Queue. The add message()
method demarshals and processes messages as specified by Protocol GMA, described in
Chapter 5.
When the GMA component dequeues an admit or remove message from its message queue,
it initiates the protocol for agreement on the next group membership, unless that protocol
has already been initiated in the current view.
Upon receiving a pre-proposal message from another replica Pi, a replica Pj’s GMA
component checks the validity of the message by invoking the following static validate
interface at the Admission or Failure Detect component depending on whether the flag
field in the message specifies an addition or removal respectively.
bool validate (ACE INET Address addr, ACE Message Block* proof);
The parameters passed are the fields of the received pre-proposal message. For addition,
the validate function at the Admission component checks whether the proof parameter
justifies a non-member replica Pk’s admission to the group. The parameter addr specifies
Pk’s identifier as it appears in the universal-list. For removal, the validate function at
the Failure Detect component in turn invokes the validate function at the appropriate
Validation subclass, which is chosen based on the protocol type and fault type. The
validate function at the subclass instance checks whether the proof parameter justifies
the member replica Pk’s removal from the group. If the justification is valid, then the
validate call to the Admission or the Failure Detect component (as the case may be)
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returns true.
Pi collects |Vx| − t pre-proposal messages from distinct replicas in a proposal vector
C and proposes C for MVBA. The GMA component creates a MVBA instance with proto-
col identifier memagree|x+1 passing a Mem Validation object to the MVBA constructor.
The Mem Validation class derives from the abstract Validation class and implements the
validate interface declared in the abstract class. The object is used in verifying the validity
of any replica’s proposal for the MVBA. The interface has the form
bool validate (ACE Message Block* proposal);
The implementation of the interface in the Mem Validation class checks the validity of each
of the |Vx|− t pre-proposal messages contained within the proposal by invoking the static
validate interface of the Admission or Failure Detect component as described above.
The next group membership Vx+1 is computed deterministically from the decision vector
of the MVBA as Vx+1 = Vx \ D ∪A. Here, D such that D ∩ Vx = D is the deterministically
ordered list of all replicas for which the decision vector has a pre-proposal message speci-
fying removal from the group. A such that A ∩ Vx = ∅ is the deterministically ordered list
of all replicas for which the decision vector has a pre-proposal message specifying addition
to the group. By the agreement property of MVBA, all correct members of Vx will decide
on the same value for Vx+1.
Stabilization of CoBFIT Protocol Instances before Membership Change
After Vx+1 is determined, the GMA component notifies the Reconfiguration component by
invoking the following interface at the latter:
void start reconf (ACE Array<ACE CString> next view);
The invocation results in a series of steps that transition the CoBFIT protocols from the
current view to the next view. The first among these steps is to ensure that the agreement
and execution phase protocols at all correct replicas stabilize, i.e., suspend their operation
in the current view at the same protocol state. That means that, at all correct replicas,
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the atomic broadcast protocol implemented by the PABC component atomically delivers the
same set of messages in the same order in a given view. Similarly, at all correct replicas, the
execution protocol (implemented by the APE component) executes all and only those requests
specified in the messages atomically delivered in the current view, where the execution order
is specified by the order of atomic delivery.
Stabilization of Atomic Broadcast: The Reconfiguration component invokes the
stabilize() method at the PABC component. The Reconfiguration component then
blocks waiting until the PABC-stabilized() method at the Reconfiguration component
is invoked by the PABC component.
Inside the stabilize() method of the PABC component at replica Pi, a special close
payload of the form (close, i, σ) is a-broadcast, where σ is Pi’s signature on (close, i). The
PABC component implements the following private function:
void deliver (ACE Message Block* payload);
The component keeps track of the number of times the deliver() function has been passed
a close payload. At the end of the epoch in which close payloads a-broadcast by t + 1
distinct replicas are a-delivered, the PABC component invokes the following method at the
Reconfiguration component:
void PABC-stabilized (ACE Message Block* payld);
After that invocation, the PABC component will not a-deliver any further payloads in the
view Vx. The payld parameter indicates the last atomically delivered non-close payload;
payld also indicates the last client request that has to be executed by the APE component
in the view Vx.
Stabilization of Service State: After dequeuing the PABC-stabilized message, the
Reconfiguration component invokes the stabilize (ACE Message Block* payld)method
at the APE component; the payld parameter indicates the last atomically delivered non-
close payload in this view. The Reconfiguration component then blocks waiting for the
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APE-stabilized method call from the APE component.
After the invocation of the stabilize method, every time the APE component receives
an agreement certificate, it checks to see whether the request certificate contained in the
agreement certificate is the same as payld. If so, then the APE component does not have to
execute any further client requests in the view Vx. However, the component has to perform
two additional tasks: (1) execution of a checkpoint request and (2) bringing of the service
state up to date to reflect the execution of all requests up to the checkpoint request. The
first task is accomplished just like any other checkpoint request handled by Protocol APE.
After a backup has obtained a reply certificate containing the digest of the stable checkpoint,
the backup can complete the second task according to the pseudocode of the state update()
function given in Figure 5.17.
After completing those two tasks, the APE component invokes the following method at
the Reconfiguration component:
void APE-stabilized (ACE Message Block digest);
The parameter digest contains the digest of the last stable checkpoint.
Conveying the Next Membership to the Joining Replica
If Vx+1 includes new members, then after the APE-stabilized method invocation, the
Reconfiguration component invokes the following method at the Admission component:
void send new view (ACE Array<ACE CString> next view,
ACE Message Block* stable state digest);
The parameter next view is an array of identifiers indicating the next CoBFIT-group mem-
bership, and the parameter stable state digest indicates the digest of the last stable
checkpoint in the current view Vx.
Inside the send new view method, the Admission component determines the list of new
members by comparing the argument next view (also denoted by Vx+1) with the current
view Vx, and to each new member Pk, the component sends a new-view message through
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the UDP-Link. The message contains the next group membership next view and the digest
stable state digest of the last stable checkpoint in view Vx. After sending the message,
the send new view method call returns.
At the new member Pk, the Admission component demarshals the received new-view
message. The component maintains a hash-table mapping the string representation of
next view and stable state digest to a counter that indicates the number of new-view
messages containing that information received from distinct members of view Vx. The hash-
table provides a way to check whether new-view messages with the same next view (that
includes Pk) and stable state digest information have been received from t + 1 distinct
members of view Vx. If they have been, the new member prepares to become a member of
the CoBFIT-group from view Vx+1. The preparation involves two steps, namely the estab-
lishment of TCP-Links with the other members of view Vx+1 and the updating of the state;
we describe these steps below.
Reconfiguration of the Network Component
The Network component provides the following interface for receiving reconfiguration noti-
fications from the Reconfiguration component:
void reconfigure (ACE Array<ACE CString> next view);
If the next view array includes new members, the Reconfiguration component invokes
the above interface after dequeuing the new view sent message from the Admission com-
ponent; otherwise, the Reconfiguration component invokes the interface after dequeuing
the APE-stabilized message from the APE component.
The Network component then reconfigures the TCP-Links appropriately. At a replica
Pi ∈ Vx∩Vx+1, any TCP-Link that connects with a replica Pj ∈ Vx\Vx+1 is garbage-collected.
Once a replica Pk that wants to join the group has received new-view messages with the
same next view (that includes Pk) and stable state digest information from t+1 distinct
members of view Vx, replica Pk starts the procedure of establishing TCP-Link components
159
with other members of view Vx+1. In view Vx+1, Pk will have a higher rank than any
Pi ∈ Vx ∩ Vx+1. So, according to the acceptor-connector rule mentioned in Section 6.6.2,
Pk plays the role of a connector and Pi the role of the acceptor for establishing point-to-
point communication between them. The Network component at connector Pk instantiates
a TCP-Link component for exclusive communication with Pi. The TCP-Link at Pk then tries
to establish a socket connection with the specified acceptor port of Pi. Pk keeps trying until
it finally succeeds. Acceptor Pi just waits for socket connections from new members at its
acceptor port. When a connection is made, Pi accepts the connection, spawns a new socket,
and instantiates its own TCP-Link with the new socket information.
After Pi and Pk have established a TCP-Link for exclusive communication with each
other, they obtain a secure authenticated channel from the TCP-Link through the same
handshake procedure described in Section 6.6.2.
After the authenticity of |Vx+1|− t TCP-Links has been established, the Network compo-
nent at a member of Vx+1 invokes the network ready() method at the Reconfiguration
component.
Transferring Service State to the Joining Replica
Inside the network ready() function at the Reconfiguration component of a new group
member Pk, the start state update() function at the APE component is invoked. The
Reconfiguration component then block waits for the APE state updated() method call-
back from the APE component.
The APE component at Pk starts the procedure to bring its (service) state up-to-date, so
that the state digest is the same as the stable state digest information in the new-view
messages from t+1 distinct members of Vx that confirmed Pk’s inclusion in the view Vx+1. Pk
can complete the state update according to the pseudocode of the state updateape function
(with new-view and stable state digest as arguments) given in Figure 5.16. After the
state update is complete, the APE component invokes the APE state updated method at the
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Reconfiguration component.
Starting Regular Operation in the New View
After dequeuing the Network-ready message, the Reconfiguration component at a replica
Pi ∈ Vx ∩ Vx+1 invokes the done reconfigure() methods successively at the Admission
component and the Failure Detect component. The method is passed two arguments:
next view, which is an array of identifiers of parties constituting the next membership, and
x+1, which is the new view identifier.
Inside the done reconfiguremethod call, the Admission component resets the recommend
list to ∅. The component updates the removal time and the rejuv time fields in the
universal table for each removed replica Pk ∈ Vx \ Vx+1. For each new replica Pk ∈
Vx+1 \ Vx, the component updates the join time field in the universal table.
Replicas that requested admission to the CoBFIT-group in view Vx but were unsuccessful
have to retry the admission protocol in view Vx+1. The trusted dealer (that creates any
replica) notifies such replicas of the new view Vx+1, so that they may retry.
When the done reconfigure method call at the Admission component returns, the
Reconfiguration component invokes the done reconfiguremethod at the Failure Detect
component. Inside the reconfigure method call, the Failure Detect component resets the
remove list.
When the done reconfiguremethod call at the Failure Detect component returns, the
Reconfiguration component at a replica Pi ∈ Vx ∩ Vx+1 invokes the done reconfigure()
method successively at the GMA, PABC, and APE components. At that point, those components
can begin their regular operation in the view Vx+1.
At a new group member, Pk ∈ Vx+1 \ Vx, the Reconfiguration component invokes the
done reconfigure() method successively at the Admission, Failure Detect, PABC, GMA,
PABC, and APE components after the APE state updated() method callback from the APE
component.
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6.7 Interaction between Applications and CoBFIT
Protocols
The protocols in the CoBFIT toolkit were designed with the client-server paradigm in mind
and can be used to make the server fault-tolerant using the state machine replication ap-
proach. Both the client and server can be viewed as applications, the former using the
services provided by the latter. This section describes how the CoBFIT protocols interface
and interact with the client-type application and server-type application.
There is only one CoBFIT protocol component that needs to communicate with the
client-type application for the purpose of receiving request certificates and sending back
reply certificates, and that is the atomic broadcast protocol implemented in the PABC com-
ponent. All interaction of the PABC component with the client-type application is through
the Client Interface component.
There is also only one CoBFIT protocol that needs to communicate with the server-type
application, and that is the execution protocol implemented in the APE component. The APE
component interacts with the server-type application only through the Server Interface
component.
Both the Client Interface and the Server Interface derive from a common ab-
stract class, Application, which is in turn derived from the Protocol Instance class.
The Application class declares the following interface:
virtual int from CoBFIT (ACE Message Block* in mblk,
ACE Message Block* out mblk = 0) = 0;
A CoBFIT protocol component (such as PABC or APE) invokes the from CoBFIT()method
to pass data onto a client-type or server-type application. An implementation of the method
by Client Interface or Server Interface will demarshal the data represented by the
in mblk parameter and pass it on to the respective application. The out mblk parameter
is used to pass the result of the method invocation back to the calling protocol component.
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The parameter is not used in the method implementation at the Client Interface compo-
nent. However, the method implementation at the Server Interface component may use
the out mblk parameter to pass back some response to the APE component; if, for certain
operations, there is no response to be sent back, then out mblk will be set to NULL.
6.7.1 Interfacing with the Client-Type Application
The All Clients Info Object
There is a client-list consisting of the identifiers (IP address and port) of all clients from
which requests are accepted by the server-type application. The All Clients Info object,
as the name indicates, stores all information regarding the clients in the client-list. The
object is directly created by the Main component at all replicas. The object maintains a
hash-table client table that maps the identifier of each client Ci in the client-list to a
Client Info object that contains the following information:
• Ci’s public key,
• an integer privilege indicating the privilege level for Ci,
• a convict flag (initialized to false) indicating whether Ci has previously requested
any operation that does not conform to its assigned privilege level,
• request timestamp (initialized to 0) indicating the highest timestamp among the
requests received so far from Ci,
• reply timestamp (initialized to 0) indicating the timestamp on the request from Ci
for which a reply certificate has been obtained, and
• reply cert (initialized to NULL), which stores the reply certificate corresponding to
Ci’s request timestamped with reply timestamp.
163
The Client Interface Component
It is the requests from the client-type application that Protocol PABC atomically delivers to
Protocol APE. The client-type application is not replicated and is run on hosts distinct from
the hosts at which replicas are run. Each instance of the client-type application represents
a distinct client.
The Client Interface component is loaded along with the PABC component at all repli-
cas; the component is instantiatedby the Main component. The component listens for client
requests and forwards the requests to the PABC component through direct method invoca-
tions. The client sends its requests to the Client Interface component at one or more
replicas. We guarantee that if a client request is sent to the Client Interface component
at t + 1 distinct replicas, then the client will eventually obtain a reply. However, before
sending a request to areplica, the client has to establish a session with that replica.
The establishment of a session between the client-type application and areplica involves
the following steps. At any replica, there is a fixed client acceptor port to which the client-
type application connects. The Network component at areplica listens for client connections
to the port. When a signed connection request is received, the Network component uses
the All Clients Info object to verify that the connection is from one of the clients in the
client-list; if the connection is valid, the component spawns a separate socket for the client
and instantiates a new TCP-C-Link component with that socket information. Although not
implemented currently, one can change the client authorization to be based on login-password
or SSL.
After establishing a session with areplica, the client directly communicates with the
TCP-C-Link, which forwards all information received from the client to the Client Interface
component. The Client Interface in turn sends replies back to the Network component,
which dispatches them to the intended client through the appropriate TCP-C-Link compo-
nent. The session may last several client requests and is terminated when the client closes the
connection or after a prolonged period during which no valid client requests were received.
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The Client Interface encapsulates the client request as an ACE Message Block which is
passed to the local PABC component through the a broadcast interface provided by the PABC
component, resulting in the atomic broadcast of the client request. Upon obtaining a reply
certificate from the execution replicas, the PABC component passes the certificate as the ar-
gument to the from CoBFIT() method invocation. If a TCP-C-Link with the client that sent
the request exists, the from CoBFIT() method implementation at the Client Interface
component forwards the reply certificate to the client.
By hiding from the PABC component the details (such as the request format) that are
specific to the particular client-type application being used, and by sending the reply values in
a format expected by the client, the Client Interface acts as a two-way adapter. Thereby,
it enables the PABC component to be implemented in a generic way that can be used for
various types of client-type applications.
6.7.2 Interfacing with the Server-Type Application
Server-type applications are the ones being replicated at the execution replicas. It is the state
of a server-type application that needs to be kept consistent among execution replicas. They
receive requests from client-type applications and send replies to client-type applications via
the CoBFIT toolkit. The server-type application, denoted by Server, is a separate process
that is started along with the CoBFIT Main process at the execution replicas.
It is through the Server Interface component that any CoBFIT component interacts
with the Server process. As mentioned before, the Server Interface component derives
from the Application abstract class. The component is loaded along with the APE com-
ponent at all execution replicas and is instantiatedby the Main component through the
Instance Handler component. The component implements the following three methods,
all of which are directly invoked by the APE component:
int from CoBFIT (ACE Message Block* in mblk, ACE Message Block* out mblk);
ACE Message Block* get state ();
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int set state (ACE Message Block* s);
The APE component invokes the from CoBFIT() method at the Server Interface en-
capsulating the client request in the in mblk parameter. The method implementation feeds
the request to the Server process and block waits for the request processing to complete.
If the Server process returns a response then the Server Interface encapsulates the re-
sponse as a message block, which is passed on back to the APE component as the out mblk
parameter.
Before a server-type application can be made fault-tolerant using the PABC and APE
protocols, it must meet two requirements: (1) the application must be deterministic, and (2)
the application state must not change in the duration between return of the from CoBFIT()
method call at the Server Interface and when the next method invocation.
The get state() and set state() interfaces, as the names indicate, are used to re-
trieve and update the server-type application state. The interfaces are invoked by the APE
component as part of the state transfer mechanism it implements for bringing a backup
replica up-to-date and for initializing the state of the Server process at an execution replica
that newly joins the CoBFIT-group. The get state() method call obtains the server-type
application state in a format specific to the particular application, encapsulates the state in
a chain of ACE Message Blocks, and returns the chain. For the set state() method call,
the state information encapsulated in the form of a chain of ACE Message Blocks is given as
an input parameter; the method converts the encapsulated state into a format that can be
processed by the Server process.
The Server Interface component encapsulates the details specific to the particular
server-type application being used and thereby allows the APE component to be implemented
in a generic way that can be reused without much change for various types of server-type
applications.
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6.7.3 Fractal Generator: A Sample Client/Server Application
To experimentally evaluate the performance of the CoBFIT protocol components, we chose
a representative application and developed a replicated service by combining the application
with the CoBFIT toolkit. The chosen application, Fractal Generator, is run as the Server
process at the execution replicas, whereas the client is a user that sends fractal parameters
via http/php. Client request processing is cpu-intensive and involves the generation of an
image file based on the fractal parameters; the reply certificate sent to the client contains
the generated image file as the result value. Upon receiving the reply certificate, the client
verifies whether the certificate contains signatures from t + 1 distinct execution replicas on
the same result value; if it does, the client accepts the result value to be valid and recreates
(through a php script) a .png file to display.
The code for the Server process was developed using the 3D (quaternionic) fractal
generator Quat-1.20 distributed by the University of Stuttgart under open source license
and available from http://www.physcip.uni-stuttgart.de/phy11733/index e.html.
An application like Fractal Generator would be useful in an environment where images or
maps are to be generated based on various parameters entered by a remote client or gathered
via other means, such as sensors. The image generated (in this case, a .png file) may be
important and sensitive enough to require the use of replicated servers and the provision of




In this chapter, we describe the experimental evaluation of the protocols implemented in the
CoBFIT toolkit. We describe a stand-alone evaluation of Protocol APE and Protocol PABC.
Then, we evaluate the two protocols working in concert to implement a replicated version of
the Fractal Generator application. Finally, we describe the evaluation of the reconfigurable
RMan suite of protocols.
In all our experiments, digital signatures, when used, were generated using 1024-bit RSA
cryptography. MACs for realizing secure authenticated channels were computed using the
SHA-1 algorithm. Confidence intervals are for 95% confidence and were computed under
the assumption that the samples were from a student’s t-distribution.
7.1 Experimental Evaluation of Protocol APE
In this section, we describe the experimental evaluation of Protocol APE under both fault-
free conditions and controlled fault injections. We compare the results for our protocol with
those obtained for the all-active execution approach.
The fact that the execution phase of a BFT-replicated service will be service-specific poses
a challenge to obtaining useful results. The resources involved during request processing will
be service-specific, and even request-specific. In our experiments, we have tried to account
for that fact by varying the range of service-specific parameters, like the resource intensity
of request processing. The specific resource type that we emphasized in our experiments is
the CPU, but the conclusions we draw are also an indicator of the trends for other resource
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types (e.g., network bandwidth) that may be involved in request processing. Our intention
was to give a flavor of how parsimonious execution compares with all-active execution for
different service types.
7.1.1 Experimental Setup
We conducted our experiments for 3, 5, 7, 9, and 11 execution replicas that can tolerate t =
1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 simultaneous replica faults, respectively. In a real-world setting, AS would
consist of a set of 3t + 1 agreement replicas; however, to keep the focus on the execution
phase of BFT replication, the clients and the agreement replicas were represented by a single
AS process that generated requests and provided the properties given in Section 4.2.
The setup consisted of a LAN testbed of 12 otherwise unloaded machines. Each machine
had a single Athlon XP 2400 processor and 512 MB DDR2700 SDRAM running RedHat
Linux 7.2. One machine was devoted to running the AS process. At most one execution
replica ran on the other machines. Each replica maintained about 1 MB of service-specific
state, organized into 1 KB blocks and loaded into its main memory at initialization time.
The machines were connected by a lightly loaded full-duplex 100 Mbps switched Ethernet
network. Communication among the replicas was through IP multicast involving UDP
datagrams.
AS sends two kinds of requests: retrieve-compute requests and update-compute requests.
Additionally, for Protocol APE, every 200th AS request is a checkpoint request. A retrieve-
compute request specifies a block to be retrieved. A replica performs some computation on
the contents of the block, and returns the result of the computation in a reply message;
there is no change to the replica state. An update-compute request specifies a block and
new contents for the block. A replica updates the specified block with the new contents,
performs some computation on the new contents, and returns the result. The argument
field of a retrieve-compute request is only a few bytes specifying the block number; for an



















































Figure 7.1: Request Latency
of the reply message for either type of request contains the result of the computation and
has the size of a block (1 KB). AS sends a new request after obtaining a reply certificate
for its last request.
7.1.2 Behavior in Fault-Free Runs
We conducted two sets of experiments that were differentiated by the amount of computation
involved in request processing. For the first set of experiments, processing a request involved
computation of a public key signature on a specified block of the service state twice; we call
such requests computation-level 2 or CL-2 requests. For the second set of experiments,
processing a request involved computation of a public key signature on a specified block of
the service state 100 times; we call such requests CL-100 requests. Obviously, one would
be hard-pressed to find a real-world application that computes digital signatures 100 times
for a request. The intention was to simulate compute-intensive request processing (e.g., an
insurance web service that has to solve multi-parameter insurance models to obtain results
for auto insurance quotation requests), in which the cost of computing one digital signature
(in the audit mode of Protocol APE) is an insignificant part of the actual request processing
overhead.
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We measured request latency, which is the time elapsed from when AS sends a request
until it obtains a reply certificate for the request. Figure 7.1(a) compares the request latencies
of the parsimonious and the all-active execution approaches for CL-2 requests. Figure 7.1(b)
does the same for CL-100 requests. The latencies were obtained as the average of the last
5,000 values from 20 separate runs, where a run consisted of the AS process sending about
10,000 requests. AS generated retrieve-compute and update-compute requests alternately.
The latency for a checkpointing request in parsimonious execution was amortized among all
the requests in the corresponding checkpointing interval.
Figures 7.1(a) and (b) show only a small difference in the request latencies between all-
active and parsimonious execution. For CL-2 requests (Figure 7.1(a)), the request latencies
for all-active execution are slightly higher than those for parsimonious execution. The reason
is that in all-active execution, even though AS needs only t+1 reply messages with identical
result values to accept the result, it will receive reply messages from all replicas (i.e., 2t+1
messages), since the runs were fault-free. Though AS fully processes only t + 1 of those
messages and discards the other t, there is overhead involved in receiving the additional
unnecessary messages and examining their headers. Thus, one can expect higher latencies
for all-active execution if the reply message sizes are increased. For compute-intensive CL-
100 requests (Figure 7.1(b)), the latencies for all-active execution are slightly lower than
those for parsimonious execution. The reason is that all-active execution allows AS to
choose the fastest t + 1 replies among the 2t + 1 replies that will eventually be received at
AS.
To quantify communication costs, we measured the total number of bytes received at each
replica (ingress network traffic) and the total number of bytes sent by each replica (egress
network traffic). Figures 7.2(a) and (b) show the overall incoming network traffic and the
overall outgoing network traffic across all replicas for 5,000 CL-2 retrieve-compute requests.
For the purpose of measuring communication costs, it doesn’t matter whether the requests































(b) Overall Egress Traffic
Figure 7.2: Overall Traffic Across All Replicas for 5000 CL-2 Requests
as the only difference would be the size of request messages from AS.
Figure 7.2(a) shows that the overall ingress traffic for all-active execution is smaller than
that of parsimonious execution, and that the difference grows modestly as the number of
replicas increases. The only incoming messages at a replica for all-active execution are the
request messages from AS. For parsimonious execution, in addition to the request messages,
reply messages are received for infrequent checkpoint requests from PC members. However,
that is not a major disadvantage, since reply messages for checkpoint requests carry only
the digests of the checkpoints (which are just a few hundred bytes each).
Figure 7.2(b) shows that parsimonious execution has about half the overall egress network
traffic of all-active execution. That is expected, since only t+1 out of 2t+1 replicas send the
reply messages to AS. The difference (and hence the advantage of parsimonious execution)
is more pronounced as t increases. If overall (ingress + egress) network traffic were to be
considered, this benefit of parsimonious execution would far outweigh its drawback with
respect to overall ingress traffic.
Since in our experiments the CPU is the dominant resource used at a replica in processing
AS requests, we used the UNIX ‘ps -aux’ command to measure the percentage of CPU
utilization on a replica’s host machine that is due to request processing. The CPU utilization




























































Figure 7.3: Overall CPU Utilization Factor Per Request
run (a run spanned the time it took to process 10,000 AS requests). The CPU utilization
percentages for PC replicas in parsimonious execution and those for any replicas in all-
active execution were roughly the same (in the 75%-85% range for CL-2 requests and in
the 85%-95% range for CL-100 requests). The CPU utilization percentages for backups in
parsimonious execution were negligible for both CL-2 and CL-100 requests.
After obtaining the average CPU utilization percentages at the individual replicas, we
computed the overall CPU utilization factor, which we obtained by summing over all repli-
cas the product of the CPU utilization percentage and the time taken to process a request.
Figures 7.3(a) and (b) show the overall CPU utilization factor for CL-2 and CL-100 re-
quests. The utilization factor for parsimonious execution is roughly half of that for all-active
execution, and the reduction is more pronounced as the number of replicas increases. This
is a practically significant result. For example, in the Application Service Provider (ASP)
business model (see Section 4.5.2), the overall CPU utilization factor would be an indicator
of the total amount of CPU resources spent by the ASP servers per request, and could form
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Figure 7.4: Behavior Under Fault Injections
7.1.3 Behavior in the Presence of Fault Injections
We conducted fault injection experiments on our protocol. We did not fault-inject the
implementation of all-active execution, since its behavior in the presence of faults would not
be much different from its behavior when there are no faults.
Figure 7.4(a) shows the different factors that contributed to the AS request latency when
a PC member was fault-injected after servicing a sufficiently large number of CL-2 requests
(about 5,000). We injected both muteness faults and malicious faults in our protocol. A
muteness fault injection was done by crashing a PC member upon receipt of a specified AS
request. A malicious fault injection was done by making a PC member send wrong values
in its reply messages.
The highest latency is obtained when a muteness fault injection is done. The latency
comprises two timeout values, state update latency, and the protocol-specific overhead. The
first timeout value of 1 second (represented by “normal-to-audit latency” in the graph) is
used at AS before AS sends a retransmit message for the request. Receipt of that message
will cause the protocol to switch from parsimonious normal mode to parsimonious audit
mode. The second timeout value of 1 second (represented by “audit-to-recovery latency”
in the graph) causes a replica to send a suspect message for the crashed PC member, as
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the replica would not have received a reply message from the PC member for the request.
Once n− t suspect messages for the crashed PC member have been received, the protocol
switches from the parsimonious audit mode to recovery mode. In the recovery mode, backups
bring their states up to date in two steps before sending their own reply messages for the
AS request. The first step (represented by “state transfer latency” in the graph) is the
transfer of state from a correct PC member up to the last stable checkpoint. The second
step (represented by “execution latency” in the graph) is the actual execution of all the
requests after the checkpoint request up to the request for which AS sent a retransmit
message. To bring out the worst-case behavior, we injected the muteness fault into a PC
member upon receiving the request just prior to the checkpoint request (so that δ − 1
requests would actually have to be executed), and all backups requested state transfer from
the same correct PC member. The portion marked “protocol overhead” in the graph includes
a round-trip transmission time from AS to the replica (for the request message from AS
and the reply message from the replica) plus other overhead related to Protocol APE (such
as exchange of suspect and indict messages, and selection of a new PC). We see that
an overwhelmingly large portion of the request latency when a muteness fault is injected
depends on tunable system parameters (like timeout) and service-specific values, such as
the size of the application state, the checkpointing technique used, the number of requests
beyond the last stable checkpoint that have to be executed to bring the state up to date,
and the normal request processing latency. The actual overhead due to Protocol APE is less
than 20 milliseconds.
The AS request latencies for malicious fault injection are essentially the AS request
latencies for muteness fault injection minus the timeout value used at replicas (i.e., the
audit-to-recovery latency). Fault detection is much faster for malicious faults because it is
based on examination of the contents of the reply message rather than on timeouts.
Figure 7.4(b) quantifies the effect that multiple correlated fault injections have at the
replicas. After servicing a sufficiently large number of requests (about 5,000), we injected
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multiple faults at the replicas so that a new PC member fault was activated every time an
AS request arrived until the fault resiliency t of the replication group was exhausted. As
before, the AS process sent a request only after accepting a result for its previous request.
We injected both muteness and malicious faults, and thus there are two rows of bars in
the graph. The first fault was activated at a checkpoint request to bring out the worst-
case behavior. At each correct replica, we measured the settling latency, i.e., the time from
when the first fault is detected at a replica until the time when the PC consists only of
non-fault-injected replicas. The time includes the fault detection latency for t − 1 faults
(i.e., for all faults except the first fault), the state update latency, the time to execute t AS
requests, and the overhead due to Protocol APE. Since the multiple faults are activated at
consecutive requests, backups have to bring their state up to date only once, after the first
fault detection.
As expected, both rows of bars in the graph show an increase in the settling latency as
the number of replicas (and hence the number of fault injections, t) increases. For a given t,
the settling latency for muteness faults is higher than that for malicious faults. The reason
is that the fault detection latency for t muteness fault injections includes 2(t− 1) timeouts
(the factor of 2 being due to the AS timeout plus the timeout at replicas), as opposed to
only (t− 1) AS timeouts for t malicious fault injections.
7.2 Experimental Evaluation of Protocol PABC
In this section, we describe the experimental evaluation of Protocol PABC under both fault-
free conditions and controlled fault injections in both LAN and WAN environments.
7.2.1 Experimental Setup
We conducted our LAN experiments for n = 4, 7, and 10 agreement replicas that can tolerate
t = 1, 2, and 3 simultaneous replica faults, respectively. The setup consisted of a testbed
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Figure 7.5: Locations of Planetlab Nodes Used
of 10 otherwise unloaded machines. Each machine had a single Athlon XP 2400 processor
and 512 MB DDR2700 SDRAM running Fedora Core 3. At most one replica ran on each
machine.
To study the behavior of Protocol PABC in WAN settings, we conducted experiments on
Planetlab, which is a planetary-scale meta-testbed that provides a large set of geographically
distributed machines. The machines are connected by an overlay network that has the char-
acteristics of a realistic network substrate: congestion, failures, and diverse link behaviors.
On Planetlab, we conducted experiments for n = 4 and 7 agreement replicas that can tol-
erate t = 1 and 2 simultaneous replica faults, respectively. Replicas were placed in distinct
machines. The locations of the machines used for our experiments are shown in Figure 7.5.
The machines had different hardware configurations and varying load conditions. However,
all the machines ran Fedora Core 2. The average round-trip message delays between the
machines was on the order of tens of milliseconds.





































Figure 7.6: Delivery Latency: Strong Consistent Broadcast versus Short Strong Consistent
Broadcast
secure authenticated channels implemented using TCP-Links as described in Section 6.2.1.
7.2.2 Behavior in Fault-Free Runs
Strong Consistent Broadcast Latency
In the parsimonious mode, the performance of Protocol PABC depends on that of strong
consistent broadcast. Hence, we conducted experiments for evaluating the latency of a
payload that is delivered among the parties using strong consistent broadcast.
For that purpose, we devised an experiment in which the parties are started and wait for
the group size to reach a specified target group size (4, 7, or 10) before beginning to transmit
messages. Each party then instantiates a strong consistent broadcast instance in which the
party with rank 0, namely P0, is the designated sender. Party P0 sc-broadcasts a payload of
size 512 bytes. On sc-delivering the payload, that sc-broadcast instance is garbage-collected,
and the parties instantiate the next broadcast instance in which P1 is the designated sender.
On sc-delivering the payload from P1, the parties then garbage-collect the corresponding
sc-broadcast instance, instantiate the next broadcast instance in which P2 is the designated
sender, and so on. Party P0 sc-broadcasts its next payload when it sc-delivers the payload
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for the broadcast instance in which Pn−1 is the designated sender. The results reported
here were obtained from 50 independent runs for the LAN testbed and 25 independent runs
for Planetlab; each run collected data for varying group sizes, and involved, for each group
size, the sc-delivery of 225 payloads. We discarded the measures from the first 25 broadcast
instances, thereby allowing the group to reach a more stable condition after its formation.
Figures 7.6(a) and (b) compare the average sc-delivery latency for a payload for strong
consistent broadcast and short strong consistent broadcast. The figures show that the sc-
delivery latency in Planetlab is an order of magnitude higher than that in the LAN testbed.
That is expected, since the message transmission delays on Planetlab are significantly higher
than those in the LAN testbed. The figures also show the average sc-delivery latency for a
payload as the group size increases. We can see from the figure that the latency increases
with increase in the group size. There are two reasons. First, the message traffic increases
with an increase in the group size. Second, the increase in group size (n) in our experiments
is accompanied by a corresponding increase in fault resilience (t); hence, the number of
signed echoes that need to be verified (n − t) for each sc-delivery also increases. We can
also note from the figure that short strong consistent broadcast has lower sc-delivery latency
than strong consistent broadcast. That is because short strong consistent broadcast involves
only 2 communication steps, whereas strong consistent broadcast involves 3.
Throughput of Protocol PABC
The throughput of Protocol PABC in the parsimonious mode depends on the availability of
non-dummy payloads to be sc-broadcast by the leader. We devised an experiment in which
the leader’s initiation queue was filled with a large number of payloads, where each payload
was 400 bytes. The leader sc-broadcasts a payload and waits for its sc-delivery before
sc-broadcasting the next payload (i.e., only one active sc-broadcast instance at a time).
Figures 7.7(a) and (b) show the throughput of Protocol PABC (after it reached stable levels)





























Figure 7.7: Fault-free Throughput of Protocol PABC
in group size is due to the increased sc-delivery latency (shown above in Figures 7.6(a) and
(b)).
Note that two optimizations that would have enhanced the throughput were not applied
here. One is request batching, in which each a-broadcast carries a batch of (say 100) payloads
instead of a single payload. The other is a sliding window mechanism for processing multiple
sequence numbers in parallel by processing a window of sc-broadcast instances concurrently,
instead of processing just one sc-broadcast instance at a time.
7.2.3 Behavior Under Fault Injections
Figures 7.8(a) and (b) show the worst-case a-delivery latency for an initiated payload minus
the timeout value used for leader complaints, when there are no other initiated payloads. To
obtain the measurements, we devised an experiment in which all parties initiated the same
payload, i.e., sent the payload to the leader so that it could be sc-broadcast. The parties
then started a timeout, expecting the a-delivery of the payload before timeout expiry. The
leader was fault-injected to ignore initiate messages from other parties. As a result, when
the timeouts eventually expired at other parties, they exchanged complaint messages about
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Figure 7.8: A-delivery Latency Under Faulty Leader
initiated the payload, the payload was a-delivered in part 3 of the recovery mode. The
results show the difference in time between when the payload was initiated and when it was
a-delivered.
For each group size, the figure shows two parts to the a-delivery latency. One is the time
it takes for the exchange and processing of a sufficient number (2t+1) of signed complaint
messages to cause a transition from the parsimonious to the recovery mode. The other is the
time taken for the recovery mode to complete. As expected, the recovery mode is expensive,
since it involves two MVBA instances. The figure also shows a marked increase in the time
taken by the recovery mode as the group size (and thereby the fault resilience) increases.
7.3 Experimental Evaluation of a Replicated Service
In this section, we evaluate a service that is replicated for fault tolerance using the RMan
suite of protocols. First, we present results for the agreement phase and the execution
phase working in concert to process client requests. Second, we present results for group
reconfiguration when the number of replicas is dynamically changed.
We deployed the replicated service in both the LAN testbed and Planetlab. The experi-
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mental setup is similar to that described in Section 7.2.1. For the experiments involving the
static version of the replicated service, an additional node was used to host the client. For
the group reconfiguration experiments, an additional node was used to host a non-member
replica that was seeking admission into the replication group. In the LAN testbed, the ad-
ditional node had the same hardware configuration as the replica nodes. In the Planetlab
experiments, the additional node was located at the University of Kentucky, USA.
All replicas participated in the agreement phase, but among those only n−t (the ones with
ranks from 0 to n− t− 1) participated in the execution phase. At each replica participating
in the execution phase, the Fractal Generator application was loaded as a separate process
using the ACE Service Configurator framework.
The results reported in this section are for fault-free runs in which both Protocol APE
and Protocol PABC functioned in their respective parsimonious modes. The t + 1 lowest-
ranked replicas constituted the primary committee for Protocol APE. The replica with the
rank 0 served as the leader for Protocol PABC.
7.3.1 Client Request Processing
Figures 7.9(a) and (b) show the latency for a “lone” client request that brings out the
behavior of Protocol PABC when no further payloads are available after the sc-delivery of
an application payload. Under such circumstances, in order to cause the a-delivery of the
sc-delivered payload, the leader must sc-broadcast two dummy payloads, each after a timeout.
The total request latency is the time between when the client sends its request to the replicas
and when it extracts the result from a valid reply certificate. The figures show the total
request latency minus twice the timeout value (one for each dummy payload) for varying
group sizes.
There are three parts to the latency shown in the figures. The first part (indicated by
“Atomic Delivery”) is the atomic delivery latency, which is essentially the time for three sc-
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Figure 7.9: Latency for a Lone Client Request
of which are for the dummy payloads. The second part of the latency (indicated by “Obtain
Result”) shown in the figures is the actual request execution latency, i.e., the time between
when Protocol APE at a committee member issues a request to the Fractal Generator service
to execute the client request and when a result value is returned. The third part of the latency
(indicated by “Reply Certificate Assembly”) is the time to gather a reply certificate from
the signed reply messages sent by the committee members and forward the certificate to
the client.
Request processing by the Fractal Generator is quite resource-intensive and takes on the
order of a few hundred milliseconds. Hence, request processing dominates the latency shown
in the figure.
Figures 7.10(a) and (b) show the throughput for the replicated service (after it reached
stable levels) measured in number of requests per minute. We devised an experiment in
which there were always enough client requests to be initiated that it obviated the need for
sc-broadcasting of dummy payloads. The decrease in throughput with increase in group size
is expected given that (1) the throughput of Protocol PABC decreases with increasing group
size (shown above in Figures 7.7(a) and (b)) and (2) the time to assemble a reply certificate




























Figure 7.10: Throughput of the Replicated Service
7.3.2 Group Reconfiguration
We devised an experiment in which after the formation of the initial group of specified size
(4, 7, or 10), a non-member party sends a request for admission into the group. At each
group member, after verification that the request is from one of the non-member parties in
the universal set, the group reconfiguration procedure is initiated.
Figures 7.11(a) and (b) show the time it takes to effect a dynamic change to the group
membership. The figures show a marked increase in the group reconfiguration latency with
increase in group size. Group reconfiguration consists of two parts: group membership agree-
ment (in which parties agree on the next group membership) and view installation (in which
the protocols at a party make a systematic transition to the next view). Group member-
ship agreement involves one MVBA, whereas view installation includes the stabilization of
Protocol PABC (which itself may involve up to two MVBA instances in the recovery mode),
stabilization of Protocol APE, conveyance of the new membership to the newly admitted
replica, establishment of secure authenticated channels with the newly admitted replica,
and transfer of service state to the new replica. The normal operation of the replicated
service is blocked for the duration of the view installation. As one would expect, because
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Figure 7.11: Group Reconfiguration Latency
agreement, the former dominates the group reconfiguration latency.
In the above experiment, there was no state transfer involved, as our application imple-
mentation was stateless. However, in a real-world setting, there will be additional latency
due to state transfer; the exact value of that latency will depend on the size of the application




The design and implementation of trustworthy distributed systems is a research area that
deserves increasing attention because of society’s increased dependence on such systems.
We considered the subject of enhancement of a system’s trustworthiness through Byzantine-
fault-tolerant state machine replication. Fault tolerance is an important means of providing
trustworthiness, which is judged by a system’s ability to meet stated goals despite accidents,
design and implementation errors, operator errors, and malicious attacks. Because of the
Byzantine fault model’s generality and the fact that it makes no assumptions about the
behavior of a faulty node, we chose to model intrusions and accidents with Byzantine faults.
In this thesis, we presented parsimonious protocols for both the agreement and execution
phases of BFT replication. The atomic broadcast protocol for the agreement phase can
be made to be parsimonious either in the number of protocol messages that need to be
communicated or in the number of communication steps involved per atomically delivered
payload. The execution protocol is parsimonious in the overall amount of resources used for
request execution.
To provide parsimony, we have taken an optimistic approach based on the practical ob-
servation that conditions are normal during most of a system’s operation. Under conditions
that are perceived to be normal, the protocols operate in a parsimonious mode that max-
imizes efficiency (measured in terms of overall resource use for the execution protocol and
either communication overhead or latency for the atomic broadcast protocol). Under condi-
tions that are indicative of failures or instability, they temporarily switch to a more expensive
recovery mode that ensures that some progress is eventually made, after which the protocols
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switch back to the parsimonious mode. Indications of normality are obtained based on tim-
ing assumptions. While inaccuracy of these timing assumptions may affect the protocols’
ability to provide parsimony, the protocols are designed such that those assumptions never
affect the protocols’ ability to provide safety and liveness.
We presented a suite of group management protocols that allow the fault resilience of the
replication group to be dynamically changed. The suite includes reconfigurable versions of
the atomic broadcast and execution protocols. While group reconfiguration capability has
been previously provided in the context of group communication systems, the replication and
even group management protocols in those systems required the removal of nodes perceived
to be faulty to make progress. Such a requirement is a serious denial-of-service vulnerability
that, if exploited, could result in the disintegration of the group. To avoid this pitfall, we
have designed our atomic broadcast and execution protocols so that they never require the
removal of faulty replicas to make progress. Such a design affords the luxury of using group
reconfigurability very selectively and conservatively.
We have developed a software toolkit called CoBFIT that combines the implementa-
tion of the parsimonious execution, parsimonious atomic broadcast, and group management
protocols within a reusable software framework and that can be used to build trustwor-
thy Internet-scale services. We described the experimental evaluation of the protocols im-
plemented in the CoBFIT toolkit. The results showed the trade-off between significantly
superior efficiency characteristics obtained during perceived normal conditions and higher
latencies during perceived failure or instability conditions. It is reasonable to expect that
a system’s operation will alternate between long periods of normality and short periods of
instability. That motivated our decision to optimize the system for the common case, even
if it means paying a slightly higher cost during periods of instability.
Although the work in this thesis takes an important step forward in enhancing the ap-
plicability of BFT replication for building trustworthy distributed systems, there are specific
and challenging ways to extend that work.
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An extension that could be made to our parsimonious protocols would be to substitute
places where a quorum of digital signatures is required with threshold signature shares.
Such an extension would be useful from the client’s point of view, since instead of having
to remember the public key of each replica, it would have to know only one public key, that
of the replicated service. Though this extension is fairly easy for the static versions of our
protocols, it requires more work for the dynamic versions. That is because the private key of
the replicated service needs to be reshared among the new members of the replication group
whenever there is a group membership change; for this purpose, an asynchronous threshold
key resharing protocol is required. With such a resharing protocol, one could easily generalize
our group reconfiguration suite of protocols to include both group membership changes and
proactive recovery.
The RMan suite of protocols provide the capability for dynamically changing the replica-
tion group membership. Policies that guide the decisions regarding when to use that capa-
bility are determined by a trusted entity (such as the system administrator) at initialization
and do not change thereafter. However, in an security environment that is dynamically
changing due to new kinds of attacks, it is desirable to have policies that can be dynamically
changed with little manual intervention.
The efficacy of our parsimonious protocols depends on the accuracy of what is perceived
to be the system’s stable behavior. A challenging course for future work is to adapt this
perception based on changes to the system, such as upgrade of a node’s hardware capabilities,
discovery of faster routes between nodes, and so forth.
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